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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the relationship between digital media and cognition
as it emerges in the problematic of attention. Specifically, the project examines the
workings of attention across three sites (social, neurological, and technological) in order
to argue for a renewed cognitive process theory of writing based in attention studies.
Using the ancient pedagogical concept of epimeleias—attending to, taking care—my
dissertation asks after the ethical and rhetorical stakes of care in context of contemporary
higher education. Ultimately, my dissertation aims to provide a foundation for digital
literacy practices—literacy narratives, wiki-writing, remix, audio-visual essays, etc.—in
light of the increasing shift towards hybrid and fully digital writing courses and massive
open online courses (MOOCs).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In “Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes”
(2007), N. Katherine Hayles argues that the greatest challenge to contemporary education
is a generational shift in cognitive styles. For Hayles, students most tangibly demonstrate
this shift in their increasing inability to sustain attention on single streams of information.
While Hayles observed this shift in her own students, she notes that its “full effects are
likely to be realized only when youngsters who are now twelve years old reach our
institutions of higher education” (187). The “youngsters” Hayles identifies are now, of
course, the students enrolled in first-year composition courses and her claims are
supported by much of what is heard from writing instructors regarding student attention.
While the increasing emphasis on multimodal composition within rhetoric and
composition is a necessary first step to meet Hayles’s challenge, I would argue there is
still much work to be done by composition scholars regarding the relationship between
digital media and attention. Further, while much of the current research surrounding
multimodal composition and digital rhetoric emphasizes the production of digital texts,
questions regarding the reception of digital texts are often left underdeveloped. In the
pages that follow, I argue two things: first, that understanding the question of reception as
inseparable from the question of attention enables a productive dynamic between
reception-attention in the context of student reading and writing courses; and, second,
1

that an ethical response by college writing instructors to Hayles’s claim entails a more
detailed investigation into varied cognitive styles and attentional forms familiar to
contemporary students.
More significantly perhaps, I argue that this kind of response to Hayles’s work
requires a re-engagement between composition studies and cognitive science in order to
fully account for the effects of emerging technologies on cognition and attention.
Necessarily, given the above, the development of a contemporary cognitive process
theory of writing would need to be wholly interdisciplinary. Hard distinctions between
technology and science studies, cognitive science, and composition would need to
become permeable enough to allow for a productive exchange of insight.
Much as Hayles’s article draws from neuroscience, education theory, English
studies, and medicine, this project draws heavily from a number of disciplines in order to
demonstrate how composition scholars might attend to attention differently. Beginning
with the sociology of science and the work of Bruno Latour, this project aims to provide
a useful frame to demonstrate how a contemporary cognitive rhetoric could resist the
positivist orientations of previous iterations in the field. Building on the work of scholars
rethinking rhetoric as a relational ecology rather than discrete event, ecological cognitive
models would work to take into account the suasiveness of the medial objects,
technologies, and environs through which students compose. Similarly, the reiteration of
cognitive rhetoric I argue for aligns itself with many of those same scholars defining
rhetorical theory broadly enough to include non-human objects historically deemphasized
by the field. As Thomas Rickert notes:
Rhetoric impacts the senses, circulates in waves of affect, and communes
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to join and disjoin people. It gathers and is gathered by things not as denial
of the social but as an essential complement to it. Rhetoric may give
priority to the expressly salient, but the salient must take part in and
emerge from the ambient. We can think this in terms of Richard Lanham’s
notion of rhetoric as an economics of attention, provided we expand the
concept of attention beyond that which is limited to the subjective,
intentional, or merely cognitive; attention would thereby come to include
the materiality of our ambient environs, our affective comportments, the
impact of that which escapes conscious notice, and the stumbling block
presented by the finitude of knowledge when facing the plentitude of the
world and its objects. (Ambient Rhetoric x-xi)
From Rickert’s observation we can begin to see how a contemporary cognitive process
theory may give priority to particular expressions of attention, but only through an
understanding that such expressions emerge from conditions exterior to individual
cognition. Similarly, from Rickert’s use of the ambient, we can see the extent to which
attention itself can be redefined as an ambient relation in order to distribute the
responsibility for attention’s composition. Attention as a distributed and emergent
phenomenon could be a productive pedagogical frame from which instructors could view
the ubiquitous presence of media and technology—not as competition for student
attention, but as integral to its very composition.
Toward this end, the questions guiding this dissertation project could be stated as
follows: How might we—as writing instructors, as English professionals—begin to think
of attention as composed and distributed across multiple sites? What might such an
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orientation enable pedagogically? How might our rhetorical traditions and disciplinary
histories inform the possibilities of inventing pedagogical and ethical practices that
respond to distributed attention? And, finally, what digital models currently exist that
composition scholars could make productively use? As a response to those inquires, the
remainder of this chapter will outline the exigence of the project and suggest how a
reorientation of composition’s disciplinary object towards attention might be used to
revitalize conversations of cognitive rhetoric.
As discussed above, Hayles observes a noticeable cognitive divide existing
between previous generations—those educated largely through the forms of media
fostering what she identifies as “deep attention”—and those current generations born
after the widespread use and availability of the Internet. Written for an audience of
language and literature professionals, Hayles’s work implies that this divide presents a
problem for those teaching the critical reading and writing courses that demand
prolonged engagement with difficult texts—just the kinds of recursive reading practices,
Hayles argues, hyper-attentive students find difficult. I argue that Hayles’s work, both in
this earlier article and the more recently published How We Think: Digital Media and
Contemporary Technogenesis (2012), provides scholars of composition and rhetoric an
opening from which we can begin to research student attention as emerging from a
relation among medial technologies, the material brain, institutional culture, language,
and cognition.1 Following Latour’s discussion of hybrids in We Have Never Been
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
In many ways, Hayles’s recent work builds from discussions that Marshall McLuhan,
Walter Ong, and Gilbert Simondon began decades ago. In particular, I am thinking of
Ong’s notion that “[t]echnologies are not mere exterior aids but also interior
transformations of consciousness” (“Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought”
2).
!
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Modern (1993)—as constructions that demonstrate the messy complexity between nature
and culture—attention can be viewed as a hybrid object that would best be served
through equally hybrid means.
With regards to role of English professionals in higher education, Hayles makes a
persuasive case that it is our job to bridge the gap between hyper and deep cognitive
modes. We are perhaps in the best position to identify what value deep attention holds—
culturally, institutionally, and pedagogically—in contemporary contexts. Taking Hayles’s
challenge seriously, this project asks how composition might scholars begin to research
and trace attention’s composition in productive hybrid ways. Beginning with this
question, this project works to couple composition’s history of engagement with
cognitive science—most identifiably in the work of Linda Flower and John Hayes—with
recent conversations surrounding the articulation of a neurorhetorics (Pruchnic 2008;
Jack 2010; Mays and Jung 2012). Such a coupling can gesture towards the ethical
implications of a cognitive process theory of digital writing. In this last regard, the value
of contemporary continental thinkers working to integrate scientific insight into their
work has been invaluable. Specifically, I draw from the work of Bruno Latour (Chapter
2), Catherine Malabou (Chapter 3), and Bernard Stiegler (Chapter 4).
Discussing the work of Malabou and Stiegler, Alexander Galloway2 recently
observed that both have related projects insofar as they use the cognitive and neurosciences to reinvigorate conceptions of subjectivity and critique. As such, I argue, both
Malabou and Stiegler are working to define a particular neurorhetoric of affirmative
inventionalism similar to the way in which John Caputo characterizes Derridean
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
See Galloway’s collected lecture and seminar notes published as French Theory
Today: An Introduction to Possible Futures in 2010.
!
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deconstruction as an “inventionalism” running counter to the forces of “essentialism”
(42). Further, in Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Politics of Pedagogy (2009), Gert
Biesta describes Derridean inventionalism as a necessary element in ethical pedagogies
as it works to sustain an openness to future alterity:
Derrida's “inventionalism” is important for education—and more
importantly for education after the “death of the subject”—because it
approaches the question of human subjectivity in a radically open manner,
as something that intervenes, that comes from the “outside,” that comes in
and breaks through our expectations and conceptions. (104)
For Malabou, inventionalism in this sense is reflected in the material properties of the
brain through neuroplasticity. Similarly, for Stiegler, the brain’s plastic properties enable
the brain to act as an interface between our individual psycho-phenomenological
experience and the collective historical trajectories of culture through transindividuation.3
That is, for Stiegler, neuroplasticity enables the individual psychic and biological I to be
always predicated upon a technological, social, and material We. As Stiegler notes in his
philosophical autobiography, Acting Out (2009), “The I and the we are two phases of the
one process, in the first place because they share the preindividual funds, which
constitute a transindividual horizon” (5). Similarly, Catherine Malabou’s notion of
plasticity is largely informed by scientific research into neuroplasticity that seems to
provide a materially embodied witness to the idea that “subjectivity can only constitute
itself by returning to itself, never by announcing itself in the naïve movement of a birth
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
Stiegler’s use of transindividuation is taken directly from the work of Gilbert
Simondon, and is meant to emphasize the collective processes of individuation. While
publication in English is currently scant, a 2007 special issue of the journal Parrhesia
dedicated to Simondon’s work is a useful introduction to his thought.
!
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without history” (Plasticity 9). To further define the importance of plasticity to
Malabou’s work, Noëlle Vahanian observed:
Malabou’s philosophy, unlike that of much of typical philosophy of mind
and neuroscience, is not about promoting a capitalistic ideological
paradigm by seeking ways to enhance the docile and disciplined neuronal
subject; instead, it is about inciting us to take charge of our own brain, of
our own subjectivity, and thereby, of our society. We can do this, not by
denying that there is continuity between our brain and our thoughts,
between the neuronal and the mental, between the natural and the cultural,
but by recognizing that this continuity is not without contradiction, by
recognizing that the passage from the neuronal to the mental is the site of
contestation whereby freedom is established precisely because the brain is
naturally plastic. (“A Conversation” 2)
We can see that both Stiegler and Malabou are invested in articulating a neuronal
subjectivity premised upon plasticity and—at least for the former—the relationship
between neuroplasticity and attention.
Coupling Malabou and Stiegler’s work with recent scholarship defining
neurorhetorics, I argue that a neurorhetorical orientation to the problem of attention
would ask how research in cognitive neuroscience can inform classroom practice without
falling into the instrumentalist and essentialist tendencies that seemed to characterize
much of the discipline’s prior engagement with cognitive science. In so doing, my project
aims to follow Mays and Jung’s anti-essentialist approach to neurorhetorics as a
pedagogically useful methodology resisting foreclosure:
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the language of brain science and rhetoric-composition’s importation of it
are united by a principle of epistemological uncertainty: Both fields are
motivated by the desire to understand concepts like agency and learning
that—by their very terministic nature—defy empirical scrutiny. (56)
Uncertainty that, I argue, is mirrored in both Malabou and Stiegler’s conceptualization of
the material brain. Further, by framing pedagogy through a concept of neuroplasticity we
can broaden current ecological models of composition in order to account for variance in
attention and cognitive styles.
In A Counter-History of Composition: Toward Methodologies of Complexity
(2007), Byron Hawk notes that the concept of ecology incorporated into rhetoric and
composition scholarship “moves discussions of writing, rhetoric, and invention beyond
the standard inventional heuristics and social categories towards models that integrate
environments into writing and invention processes” (223). This project argues that
scholars working with ecological models of composition, in their efforts to distance
themselves from the positivist implications of cognitive rhetoric, are often overly
dismissive of the potentials of contemporary cognitive and neuro-sciences to speak to
how we might integrate environments into composition studies. And, just as often, such
scholars are too reliant upon defining cognitive process theories of writing in ways that
were articulated nearly two decades ago. For instance, Sidney Dobrin and Christian
Weisser in “Breaking Ground in Ecocomposition: Exploring Relationships between
Discourse and Environment” (2002):
When cognitivists in composition began examining the processes by
which individual students compose written text, this inquiry was
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undertaken with little regard for the sites in which writing takes place.
That is, cognitive process understanding of writing offers few means of
considering the effect environment has on those very processes. As
composition moved away from cognitive models of writing,
compositionists began to consider the implications external forces might
have for writers, and in turn what effect writers have on those same
external forces: gender, culture, race, class, ideology. (575)
While Dobrin and Weisser are certainly right with regards to historical trajectories of
composition studies, I argue that it is time for scholars to reconsider cognitive process
theory in light of recent research highlighting the affective relationship between cognition
and the technological-material environment. In this way, ecological models of
composition could reconsider the role of cognition in composition and begin to address
both attention and the issue of the “cognitive divide” identified by Hayles. Towards this
end, I will provide a theoretical foundation for identifying texts, new media objects, and
classroom objectives that address Hayles’s call for educators to “allow classroom space
to be reconfigured” and for 21st century pedagogies to work towards “building bridges
between deep and hyper attention” (“Hyper and Deep” 195).
In 2012, Elon University’s School of Communication together with the Pew
Research Center’s Pew Internet & American Life Project released their fifth “Imagining
the Internet” survey. The results of this “Future of the Internet” report gathered survey
data from over a thousand Internet “stakeholders” and were based on questions designed
to predict the cultural impact of digital technologies in the next decade. The first series of
questions asked respondents to address the effects of emerging technologies on education
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and the mental abilities of hyper-connected students. Many of the responses are notable
not because they unanimously agreed that education has to adapt vis-à-vis digital
technology, but because this adaptation was necessary due to the neurophysiological
differences between generations. For example, respondents were asked to agree or
disagree with the following statement:
In 2020 the brains of multitasking teens and young adults are ‘wired’
differently than those over the age of 35 and overall it yields helpful
results. They do not suffer notable cognitive shortcomings as they
multitask and cycle quickly through personal- and work-related tasks.
(“Imagining” 2)
While respondents were fairly split (55% agreed, 42% disagreed, 3% did not respond) as
to whether or not this different “wiring” will have beneficial or harmful results—and in
what ways—few respondents took issue with the very premise of the statement itself: the
idea that the future multitasking teen would be wired differently than his or her parents.
In fact, most agreed that the fragmented attention and lack of patience already
recognizable in current students will only be intensified in the coming decade. Over the
course of the survey a narrative emerged that equated increased use and time spent in
front of digital screens with an increasingly unwaverable disposition towards distraction.
This belief led one respondent, futurist author of Welcome to the Future Cloud: The
World in 2025 in 100 Predictions (2012), Marcel Bullinga, to observe that “Game
Generation” teens will have issues with attention as they “find distraction while working,
distraction while driving, distraction while talking to the neighbours” and, further, that
the parents and teachers of these teens “will have to invest major time and efforts into
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solving this issue: silence zones, time-out zones, meditation classes without mobile,
lessons in ignoring people” (“Imagining” 20). While education has historically been
largely a matter of managing distraction in much the same way Bullinga mentions, what
makes many of the sentiments expressed in the “Future of the Internet” report different
are the ways in which the properties of the material brain are coupled with emerging
technologies in order to rhetorically mobilize and ground arguments regarding these now
familiar dynamics of attention and distraction.
Readers of Hayles’s work will no doubt find something familiar in the “Future of
the Internet” responses. The narrative of the differently wired teen is similar to Hayles’s
argument that “Children growing up in media-rich environments literally have brains
wired differently from those of people who did not come to maturity under that
condition” (192). For Hayles, such neuronal changes are rooted in a more general cultural
shift towards media that both require and encourage hyper attention. Hayles characterizes
these “hyper” media as having an “increased tempo of visual stimuli and an increased
complexity of interwoven plots … [coupled with] a decrease in time required for an
audience to respond to an image” (191). Conversely, the media of deep attention, best
characterized by Hayles as the Victorian novel, presents the consumer with a noninteractive object composed in a single medium and requiring a minimum of distraction.
For those of us in composition and rhetoric, a discipline historically invested in fostering
modes of deep attention and critical reading skills, Hayles’s argument has immediate and
obvious implications for our classroom practice. Less obvious, however, is the ways in
which this work gives us an opportunity to reorient the discipline in relation to attention
itself—as a composition. Less obvious too, is how composition studies could use such a
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reorientation to begin discussions with what many scholars have identified as a
“neurological turn” in the humanities.4
Cathy N. Davidson’s Now You See It: How Technology and Brain Science Will
Transform Schools and Business for the 21st Century (2011) provides a positive and
popular iteration of what is at stake in the “neurological turn” for the humanities.
Davidson’s book opens with a retelling of her participation in the now famous “gorilla
experiment.” This 1999 experiment, conducted by two experimental psychologists and
cognitive scientists, Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris, aims to demonstrate the
power of selective attention by having audiences watch a short video of six students
tossing a basketball. The audience is simply told to count the number of times the
students in white shirts toss the ball. As the students begin tossing the ball and weaving
randomly around one another, it quickly becomes obvious to the viewer how much
attention is required to focus and count the number of tosses. About twenty-five seconds
into the video another student dressed in a rather unconvincing gorilla suit enters from the
right of the frame, stops in the middle, thumps his chest, and exits to the left. As the
experiment’s results surprisingly demonstrate, 50-60% of audience participants
consistently miss the gorilla simply because they were so intensely focused on counting
the correct number of tosses. Conversely, the participants that see the gorilla fail to count
the correct number of tosses. For Davidson, this experiment is a clear indication of an
individual’s cognitive limitations. It is also a call to pool our cognitive resources in order
to both count the tosses and see the gorilla.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
The recently published A Field Guide to a Meta-Field: Bridging the HumanitiesNeuroscience Divide (2011) presents a thorough introduction to many of the issues
involved in this turn.
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Davidson’s book questions popular assumptions regarding attention and
multitasking. Reflecting on the distinctions between monotasking and multitasking,
Davidson makes a case for a productive blurring of the two when interacting with digital
technologies. Rather than discrete units of information and attention, digital environments
encourage an associative and affective logic where activities, ideas, and texts bleed over
into one another. In Now You See It, Davidson notes,
If what we are seeing isn’t discrete switching from one task to another but
a form of attention that merges and remixes different strands of
information almost seamlessly, then one ally we have in this new form of
attention is the brain’s own associational, interconnecting energies. (143)
Similarly, in Lingua Fracta: Toward a Rhetoric of New Media (2009), Collin Gifford
Brooke discusses how this medial and textual blurring is experienced in online
environments. Using the phrase “persistence of cognition”—a take on the use of
“persistence of vision” in cinematic studies—Brooke notes that keywords, concepts, and
images leave a cognitive imprint forms over time that into patterns with an associational
logic—much like an image itself may leave traces as it imprints itself on the retina in the
persistence of vision phenomenon. Defined as the recognition of “the construction (and
dissolution) of patterns over time” (151) and “the practice of retaining particular ideas,
keywords, or concepts across multiple texts” (157), Brooke’s persistence of cognition
points towards the ways in which we may begin to articulate styles of attention that are
simultaneously deep and hyper. Such intensifications of associational logics and their
effect on attention are, I argue, inseparable from rhetoric. Further, for rhetoricians
informed by Richard Lanham, inquiries into the workings of human attention, such as the
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“gorilla experiment” and Brooke’s articulation of a “persistence of cognition,”
simultaneously inform us to the workings of rhetoric.
Like Hayles, Stiegler recently turned towards the subject of attention as both a
pedagogical and neurocognitive problem. In Taking Care of the Youth and Generations
(2010), Stiegler argues that some forms of digital technologies capture attention and
effectively “short circuit” the individuating properties of the brain precluding students
from making intergenerational connections necessary for education. For Stiegler, the
“capture” of new media results in an “organized mass regression” in which culture itself
is at stake (12). Stiegler’s answer, however, is not to languish in nostalgia or mount
arguments for a return to pre-digital media, but to work to develop and produce
sustaining systems of care in the digital milieu. By care, Stiegler means to attend to and
look after, the pharmacological5 work of tracing relationships between technologies, their
neurophysiological effects, and their socio-cultural consequence. In other words, to
develop what could be referred to as a posthuman ethics of technology. Unlike Hayles’s
hyper/deep distinction of cognitive modes, Stiegler’s capture/care distinction can provide
a more explicit articulation of the ethical dimensions at play in problems of attention.
Dimensions that oblige writing instructors to define what responsibility means in relation
to emerging technologies and new media. How do we, as teachers, look after the
reception and interaction of digital texts in order to attend to their cognitive effects?
After developing the distinctions between Hayles’s hyper/deep and Stiegler’s
choice between capture and care, I will turn explicitly towards the kinds of new media
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
Following Derrida’s work on Plato’s Phaedrus, Stiegler defines all technologies as
essentially “pharmacological” in that they present us with a pharmakon—a poison and a
cure. This will be discussed at length in the fourth chapter.
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objects6 that, in Stiegler’s terms, elicit care. Such objects, I argue, act as an interface
between individual psychic, social, and technological bodies. Whereas Hayles argues that
educators need to begin thinking about the cognitive styles of our students, and Lanham
observes a return to rhetorical education through oscillatio,7 this project aims to
demonstrate that such discrete categories (at/through, hyper/deep, even capture/care) are
not as conceptually discrete as commonly thought, but are, in fact, better understood
ecologically as existing in a plastic state. As Hayles mentions elsewhere in her essay, “In
contemporary developed societies, this plasticity implies that the brain’s synaptic
connections are coevolving with an environment in which media consumption is a
dominant factor” (“Hyper and Deep” 161). Plasticity makes evident that human brains
are in a constant state of becoming with their environments. Similarly, in their recently
published Life after New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process (2012), Sarah Kember and
Joanna Zylinska rethink radical neuroplasticity along Deleuzian lines as enmeshed in
digital environments—as a becoming ontology. When interacting with “friends” on
Facebook, for example, Kember and Zylinska question whether the experience would be
better understood as a “becoming Facebook” (161). The recent turn to neuroscience,
particularly this notion of plasticity, presents scholars in composition and rhetoric with an
opportunity to question how digital practices in all areas of student life are affecting the
pedagogical practices available to us as teachers. As long as students and teachers are
spending time with one another in a physical classroom, I would argue, that time is better
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
I use the term “new media objects” here in the broad sense employed by Lev
Manovich as any digital object or artifact from “a still digital image, a digitally
composited film, a virtual 3D environment, a computer game, a self-contained
hypermedia DVD, a hypermedia Web site, or the Web as a whole” (Language 39).
7
Lanham’s at and through oscillation will be discussed at length in the following
chapters.
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spent increasing the rhetorical capacities of attention rather than attempting to micromanage distraction. And, a reorientation of the field towards attention would facilitate
such processes.
The second chapter, “Cognitive Rhetoric, Second Empiricism, and Writing as a
Matter of Concern,” begins this process by tracing the scholarly history of cognitive
process theory in composition studies. The chapter works not only as a review of the
literature, but also to demonstrate the ways in which contemporary cognitive process
theory would be best framed as a Latourian matter of concern. As such, new cognitive
theories would not rely on the positivist models of scientific realism, as previous scholars
working in cognitive rhetoric arguably had, but work to produce cognitive studies as
hybrid objects combining a variety of modes, values, and epistemologies. Approached in
this way, new cognitive theories would resist the essentializing effects previous theories
had towards the composing practices of students. Rather, new models would be aligned
with Latour’s notion of a second empiricism premised on empirical models that are
affirmative, generative, and playful. This chapter ends by gesturing towards rhetorical
theories that have already initiated the work of a new cognitive rhetoric through the
incorporation of neuroscience.
Chapter three, “Plasticity and the Neurorhetorics of Attention,” begins by
identifying three distinct articulations of neurorhetorics in recent literature in order to
emphasize the material neurorhetorics defined by Jeffrey Pruchnic in “Neurorhetorics:
Cybernetics, Psychotropic, and the Materiality of Persuasion” (2008). Pruchnic’s
articulation of neurorhetorics questions whether the
intersection of neurology and culture is perhaps reaching unprecedented
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degrees of intensity in the present moment as our affective capacities and
neurological responses increasingly appear to be the common ground of
contemporary experiences with not only psychotropic substances, but also
our growing immersion in virtual realities and online realms, as well as the
general productions and flows of hypercapitalism. (195)
From the above, we can begin to see how neurorhetorics may be a productive frame for
how rhetoric and composition might work to integrate the neurological, the social, and
the technological into the issue of attention. Further, this chapter moves from a discussion
of neurorhetorics to Catherine Malabou’s notion of neuroplasticity, which reinvigorates
questions of subjectivity and agency in inventive ways for rhetoric and composition.
Ways that allow us to look back through the rhetorical tradition, to Isocratean rhetorical
paideia, in light of plasticity, specifically, through the role of epimeleias—as focused
attention, training, and taking care—in Isocrates’ idea of rhetorical education. After
tracing a number of studies in conventional neuroscience highlighting the role of
environment and repetition, chapter four asks how the rhetorical arts may be interpreted
as plastic arts. Just as the plastic arts—sculpture, ceramics, etc.—involve the
manipulation of plastic material, contemporary scientific research suggests that the
neuronal properties of the material brain are equally dynamic and malleable.
The fourth chapter, “Psychopower and the Pharmakon of Composition,” takes an
explicit turn towards the ethical in order to ask, after Bernard Stiegler, how the challenge
of attention identified by Hayles and others may present an ethical problem—and, if so,
what responsibility writing instructors have to engage it. Beginning with Stiegler’s
concept of psychopower, which can be thought of as the effect of Foucauldian biopower
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on the cognitive domain, chapter four works to challenge Richard Lanham’s conception
of the attention economy as emerging through a “bottom up” dynamic. Stiegler’s use of
capture troubles the efficacy of bottom-up organization arguing instead for an increased
focus on the role of hypercapitalism in an “attention economy.” Finally, this chapter
works to couple Lanham’s bi-stable oscillation with the pharmacological oscillatory
dynamic between capture and care. Identifying three persistent elements of care—the
interfacial, the contributory, and the ontological—chapter four ends by gesturing towards
the ways systems of care may be created and maintained within composition courses.
Finally, the fifth chapter, “Careful Pedagogies,” analyzes three digital objects as
potential systems of care: Stephen Duncombe’s Open Utopia project, a wiki-based
writing course taught at the University of South Carolina in the spring of 2009, and
machine-scoring software currently being developed by a for-profit company, LightSIDE
Labs. The first consists of a digital edition of Thomas More’s Utopia that aims to not
only present an authorative text, but also a social platform to discuss More’s work, and,
finally, a wiki-based writing environment that encourages users to remix More’s text in
order to construct their own utopian ideals. The second, a wiki-based writing course
piloted at the University of South Carolina, asked students to work through networked
writing spaces in order to enact and question the deliberative potentials of digital
technologies. For their final projects, students spanning multiple sections collaborated to
research and compose wiki-based multimodal essays responding to salient issues found in
their readings of John Dewey, Michel Foucault, Cornel West, and others. Finally, the
third example looks at the public debate surrounding writing assessment following the
National Council of Teachers of English’s “Position Statement on Machine Scoring”
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(2013). After identifying a number of the field’s guiding assumptions regarding
automated assessment, I ask if there might be a place for automated systems of care
within what Wardle and Roozen (2012) have identified as “ecological models of writing
assessment.” Premised on complexity, such models are nuanced enough to recognize the
multiple sites and varied ways in which writing occurs and is evaluated. Chapter five
argues that this ecological model is key to articulating a productive middle ground
between the locally-grown writing assessment of Bob Broad’s “Dynamic Criteria
Mapping” and software emphasizing speed and efficiency asked for in the Hewlett
Foundation’s original call for A.S.A.P., the Automated Student Assessment Prize. In
place of a choice between either situated or standard models of assessment, this chapter
ends by observing potentials for careful invention within situations of automated scoring.
!
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CHAPTER 2
COGNITIVE RHETORIC AND WRITING AS A MATTER OF CONCERN
The question was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting
empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism.
– Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?
From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern”
Largely due to emerging technologies, discussions surrounding the subject of
attention have recently intensified. By presenting a “crisis of attention”—implicitly
obliging its readers to choose between the affordances of alphabetic print or digital
media—many of these discussions are mapping the stakes of changing literacy practices
and their uncertain effects on education. In addition, they are reframing the boundaries
between individual agency and the ambient world by situating themselves in the nexus
between contemporary neuroscience emphasizing both the role of environment in brain
development and anecdotal evidence suggesting digital media affects neurophysiology
(Hayles 2012; Stiegler 2010). Bestselling books like Nicholas Carr’s The Shallows: What
the Internet is Doing to our Brains, and Cathy Davidson’s Now You See It: How
Technology and Brain Science Will Transform Schools and Business for the 21st
Century, as well as the much-shared series of articles appearing in the New York Times,
“Your Brain on Computers,” exemplify how these discussions have captured the popular
imagination and just how broad the spectrum of opinion can be.
Despite the amount of work produced on the subject of attention and its centrality
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to the writing process, composition studies remains reluctant to attend to these
conversations. With few exceptions, compositionists have left a broad array of
interdisciplinary work on attention out of their scholarly conversations altogether. The
current lack of interest in attention studies by composition scholars, I argue, is the result
of two persistent tendencies in the field: first, a continued backlash against the cognitive
theories of composition that were so dominant in our disciplinary past; and, second, the
conservative pace at which composition studies1 moves to recognize emerging
technologies—technologies that continue to change our compositional and rhetorical
practices.
Beginning with the dual premise that attention is the site best suited to theorize
the relationship between cognition and technology and that putting such theories into
practice is the future of composition studies, this chapter attempts to rectify the above
tendencies in the field precluding attention from scholarly work. Through an historical
survey of composition’s interrupted engagement with cognitive science, I hope to
reassess this institutional legacy and make an argument for tactical empiricism following
Bruno Latour’s idea of a second empiricism that is the “next task for the critically
minded” (“Why Has Critique” 232).
Due to its positivist connotations, scholars working in composition theory are
hesitant to engage empirical research in writing. By many, this research is often viewed
negatively, as a product of the field’s ideologically uninvested past, and enabled only by
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Due to its historical relation to Richard Braddock’s 1963 report for the NCTE, I have
chosen composition studies as the site of this engagement, rather than computers and
writing, composition-rhetoric, literacy studies, or any other configuration of the related
fields that make up rhetoric and composition.
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neglecting the socially and politically situated aspects of knowledge production. Often,
the early dominance of cognitive rhetoric in the history of composition studies is invoked
as a cautionary tale against what happens when we let positivist epistemologies
undermine the complexity of the writing process (Berlin 1987; North 1987). On the other
hand, there is currently a growing body of scholarship that argues the emphasis on socialconstruction, ideological critique, and textuality have left research exhausted and, in the
final analysis, unable to say anything at all. As Raúl Sánchez has recently noted, “the
issue today is that composition’s modernist and postmodernist legacies together do not
offer enough equipment with which to theorize, examine, and teach writing in
contemporary contexts” (“Outside the Text” 236). As Sánchez himself suggests in the
same piece, I argue that the work of Bruno Latour is currently the closest thing we have
to provide the kind of necessary theoretical and pedagogical equipment Sánchez calls for.
Running the risk of oversimplification, it could be said that Latour’s project aims
to articulate an affirmative and between the natural and the social—not as a bridge
between two supposedly opposed ends, but as a denial of the totalizing claims of both and
“move sideways,” drifting through the fluid current of relations without affirming either
(What is the Style 14). Such an orientation would aim to engage in meaningful relations
with actors—human, non-human, social, environmental, technological, and conceptual—
in order to enter those flows and resist the demands to make static choices between either
the natural world of scientific realism or the socio-phenomenological world of
experience.
Observing the former, Alfred North Whitehead (1926) noted that scientific
realism consists wholly of the “dull affair” of nature carrying on “soundless, scentless,
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colorless; merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly” (Science and the
Modern World 69). Of the latter, Latour argues, all we have to go on is a phantasmagoria
of the senses contained in the “circumvolution of our brain and the illusions of our mind”
(What is the Style 11). Further, drifting in the flow between these totalizing forces entail
the recognition of complex ecologies of relations that make up both the natural world of
material and the discursively constructed social world. In between, the primary
debunking modes of critique, so esteemed on either side of the bridge, are deemphasized
while the role of composition is emphasized. Composition, here, is just as concerned with
universal values as critique; however, it proceeds because those values are to be
composed rather than preexisting.
Composition, therefore, proceeds through a double movement that is, in a sense,
always ahead of itself: first, composition is predicated upon what is attended to—what
and how attention is paid to various relations; and, second, how well or successful the
rhetorical practices are that emerge to announce those relations. In this way, composition
remains intimately related to Richard Lanham’s definition of rhetoric as a double gesture,
attention-rhetoric. Through Latour, scholars can begin to articulate the relationship
between composition and rhetoric in a much different way than either empirically
informed writing studies or writing process theories founded on social-constructivism and
ideological critique. It will, in a sense, be much like Latour’s own articulation of
compositionism in the “Compositionist Manifesto” (2010):
compositionism takes up the task of searching for universality but without
believing that this universality is already there, waiting to be unveiled and
discovered. It is thus as far from relativism (in the papal sense of the
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word) as it is from universalism (in the modernist meaning of the world—
more on this later). From universalism it takes up the task of building a
common world; from relativism, the certainty that this common world has
to be built from utterly heterogeneous parts that will never make a whole,
but at best a fragile, revisable, and diverse composite material. (474)
Composition studies as a Latourian discourse of compositionism, I argue, provides a
productive inroad through which composition studies could reengage with cognitive
science and begin to articulate empiricism differently. Perhaps most importantly,
however, compositionism has historical precedence in the field from scholars most
responsible for cognitive rhetoric’s dominance throughout much of the 1980’s. As will be
returned to later in this chapter, Linda Flower’s own notion of Observation-Based Theory
Building and its contribution to empirical methodologies holds potential for future
research in composition studies. Indeed much of Flower’s work in the last quarter century
is concerned with many of the same problems and lines of inquiry so central to Latour’s
own work.
Before returning to either Flower’s observation-based approach and Latour’s
potential impact in composition studies, the remainder of this chapter will trace a
disciplinary history of cognitive rhetoric from its scholarly dominance to the sociallyoriented theories of writing that worked to replace them. Ultimately, I hope to
demonstrate how the conversations that surrounded cognitive rhetoric could, if viewed
through a Latourian empirical lens, be productively revitalized for contemporary
research—specifically, research focused on attention a composition relation.
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Composition and First Empiricism
As Gerald Graff observes in Professing Literature (1989), the tensions between
scientific and humanistic ways of knowing in English departments can be traced to the
beginnings of the American university as a research institution. As the German research
model was incorporated into American liberal arts colleges, English departments across
the country adopted philological research agendas. Also a German import, philology
came to replace a generalist approach to the study of languages and literature present in
many American colleges. Paraphrasing Arthur Applebee, Graff notes that during this
time in nineteenth-century English education, the appreciation and value-oriented
curriculum of the generalists gave way to investigation and fact-oriented work of the
philologists (55). The methodology and rigor of philology provided a scholarly agenda
that was on par with the research agendas of other departments in the new university for
language and literature departments. Speaking at the first meeting of the Modern
Language Association, H.C.G. Brandt, professor of German at Hamilton College, argued
for the necessity of this agenda: “teachers of modern language … do not realize, that their
department is a science … our department is a science, and that its teaching must be
carried on accordingly … a scientific basis dignifies our profession” (qtd in Graff 68).
Along these lines, in “Science, Theory, and Politics of Empirical Studies in the
English Department” (1994), David Shumway argues that the conflict between this
empirical legacy in English studies on one end, and a focus on “humane aesthetics and
moral values” on the other, is the central productive tension in English departments
historically. Shumway notes that literary criticism and theory in the twentieth-century
was largely engaged with saving literature from the scrutinizing gaze of scientistic
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inquiry. Further, the “new” literary theories of English departments—by which Shumway
expressly means the poststructuralist and critical theories of Jacques Derrida, Michel
Foucault, Louis Althusser, and Theodor Adorno—are even more hostile to science than
are the New Critical approaches they came to replace. Given this history, Shumway
notes, “it is not surprising that people in English departments should feel threatened by
another encroachment of science on their territory: empirical studies in composition and
rhetoric” (149). Empirical studies that were, by the early 1960’s, an explicit research
agenda for the National Council of Teachers of English.
The NCTE report, Research into Written Composition (1963), assembled by
Richard Braddock, Richard Lloyd-Jones, and Lowell Schoer, represents an early attempt
to develop a methodology and objective criteria for the teaching of writing and it is often
cited as the beginning of composition studies. As Braddock et al. argue, research into the
teaching of composition,
complex though it may be (especially when it deals with the “larger
elements” of composition, not merely with grammar and mechanics), has
not frequently been conducted with the knowledge and care that one
associates with the physical sciences. Today’s research in composition,
taken as a whole, may be compared to chemical research as it emerged
from the period of alchemy: some terms are being defined usefully, a
number of procedures are being refined, but the field as a whole is laced
with dreams, prejudices, and makeshift operations. (5)
To counter these, the report argues for greater objectivity in writing instruction through
“frequency counts” and controlled experimentation. Frequency counts that could be used
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to tally not only the grammatical and mechanical errors writing instructors were used to
marking, but also predefined sets of rhetorical errors as well. Despite the apparent
difficulties, the Braddock report argues that any gains toward objectivity in writing
instruction must include the rhetorical considerations of writing. In this way, for the
report’s writers, frequency counts present a way to demythologize writing instruction and
provide objective criteria towards an assessment of rhetoric. The Braddock report urges
composition studies towards the “strength and depth” that could only come to the field
through an empirical research agenda (6). Though, with the perspective of half a century,
it is obvious that the report did not so much present a way out of the “dreams, prejudices,
and makeshift operations” of composition, but presented writing researchers with a new
dream: composition studies as a scientific inquiry.
Towards this, Stephen North argues that the Braddock report fated research in
composition to performing a series of “constitutive rituals” in which knowledge does not
so much accumulate and progress, as simply work to repeatedly re-invent the field itself.
For North, composition studies itself was thus founded on a unreachable myth of
“Paradigm Hope” that keeps composition scholars hoping to find something verifiably
true or provable about the writing process and, when inevitably unfound, settles on utility
and plausibility instead (“Death” 205). Invoking the notion of paradigms here, North
reminds us of Thomas Kuhn’s tremendous influence on composition studies beginning
decades after the Braddock report. As Robert Connors suggests, the influence of Kuhn’s
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published a year before the Braddock report in
1962, could be taken as an alternative to the trajectory of “imitation science” initiated by
the NCTE report.
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Writing in a moment when cognitive process theories had gained dominance in
the field, Connors’s “Composition Studies and Science” (1983) offers a Kuhnian analysis
of scientific research in composition studies. Connors notes that Kuhn’s paradigm theory
opposes positivist approaches to science as it presents a rhetorically-based model of
scientific progress through paradigmatic structures. Summarizing Kuhn, Connors
observes “paradigms are essentially incommensurable—one cannot be measured against
another empirically—science proceeds not by better theories driving out poorer ones, but
rather by a series of loyalty-decisions on the parts of members of a scientific community”
(2). Rather than progressing through a linear accumulation of data through time, Kuhn
argued that science progresses through the incommensurable shifts in dominant models.
Reviewing composition studies, Connors is alarmed by the increasing reliance on
unproblematized scientific modes of research in cognitive process theories of writing and,
following Kuhn, the unnuanced understanding of scientific progress held by many in the
field. For Connors, research into the composing process in this way confuses the modes
appropriate to the physical sciences with those of the human sciences. Experimentation in
the former is reliant upon isolation, testing, and manipulation of discrete phenomenon by
formal systems of measurement—processes that are notoriously difficult to transfer to a
study of writing or cognition as “the complexity and interdependence of mental processes
… make such disembedding of discrete phenomenon difficult and tend to make
experimental conclusions in psychology isolated and sterile” (12). Even protocol
analysis, the most widely used tool to analyze the writing process by cognitive rhetoric, is
doomed to be “noncumulative semi-scientific experimentation and semi-rigorous
description” for Connors (13).
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In this way, Connors argues that the desire for validity that science seemingly
brings is the wrong approach for composition studies. According to Connors, “We are not
a science and will not be one in the foreseeable future, and we must beware lest our
understandable desire to share in the cachet of science lead us to a barren enactment of
imitation science” (19). While not against empirical inquiries into the composition
process altogether, 2 Connors is against the “role-playing of scientism” and “processgoverned ameaning” that too often comes under the guise of science as it attempts to
define the writing process (20). While Connors’s critique here is certainly valid, and
eventually became the dominant attitude towards empiricism by the end of the decade, I
would like to question just how “barren” the field’s enactment of science actually was. If
measured by how generative such studies were for the field, the empirical inquiries of
cognitive rhetoric would certainly be some of the most productive examples of research
in the discipline’s history. Even more so if we were to include to many exchanges and
debates spurred on when empirical methodologies collided with the emergence of
socially and contextually-based theories of writing.
Towards this end, writing within the context of professional and technical writing,
Davida Charney’s “Empiricism Is Not a Four-Letter Word” (1996) argues that there is
too often an easy conflation between the methodologies and the ideologies of research
agendas when, in reality, those relationships are much more complex. According to
Charney, it is as ridiculous to assume that scholars working in qualitative analysis or
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
In fact, towards the end of the article, Connors champions the behaviorist approaches
of Robert Zoellner’s Talk-Write pedagogy. For Connors, “Behavior modification in
various forms promises to be the central useful component in all future composition
research that has any functional effectiveness” (16).
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ethnography are necessarily self-reflective and committed to social justice as it is to
assume that those working in more scientifically rigid forms are opposed to liberatory or
postmodernist values (568). Towards this, Charney argues, “[r]ather than endorsing or
condemning methods a priori by ideological purity, we should consider how they affect
our ability to work with each other to conduct the very best research we can” (568-569).
Charney works to complicate many of the critiques leveled at cognitive rhetoric discussed
below by complicating the science/social divide by providing examples of scientific
progress as a social and discursive community of peers—working together, self-critically,
towards meaningful data. The elision of such complexities, according to Charney, have
created an “over-reliance on qualitative studies and repeated disparagement of objective
methods” which have resulted in a “serious imbalance in studies of technical and
professional writing—and the same may be true in composition studies as a whole”
(590).
Writing in a moment when socially-oriented epistemologies and ideological
critique were arguably at an apex in composition studies, Charney’s work demonstrates
how—in little more than a decade—those working to map out taxonomies of the field had
intensified divisions that possibly hindered more than they helped. For Charney, much of
what lay ahead for writing studies consisted of the “hard task of inter-connecting our
work, by building up provisional confidence in our methods and our knowledge base by
challenging and impressing each other” (591). A similar article by Charney appearing in
Technical Communication Quarterly shortly after this piece, details how this interconnective work has historically been the case in composition studies. In fact, in “From
Logocentrism to Ethocentrism: Historicizing Critiques of Writing Research” (1998),
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Charney observes that “many treated the social and cognitive aspects of writing as
interrelated” despite the charge that cognitive process theories of writing too often
ignored the social factors of writing in favor of a naïve instrumentality (25). The
interconnection of the field discussed by Charney is, I would argue, the result of the
field’s notion of process at the time being both new and large enough to contain many
otherwise contentious voices. As long as scholars were identified as pro-process,
particular epistemological differences could be overlooked.
In “Composition at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century” (2005), Richard
Fulkerson reminds us that the vast legacy of “process” and process-based pedagogies in
the field owe more to cognitive process theories than the “individualistic advocacy” of
Donald Murray and Ken Macrorie’s work despite our current tendency to think otherwise
(669). Fulkerson’s observation is, I argue, indicative of more than just a willingness to
overlook cognitive rhetoric with regards to process, but a general move away from
cognitive research by composition scholars following the “social turn” in the humanities.
The current lack of interest in cognitive science in the field makes it easy to gloss over
the work of Linda Flower, John Hayes, and a host of others who sustained a discussion of
cognition and the writing process during a defining moment in composition’s history.
Joseph Harris’s The Teaching Subject: Composition since 1966 (1997) reminds us of this,
noting that Linda Flower was the most cited scholar in College Composition and
Communication from 1980 to 1993—having double the number of citations as the next
most cited scholar (129). Today, on the other hand, those working in cognitive process
theory throughout the late ‘70’s and into the ‘80’s are more likely to be cited by
historiographers or scholars critiquing positivist orientations rather than evidence of an
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active research agenda. Looking to the work of James Berlin can give us an indication of
the divisions enabled by the social turn and what happened to effectively end the
conversation between composition studies and cognitive science.
In his most active decade, Berlin produced four complete taxonomies of the field
including the associated research agendas, related epistemologies, and pedagogical
practices of his classifications. Berlin’s oeuvre is invaluable not only because it oriented
compositionists in the field, but because—perhaps counter-intuitively—by dividing the
field it worked to solidify it as a recognizable set of practices and agendas. Similarly, at
the same time, Stephen North’s The Making of Knowledge in Composition (1987) worked
in much the same way. Here, I am particularly interested in two of Berlin’s taxonomies:
the first appearing in Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges
1900-1985 (1987) and a second set published the following year in “Rhetoric and
Ideology in the Writing Class” (1988).
In the former, Berlin champions cognitive rhetoric, grouping it alongside the
classically oriented rhetoric of Ed Corbett and the epistemic rhetoric of Robert L. Scott,
Richard Ohmann, and Kenneth Bruffee. Arguing that cognitive rhetoric, because it
remains focused on the social context of problem-solving, deserves to be considered
transactional. Towards this, Berlin notes:
Although the rhetoric of cognitive psychology focuses on the psychology
of the individual, it is indeed a transactional approach. While the mind is
made up of structures that develop naturally, it is necessary for the
individual to have the right experience at the right moment in order for
this development to take place. Without these experiences, or with the
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wrong sequence of experiences, cognitive structures do not properly
mature. Thus, the individual’s environment can play as important a role as
the inherent makeup of the mind. (159)
Recognizing the inherent interrelatedness of individual cognition and the rhetorical
contexts which frame it, Berlin makes an argument for cognitive rhetoric’s inclusion with
other socially oriented trends in the discipline. Gesturing towards work by Ede and
Lunsford, Frank D’Angelo, Barry Kroll, and Joseph Williams, Berlin continued to argue
that cognitive approaches are expansive enough to allow “a place for the social in shaping
knowledge and learning” and that our notion of process more generally has been most
influenced by these approaches (187). This earlier consideration of cognitive rhetoric
stands in stark opposition to Berlin’s next taxonomy—published the following year—as
it argues against cognitive approaches for a myriad of reasons.
In “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” Berlin revises his view of the
field and his consideration of cognitive process theory by arguing that such theories rely
too heavily on the role of the individual in knowledge production, are objectivist in their
approach, and, ultimately, work to serve the same Fordist agenda as current-traditional
rhetoric. In fact, in this later piece, Berlin notes that cognitive rhetoric “might be
considered the heir apparent of current-traditional rhetoric” as both aim to streamline
writing processes into a manageable, efficient, and ultimately, commodifiable product
(480). Stemming from objectivist epistemologies, Berlin argued, both current-traditional
and cognitive approaches refuse to engage ethical and political questions as they insist
that scientific realism is beyond the purview of ideology. As Berlin argues, “[c]ognitive
rhetoric, then, in its refusal of the ideological question leaves itself open to association
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with the reification of technocratic science characteristic of late capitalism” (484).
Despite previous critiques, Berlin’s interpretation of cognitive rhetoric as complicit in the
exploitative agenda of late capital effectively ended the discussion. It would be hard to
imagine a more thorough critical evisceration of cognitive rhetoric than the one that
appears in Berlin’s later work. As hard as Berlin’s critique was, it was not the first in this
direction.
Six years prior, Patricia Bizzell’s “Cognition, Convention, and Certainty: What
we Need to Know about Writing” (1982) argued that the “inner-directed” approach of
Flower and Hayes too easily elided the role of the social in composing processes. For
Bizzell, by seeking the universal form of the writing process, Flower and Hayes neglected
the role of content—that which gives shape and works to guide form. Bizzell’s “outerdirected” approach, on the other hand, argues that “universal, fundamental structures
can’t be taught; thinking and language use can never occur free of a social context that
conditions them” (390). As a consequence, according to Bizzell, compositionists looking
towards scientific research into the writing process were misled. For Bizzell, just as for
Connors, science sought a kind of “authoritative certainty” that is simply not available
given the situatedness of knowledge production and the complexity of composing.
However, there have been other, arguably more nuanced, interpretations of cognitive
process theory.
In the piece by Shumway discussed earlier, he notes that Linda Flower’s work
gestures towards the possibility of an empirical research disengaged from a positivist
orientation. A form that could, in fact, can be understood as a “particular form of
argumentation” (154). Though Shumway stops short of saying that Flower’s work does
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this, rather her work “fails to say why empirical arguments might be useful or persuasive
and instead relies on the traditional claim of greater access to the real” (154). Shumway’s
argument is supported in Flower and Hayes’s own work beginning with “Identifying the
Organization of Writing Process,” the opening chapter in the Cognitive Processes in
Writing (1980) collection. This collection, put together and released by Carnegie-Mellon
University following an interdisciplinary symposium of the same name, helped to both
solidify cognitive rhetoric as a research agenda and identify Carnegie-Mellon as its hub.
Similarly, the symposium and following collection, established Linda Flower and John
Hayes as the leading purveyors of this particular method of composition research.
Together, Flower and Hayes have two pieces in the collection, and take up nearly a third
of the total page count.
In the opening chapter, Flower and Hayes remove the study of writing from the
classroom, a traditionally privileged site for the study of writing, and move it to the
laboratory. Because, for Flower and Hayes, writing was to be accessed through protocol
analysis—a “far too laborious a procedure to be used routinely in the classroom either for
teaching or for evaluation” (27)—it must be studied in the laboratory. The move from the
classroom to the laboratory is significant for a number of reasons. As Charney notes, such
a move begins the study of writing with “unnatural tasks, unnatural settings, and intrusive
procedures” and must therefore lack objectivity and only provide researchers with
incomplete data (“From Logocentricism” 17).
Because the study of writing through protocol analysis must take place in a
laboratory, it becomes an example of the highly staged artifice that Bruno Latour relates
to a particular aesthetic of first empiricism. In a lecture entitled “The Aesthetics of
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Matters of Concern,” Latour analyzes a photograph by Jeff Wall. In the photograph,
scientific illustrator, Adrian Walker, sits contemplatively before a mummified arm. The
viewer can see that Walker is employed in sketching the arm from the easily visible
sketchpad on his lap and the pencil in his hand. The title of the photograph, Adrian
Walker, Artist, Drawing From a Specimen in a Laboratory in the Dept. of Anatomy at the
University of British Columbia, Vancouver (1992) leaves little to the imagination with
regards to the actual content of the photo. For Latour the photograph, with its gleaming
white tile background that the prominently figure of Walker, is indicative of laboratory
life itself and is meant to represent the “white light of the Enlightenment” which “floods
over the skills of the draughtsman in one of the rare remaining disciplines, namely
anatomy, where drawing remains superior in scientific precision to photographs” (30).
For Latour, what is important here is not the particular content of this one photograph,
nor its relation to one particular set of scientific discipline and practice, but that is
illustrative of the whole host of objectivity-making practices employed in the aesthetics
of matters of fact. For Latour, “there is nothing more amazingly artificial, more carefully
staged, more historically coded than meeting a matter of fact face to face” (32). Knowing
this, one cannot help but revisit the elaborate protocol transcriptions, detailed models, and
abstracted figures running through the work of Flower and Hayes. In this light, cognitive
process theory itself becomes a highly constructed theatre expressing the aesthetics of
first empiricism. In a sense, the visual representations in Flower and Hayes’s work are
attempts to render the three-dimensional reality of student writing into two-dimensional
representations. This reductionist aesthetic is, for Latour, a process that does not get us
closer to the real, but only works to be demonstrate the constructedness of facts and the
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elision of complexity.
One way to distinguish first empirical matters of fact from second empirical
matters of concern is that, in the latter, there is a ethical obligation to not forgo that
complexity, but rather to include it, reproduce it, expand on it, and distribute it to other
networks. In this way, matters of concern reflect the complexity of lived relations. To do
so is to be amongst Latour’s metaphorical rapids, denying the totalizing vision structuring
the nature/culture divide. Such work, I argue, has precedence in both composition studies
and cognitive process theories of composition. In fact, I would argue that, beginning with
Marilyn Cooper’s landmark “The Ecology of Writing” (1986) there has been a way to
think through the complexities of cognition and writing that is inherently taken up with
writing as a matter of concern.

Composition and Second Empiricism
In Writing Inventions: Identities, Technologies, Pedagogies (2001) Scott DeWitt
characterizes the history of composition’s relationship with “invention, inquiry, and
exploration” after the turn of the century as either stemming from the cognitive processes
of the individual writer or writing as a social act (46). Indeed, this was the polarized
intellectual climate after the social turn that Flower addresses in “Cognition, Context, and
Theory Building” (1989). Here, Flower questions whether we, as compositionists, can
reconcile our urge to nurture individual voice and meaning-making through writing while
simultaneously arguing that meaning and voice begin in social and ideological arenas.
Observing a trend in the discipline to further entrench scholars in their respective camps,
Flower works towards an “integrated theoretical vision” able to encompass both the
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social and individual cognitive domains. Critiquing her own early work with John Hayes,
Flower notes that cognitive process theory, like most work in the field at the time, was
too focused on interior processes of the individual writer. But rather than take the
opposite approach, into “speculative theories based only on abstract social or political
imperatives” (283), Flower calls for a complex interactive theory which would work from
the nexus of individual cognition and social context through observation-based theory
building. Theory building in this way would be guided by three principles:
One principle is that cultural and social context can provide direct cues to
cognition. The second is that context is also and always mediated by the
cognition of the individual writer. And the third is that the bounded
purposes that emerge from this process are highly constrained but at the
same time meaningful, rhetorical acts. (287)
The interplay between these actors—cognition, context, and rhetoric—must be sought in
what Flower calls “real acts of writing,” where individual cognitive acts meet with social
forces under the constraints of rhetorical situations (294). This focus demands, for
Flower, the articulation of a type of research agenda that is both self-aware enough to
know its epistemological limitations and certain enough to continue with the project of
knowledge production despite such limitations. From this impetus, Flower works towards
defining an empirical research of observation-based theory building. Commenting on this
approach, Raúl Sánchez argues that the methodological implications of Flower’s later
work on observation-based theory building essentially frees empiricism from its
“ontological baggage” and allows its rhetoricity to come to the fore (Function of Theory
14). While never citing him directly, many of Flower’s later articulations of composition
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research parallel Bruno Latour’s work towards matters of concern in the context of a
second empiricism.
In “Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands” (1986) for
instance, Latour argues that material and mental factors at play in scientific inquiry are
intimately bound up with one another in the inscription—the written inscription and the
images generated in knowledge production; or, as he phrases it, “the transformation of
rats and chemicals into paper” (3). Despite the variance of laboratories—the discipline,
the size, the number of instruments, etc.—the end result was always the same: “a small
window through which one could read a very few signs from a rather poor repertoire
(diagrams, blots, bands, columns)” (3). By paying attention to the practice of inscribing
that issued from these centers of calculation, Latour argues, we can see how science is
able to maintain a certain stability. In this way, the writing, printing, and propagation of
texts is not a scientific aside—a residual manifestation of the “real” knowledge work of
the lab—but rather central to the stability of the enterprise itself. The work of the lab, for
Latour, is the development of immutable mobiles—inscriptions that can be circulated and
rhetorically mobilized, and therefore must necessarily be “immutable, presentable,
readable, and combinable with one another” with a minimum of loss (7). While such
inscriptions are beneficial towards making science a stable enterprise, this stability comes
at the cost of difference and complexity of the object under scientific scrutiny. Using an
example from Foucault’s work in The Birth of the Clinic, Latour notes,
The same medical mind will generate totally different knowledge if
applied to the bellies, fevers, throats and skins of a few successive
patients, or if applied to well-kept records of hundred of written bellies,
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fevers, throats and skins all coded in the same way and all synoptically
present. Medicine does not become scientific in the mind, or in the eye of
its practitioners, but in the application of old eyes and of old minds to new
fact sheets inside new institutions, the hospital (15).
Thus, in the move from small-scale practice to large-scale institution, the complexity of
the individual situation—in this case illness—is reduced through inscription, codification,
and a whole cascade of representations that allow “harder facts to be produced at greater
cost” (17). This critique could easily be leveled against the early work of Flower and
Hayes in their development of an identifiable model of the writing process that could be
inscribed and transferred to other writing situations. Further, many of the post-process
critiques are grounded in similar injunctions that the insistence on process—and process
as an identifiably recurring and universal process—foregoes far too much complexity of
actual writing processes. While this is true of Flower’s early work with Hayes, her later
work emphasizes the situatedness of knowledge in observation-based theories that can
only ever be provisional renderings and are never meant to represent the complexity of
the whole. Looking towards Donna Haraway’s argument for a feminist objectivity,
Flower asks:
The problem is: how do you construct a usable, not an innocent, doctrine
of objectivity that allows ‘the possibility of sustained, rational, objective
enquiry’ without pulling the ‘god trick’ of promising a totalizing vision
and claiming it has the disinterested power to produce one? (“ObservationBased Theory Building” 168)
The key lies, for Flower, in the telling shift of emphasis from the “truth” of scientific
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realism to the pragmatics of utility—it is a similar shift, I would argue, in Latour’s
movement from matters of fact to matters of concern.
In both “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of
Concern” (2004) and Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory
(2005), Bruno Latour articulates an alternative to the exhaustion of critique—by shifting
from the debunking and demythologizing apparatus of critique to the pragmatics of
concern. As Latour observes, the critique of science did not go far enough into the
ontology of facts, for, if they had, they would have discovered that facts are nothing more
or less than “very polemical, very political renderings of matters of concern” (“Critique”
32). Just as matters of fact were the objective in the paradigms of first empiricism,
matters of concern become the goal of a second empiricism. For Latour, the shift
complicates the natural/social divide in productive ways as it offers new possibilities to
the exhaustion of social constructivism while not returning to the positivist
epistemologies of first empiricism. For Latour, second empiricism differs from its first
iteration in that “its science, its politics, its esthetics, its morality are all different from the
past,” and while it remains “real and objective” it is “livelier, more talkative, active,
pluralistic, and more mediated than the other” (Reassembling 115). Whereas both the
scientific mode of first empiricism and the social-constructivist critique of science
seemingly progressed through critical engagement, second empiricism progresses
through composition. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Latour’s articulation of
compositionism in “An Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto’” has many implications
for the future of composition studies through a second empirical trajectory. Such a
trajectory arguably began in Marilyn Cooper’s articulation of ecologies of writing and
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continued through Margaret Syverson’s mapping of cognition in distributed models of
composition.
Implicitly critiquing the work of Flower and Hayes as limited in their scope,
Marilyn Cooper begins “The Ecology of Writing” by stating that now is the time for
some “assessment of the benefits and limitations of writing as essentially—and simply—
a cognitive process” (364). Further, Cooper articulates the problem with cognitive
process theories of writing as having,
nothing to do with its specifics: it describes something of what writers do
and goes some way toward explaining how writers, texts, and readers are
related. But the belief on which it is based—that writing is thinking and,
thus, essentially a cognitive process—obscures many aspects of writing
we have come to see as not peripheral. (365)
Articulating this peripheral, the neglected strata of systems affecting the act of writing, is,
for Cooper, the recognition of the ways any composition is both emerging from and
engaging in ecologies. Cooper is quick to point out that ecology in this sense, is
significantly different from context—or, more precisely, social context—in that the
former includes a broader and more dynamic sense of temporality. Just as environmental
ecologies as conventionally understood may change over long swaths of time—as new
species are introduced and other species may die out—so too do the ecologies producing
and affecting particular compositions account for more than simply the moment of
inscription or the limited social context from which it emerges (368). Ultimately, for
Cooper, an ecological broadening in this way adds to emerging social theories of writing
and works to move writing studies away from the centrality of individual cognition
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towards the student-writer as an actor enmeshed in dynamic networked systems. As
Cooper states towards the end of the article, “[writing] is not simply a way of thinking
but more fundamentally a way of acting” (373). I would argue that Cooper’s work here is
prescient in that it both anticipated the movement away from strictly cognitive theories of
writing associated with Flower and Hayes and that it made possible a renewed
engagement with cognitive science a decade later—with the work of Margaret Syverson.
Cooper’s work anticipates the work of Edwin Hutchins towards ecological models of
cognition that recognize the role of systems distributed through material, social, and
technological sites enabling any individual cognitive act. Through Cooper’s early work
we can see the necessity of reexamining cognitive process theory of writing in order to
account for the complexity of student writing and thinking. Both the work of Margaret
Syverson, discussed below, and the later work of Marilyn Cooper perform just this kind
of skeptical gesture towards conventional scientific understandings of cognition.
In her most recent work Cooper continues to question the distinctions among the
social, technological, and individual. In “Being Linked to the Matrix: Biology,
Technology, and Writing,” included in Stuart Selber’s edited collection Rhetorics and
Technologies: New Directions in Writing and Communication (2010), Cooper works
towards a more fully realized version of the ecology of writing in that she defines writing
to a particular kind of action, that is, it is a response. As Cooper notes, “writing is not a
matter of autonomously intended action on the world, but more like monitoring, nudging,
adapting, adjusting—in short, responding to the world” (16). An important, yet easily
overlooked, element here is Cooper’s displacement of intention in relation to response.
For Cooper, writing as response is as much about the material body affecting a response

!

43

to a world of other material bodies as it is about a deliberative response fashioned by and
for rationally thinking subjects: “writing is as much a biological as it is a cultural practice
… not the product of minds somehow separate from bodies nor of innate technical or
linguistic abilities” (18). In this essay Cooper provides a sense of what a study of
attention’s composition could look like as she analyzes professional writer Steven
Johnson’s use of DEVONthink, an indexing software, and a group of composition
students working to document the Paulding light, a well-known mysterious phenomenon
in the Upper Peninsula region of Michigan.
Like many information management packages, DEVONthink stores and manages
information. Unlike many packages, DEVONthink learns to make associations between
commonly used words and files tailored to each individual user. For Cooper, the
software’s ability to make associations while Johnson prepares a book manuscript—no
doubt affecting the composition in a myriad of ways—is indicative of the ways that
technological and social systems work in accord to enable one particular composed
response—that of Johnson’s manuscript. Cooper reads one such association emerging
from DEVONthink’s algorithms while it worked with Johnson on a piece about the
London sewer systems. The association, a connection between the searched terms
“sewage” and “waste” affected the composition by producing a particular connection
between waste and calcium waste deposits in vertebrate bone matter during evolutionary
processes—a connection Johnson admits he would not have paid attention to on his own.
For Johnson, and for Cooper’s analysis, this example is indicative of potential
collaborations between silicon and carbon-based intelligences. Similarly, it is indicative
of how human attention is directed by algorithmic processes in productive ways.
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In the latter example, students used GPS units and cell phones to deduce that the
Paulding light mystery is actually the result of headlights from a distant highway being
reflected off the atmosphere. For Cooper, such prosthetic technologies are simply readyat-hand for contemporary students in their general day-to-day comportment; a
technologically enhanced bearing in the world helping to make it knowable (19). Cooper
argues that from these two examples, she can make three points concerning composition
as a response: first, that words and tools are experienced together as “part of our bodies
and brains”; second, that writing is not simply social, it is a interaction with beings and
objects in our surround that we “habitually misconceive as autonomous planned action”;
and, third, that writing is best understood as a “complex system organized by dense
interactions of writers and their worlds” (20). From these three points, Cooper uses
writing as a way to argue that cultural and biological evolution is always a co-evolution
taking place with technologies, language, and the environment. Thus, the human
attention, emerging from individual psychic cognition, can be seen as a co-production
between technologies of composition—as is the case with Johnson’s DEVONthink
package—and orientation—as is the case of Cooper’s student’s using GPS devices to
research the Paulding lights.
Given Cooper’s work here, an argument can be made regarding a return to a more
inclusive version of cognitive rhetorics that can account for the co-productive dynamics
involved in attention. Just as Johnson attended to a particular connection suggested by his
software, and students making a documentary were able to attend to the distances of
highways when investigating mysterious lights, we can see how accounting for attention
is hardly capable of being contained within an individual’s biological nervous system
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without first making the concession that the individual body—including, of course, the
nervous system—is thoroughly ran through and permeated by a continual involvement
with external systems affecting and shaping any individual biological body. Further,
given this, we can see that even the most conventional understandings of rhetoric as a
discursive and linguistic practice are caught up and enmeshed in systems that are
thoroughly non-discursive, material, and nonhuman. Cooper’s article that appeared the
following year in College Composition and Communication works from these ideas to
reimagine what rhetoric, rhetorical subjectivity, and agency might mean given the
complexity of the above.
In “Rhetorical Agency as Emergent and Enacted” (2011), Cooper begins by
observing how the question of agency has been problematic in the humanities for some
time. While many scholars argue that the question is no longer even valid—as the notion
of a “centered, conscious, rational self” (420) has been problematized to the point of no
return at the hands of postmodernists and poststructuralists—Cooper is interested in
revitalizing question of agency. For her part, Cooper sees the necessity for a rescue and
resuscitation mission for the subject by redefining the subject as an “emergent property of
embodied individuals” (421). Similar to her previous piece, Cooper works to complicate
what it means for the subject to have conscious intentions and free will. As Cooper notes:
Agents do reflect on their actions consciously; they do have conscious
intentions and goals and plans; but their agency does not arise from
conscious mental acts, though consciousness does play a role. Agency
instead is based in individuals’ lived knowledge that their actions are their
own. (421)
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As such, agency emerges from a self-consciousness of lived experience. It follows that
rhetorical possibility emerges from a feedback loop between conscious reflection and
previous experience in a world. Coupled with her work on writing as response, here
Cooper gestures towards rhetorical agency as a responsibility that rhetors have towards
their audience in the making of a common world (442). Rhetoric, in this manner, is a kind
of posthuman ethics as it removes the overly reductive role of personal responsibility in
the ethical equation. Such a reductive definition of ethics is problematized by Cooper’s
notion of agency as distributed response-ability:
neither conscious intention nor free will … is involved in acting or
bringing about change: though the world changes in response to individual
action, agents are very often not aware of their intentions, they do not
directly cause changes, and the choices they make are not free from
influence from their inheritance, past experiences, or their surround. (421)
Rhetorical agency, for Cooper, is not reducible to the individual human rhetor, but is
dependent upon the distribution of technologies, the biological capacities of the
individual, and the material occasions and environment for that agency to take place—in
short, dynamic ecologies. In this way, Cooper is working to build on a distributed
cognitive rhetoric in accord with the work of Margaret Syverson.
In their article “Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social
Merge” (2003), philosophers Ronald Giere and Barton Moffatt argue that inquiries into
the distributed modes of cognition question the boundaries between the collective social
sphere and the sphere of individual cognition. Summarizing Edwin Hutchins’s landmark
Cognition in the Wild (1995), Giere and Moffatt note that Hutchins discovered—through
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an ethnographic study of the cognitive and social processes aboard a U.S. Naval ship—
that cognitive systems include social rank, navigation technologies, and other material
and social artifacts beyond the individual mind (3). Similarly, Syverson notes that,
following Hutchins, we can see that cognitive processes in complex systems are “divided
and shared among agents and structures in the environment” (7). For Syverson this has
enormous import for composition studies as it challenges who—or what—we can
identify that is doing the writing. Reminiscent of many critiques against cognitive
rhetoric, Syverson argues that composition researchers have “[t]ended to focus their
attention on the person inscribing the lines on the page, or on the nature or quality of the
lines themselves, or on the activity of inscribing” and, as a result, “[o]ur theories of
composing have been somewhat atomistic, focusing on individual writers, individual
texts, isolated acts, processes, or artifacts” (8). For Syverson, however, writing—as well
as thinking—occurs in complex ecologies that involve social, environmental, biological,
and technological agents. While opening the cognitive process theories of writing to a
greater complexity, distributed approaches present a challenge to research in
composition.
In the conclusion to The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of Composition (1999),
Syverson argues that the greatest challenge an ecological approach presents is the notion
that “the subjects of inquiry are not primarily objects or objectified subjects but
relationships and dynamic processes” (186). Syverson notes that composition research
after the social turn has aimed towards more collaborative and ethnographic writing
research models, though such projects still view texts, writers, and readers as
ontologically separate objects and not as the complex sets of relations offered in
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distributive models. Following Hutchins’s lead, Syverson works towards researching
distributed models of composition through three different case studies: first, from the
point of view of the text within larger ecological models; second, how student-writers
work in coordination with their peers and instructors in environments of learning; and,
third, through the role of readers in the “complex adaptive system” of an online forum
during the Persian Gulf War. Working through these three sites of composition, Syverson
maps the distribution of cognition across five dimensions: physical, social, psychological,
spatial, and temporal. For Syverson, these dimensions can be scaled up and down across
registers from the individual, to local community, to global culture, and, finally, to
genetic phenomenon of the species. Closer to the context of composition studies, this
means that distributed cognition is able to discuss, for instance, an individual correction
on a draft in terms of global literacy and cultural trends. Syverson’s work here, I would
argue, rekindles the possibility of a cognitive process theory of composition not seen
since the work of Linda Flower, both the collaborative work with Hayes and later sociocognitive research. Following this trajectory began by Syverson, Kristie Fleckenstein’s
“Reclaiming the Mind: Eco-Cognitive Research in Writing Studies” (2012), argues for an
ecological model of cognitive rhetoric based on the work of Gregory Bateson.
Here, Fleckenstein makes a connection between the way both cognitive and
computer science take up the “processing” of information. Tracing a history of cognitive
psychology from the late 1950’s, Fleckenstein notes that information processing is the
central concept to cognitive psychology as it “attends to the flow or sequence of mental
operations in the performance of a cognitive task” (96). Adopted from computer science,
specifically the study of artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology’s reliance on
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information processing as the central analogy of how human minds process information
is, for Fleckenstein, a fundamental error, and one that passes through to the rhetoric of
Flower and Hayes’s work. I would argue, given Fulkerson’s reminder that composition
studies itself owes its emphasis on process more to cognitive rhetoric than any other
source, that this reduction of complexity is systemic to the discipline itself. Fleckenstein
notes the similarities between the schematics of computer science as they represent the
“sequential breakdown and organization of a computer program” and the diagrams
developed by Flower and Hayes to represent the writing process (98)—a similarity that,
Fleckenstein argues, is reflected in the way that Flower and Hayes approach writing as a
problem to be solved by a central processor—the student writer—rather than the complex
and radically distributed ecology that it is. Fleckenstein’s approach turns to Gregory
Bateson’s ecological model of mind that reconfigures the individualist orientation of
cognitive rhetoric and yields an eco-cognitive model. While not cited, Fleckenstein’s
model owes much to both Marilyn Cooper’s work on the ecology of writing (1986) and
Margaret Syverson’s work on distributed cognition and the writing process (1999).
Together with Syverson, Fleckenstein’s eco-cognitive model moves us towards an
empirical research agenda relying on relations among actors rather than the inaccessible
interior cognition of the student-writer. Thus, Syverson and Fleckenstein gesture towards
a second empirical trajectory for composition research.

From Cognitive Rhetoric to Attention Ecologies
Collin Gifford Brooke’s work on digital ecologies provides insight into how
models of distributed cognition and composition may be applied to explicitly digital
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environments and digital reading. In Lingua Fracta: Toward a Rhetoric of New Media
(2007), Brooke argues that the advent of new media necessitates a rethinking of the
classical rhetorical canon. For Brooke, the rhetorical affordances of digital media demand
a “revitalized understanding of the canons” that can both inform and respond to the
contemporary milieu. The digital interface establishes a novel element in the rhetorical
situation and one that, according to Brooke, establishes rhetoric as an ecology of practice
focusing on the “strategies and practices that occur at the level of interface” (28).
Informed by both Cooper and Syverson, Brooke’s rearticulation of the rhetorical canon as
an ecology of practice provides a productive frame to think about the ways in which
cognition and attention are directed in digital environments. The challenge is, for Brooke,
to discuss particular rhetorical categories that are both stable enough to distinguish sets of
practices, and supple enough to “preserve the dynamic flexibility of an ecological model”
(42). Towards this end, Brooke observes how ecologies of practice could be useful model
for describing distributed attention:
When we have paid particular attention to one or more canons, it has often
been to render it more static. Consider, for example, the various strategies
advanced under the umbrella of invention, like freewriting, outlining,
mapping, tagmemics, and so on. Although part of viewing invention
ecologically must include this repertoire of pedagogical strategies, the
emphasis on conscious, visible activity is necessarily a reduction of the
canon. An ecological model of invention would treat it as the level of
generalized activity. (44)
Here, Brooke notes a double movement that defines the relationship between attention
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and salience. First, that attention paid to something creates salience. As Richard Vatz
famously argued in “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation” (1973), rhetoric generates the
salience of situations, it does not simply reflects it. Second, salience works to make
previously dynamic processes static. Brooke, using the example of invention, notes how
pedagogical attention towards the ecological practice of invention works to render it to a
static set of particular practices. Here Brooke identifies a feedback dynamic between
attention and salience that reduces complexity. Keeping with the above example, there is
nothing intrinsically inventive about any one practice—freewriting, for example—but
invention frames the practice in salient ways. Brooke uses two examples of his own
composing practices to further demonstrate what he means. In the first, Brooke observes
that following his attending an academic conferences he is temporarily more prolific than
he would otherwise be. While there is nothing inherently inventive about the conference
itself, it enacts ecologies of practice that affect Brooke’s productivity. Practices that not
only make possible connections between dozens of conference presentations, but also
about the tradition of humanistic inquiry that trains scholars to respond in particular
ways. Similarly, Brooke notes that keeping a weblog has affected his daily comportment
towards generating material for the blog. As Brooke notes, the practice of keeping a blog
made a “much larger portion of my daily life … available to me as subjects for writing”
(44). What needs to be foregrounded here is the diligence needed to not make the
ontological mistake of confusing the individual practice with the ecology of practices it
enacts.
For my purposes, Brooke’s reconceptualization of the rhetorical canon as
ecologies of practice is incredibly useful. With this in mind, we can work towards making
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visible the dynamics of attention as they become salient in discrete material practices.
And, more importantly, resist making a simple equation between those practices and
specific modes of attention. For instance, while the there is nothing inherently hyper or
deep about specific medial practices, those practices can provide a useful salient frame
from which attention’s distributed composition can be productively traced.
In “Tech-TOC: Complex Temporalities in Living and Technical Beings” (2012),
Hayles discusses a “dynamic interplay” between attention and salience similar to
ecological model identified in Brooke’s work:
attention is nevertheless a limited cognitive faculty whose boundaries are
difficult to see because it is at the center of consciousness, whereas
unconscious and nonconscious faculties remain partially occluded, despite
being as (or more) important in interactions with technological
environments. Human cognition as a whole (including attentive focus,
unconscious perceptions, and nonconscious cognitions) is in dynamic
interplay with the tools it helps to bring into being…
Here, Hayles observes how individual and collective attention works to make salient the
technologies that, in turn, effect attentional capacities. This dynamic clearly demonstrates
the error in simply locating attention in an individual’s cognitive capacities. Rather,
attention is folds in on itself as it circulates through technologies, retentional media,
individual cognition, and institutional culture. Bernard Stiegler, taking the concept from
Gilbert Simondon, refers to this dynamic interplay as the processes of transindividuation
necessary for both psychic maturity and cultural sustainability. Hayles works to
differentiate between an individual’s focused attention and the larger ambient attentions
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in the collective material environment. A change in the collective can result in a change,
or mutation, in the individual’s abilities and capacities to be attentive. For Hayles, this is
demonstrated in large medial shifts and their socio-cultural and psychic repercussions.
Further, medial shifts—from orality to literacy, or from literacy to electracy,3 for
instance—interrupt and mutate individual capacities of attention that, in turn, affects
social institutions. Following this line of thought, we can see how Hayles can make an
argument that the shift from print-based media to digital media resulted in a cognitive
shift from deep to hyper attention that, in turn, necessitates a reformation of educational
practices. Discussing this, Hayles notes that the mechanisms of attention “themselves
mutate in response to environmental conditions” in such a way that when “dramatic and
deep changes occur in the environment, attention begins to operate in new ways” (“TechTOC.” For my purposes here, I would argue that a renewed interest defining a cognitive
rhetoric in the contemporary milieu must work to theorize the cognitive and attentional
mutations that occur when particular technologies and composing practices are removed
or added. More practically, working to increase the metacognitive capacities of students
to manage their own attention might be a productive frame to a cognitive rhetoric of
digital composition.
I would argue that this work has already begun in Ben Gunsberg’s attempt to
research and map student attentions in relation to digital objects. Gunsberg’s “Make it
Now: QuickMuse and the Arrival of Fast-Track Composition” (2011) uses an online
poetry website, QuickMuse, as an interface to map the relationship between student
attention and temporality during the composing process. For Gunsberg, QuickMuse
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Due to its importance in digital rhetoric, I have used Gregory Ulmer’s notion of
electracy rather than other articulations of connoting the shift from print to digital media.
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presents a particularly productive interface for the mapping of attention as it both
presents students with multiple streams of information typical of media fostering hyper
attention and focuses on literate practices typically associated with deep attention. In this
way, Gunsberg argues, QuickMuse contains elements of both hyper and deep modes of
attention identified by Hayles. While Hayles discusses how the speed and variance of
media affect attention, Gunsberg adds to this discussion of attention a temporal
dimension that reframes the stakes. For Gunsberg, a “work’s configurations of
temporality” comports attention towards either hyper or deep cognitive modes by
“narrowing consciousness toward either end of the attention continuum.” Towards this
end, Gunsberg notes three related temporal instantiations present on QuickMuse: the first,
(re)articulation time, refers to versions over time of the website’s homepage design; the
second, access time, relates to the navigational speed of site’s interface; and, finally,
representational time, refers to the intentional and unintentional culturally significant
representations of time integrated into site design. A change in QuickMuse’s homepage
indicative of (re)articulation time demonstrates not only the speed and mutability with
which digital objects can shift, but their concurrent effects on attention. Similarly, the
speed which a site can be navigated with—often dependent upon the speed of the
microprocessor in one’s machine—demonstrates both the temporal dimension of access
time and how larger material and economic concerns inform decisions affecting
(re)articulation time. Also demonstrated through the change of QuickMuse’s homepage,
representational time, indicates the what Gunsberg calls the “temporal horizon” of design
choice and the affective and associated relations users have with particular
representations of time. Concerning the latter, for instance, QuickMuse makes use of
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conventional representations of bookishness and literary high culture. For Gunsberg,
these three articulations of time are meant to “illustrate some of the ways a work’s
instantiations of attention are bound to different temporal qualities.” As a productive
heuristic to map student attention, Gunsberg uses the three identified temporal
characteristics.
To do this, Gunsberg suggests having students use screen-casting software to
record their online interactions with a particular site’s interface. Students could then write
reflective essays using the temporal heuristic above in order to “encourage students to
think critically about cognitive style in relation to various academic, professional, and
recreational pursuits.” Further, for Gunsberg,
Such “attention mapping” activities might cultivate awareness of the ways
in which different activities (e.g., close reading, essay writing, gaming,
surfing the Internet, and so on) call on different styles of attention. While
these activities may not reverse the cultural drift toward hyper attention,
they may provide students with concepts that help them regulate their
attention in appropriate ways.
Coupled with Brooke’s ecologies of practice, Gunsberg’s heuristic for attention mapping
could provide a productive frame for researching the relationship between the digital
spaces used in composing practices and the cognitive style of student attention. Further,
the ecological approach identified by Brooke highlights the importance of not confusing
the individual composing practice with the conceptual apparatus the practice is meant to
deploy. In other words, the practice of reading a Victorian novel, the media most
associated with deep attention for Hayles, is not inherently deep. Similarly, playing the
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latest iteration of Grand Theft Auto is not inherently hyper. Individual medial practices
only become associated with particular cognitive styles when, by attending to that
connection, the relationship is made salient. In such a way, I would argue, Brooke gives
us a way out of the kind of technological determinism implicit in Hayles’s argument.
Similarly, Brooke’s notion of the “persistence of cognition”—an associative effect of
digital reading practices generating affective and memorial relations over time—could be
a productive way to redefine deep attention within a digital milieu. As the affective
dimensions of digital space are only now becoming a rich area of study for composition
scholars, it is time that we can begin to discuss how we might conduct the kinds of
tactically empirical research agendas hinted at in Gunsberg’s “attention mapping.” As I
have argued, the work of Bruno Latour gives us a rich enough theoretical language and
frame to articulate such complex relations.

Conclusion
In a keynote lecture for the annual meeting of the British Sociological Association
in 2007, Latour worked to define second empiricism. There, Latour notes that rather than
looking for the reality of object outside of social or cultural influence, as is the case with
first empiricism, second empiricism looks towards its “relations, or connections, that is
precisely those modes of connections, or modes of existence that are not depending on
the divide, on the bifurcation, between, natural and social” (8). Such bifurcations were
intensified in composition studies following the advent of the “social turn” as dominant
models of cognitive process theory, arguably premised on scientific realism, ran up
against social-constructivist theories of process. In short order, the disciplinary
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conversation began to draw sides between empirical research or the socially constructed
orientation of cultural studies and ideological critique. Second empiricism, on the other
hand, would seek hybrid empirical models unwilling to force research to decide between
invention and discovery, or, said differently, between discursive realities and natural fact.
Rather than the modernist subject acting from autonomous will, the student-writer in
second empirical models would be the always already constructed agent of a multiplicity
of forces—discursive and otherwise. This orientation looks back towards the
“commonsense materiality” of the writer to give an “identifiable object focal point for
pedagogy” (Sánchez “Outside the Text” 235). With this in mind, compositionists can
begin to attend to the “crisis of attention” as it has manifested itself in the popular
imagination not as a matter of fact necessitating the need for scientific inquiry and
intervention, but as a matter of concern as it has implications for the future of
composition studies and education writ large.
For Latour, attention is at center of second empiricism and the progression of
knowledge production in a contemporary milieu. As he observes in the second lecture
making up What is Style of Matters of Concern, we are now charged with the
responsibility of making visible the conduits for attention working in the production of
objectivity (47). The science of first empiricism, for Latour, is a particularly focused kind
of attention that must be drawn out and broadened to include the networks of ensembles
responsible for the production of that style of attention. This is the shift from a matter of
fact, to a matter of concern. As Latour observes: “A matter of concern is what happens to
a matter of fact when you add to it its whole scenography, much like you would do by
shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of a theatre” (39). Such a
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shift of attention exposes the an entirely different topology from those that would have us
considering only the bifurcated choice between world or word, mind or material. Such a
move, I would argue, has a precedent in composition studies through the work of
Margaret Syverson who reveals the larger ensembles operating in any cognitive act. In
moving the disciplinary object of composition from solely centered on the composition of
alphabetic print and towards the composition of attention itself we broaden the scope of
ensembles still further. In this way, we question along with Latour: “How many other
things are accompanying, flowing with the flow, when we try to be attentive to new
features of what is also given in experience?” (What is the Style 25). From this middle
ground, we can begin to discuss the distribution of cognition and rhetorical agency in
contemporary digital learning environments and address what N. Katherine Hayles and
others have identified as the challenge of education in the twenty-first century:
generational shifts in attentional capacities. Central to this challenge, and most in need of
the kind of interdisciplinary Latourian intervention, is the relationship between digital
technologies, human biology, and cognition that together constitute attention. Being
examined together, the composition of new relations and novel topologies of attention
become open to scholarly production.
!
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CHAPTER 3
PLASTICITY AND THE NEURORHETORICS OF ATTENTION
Is this not the best possible definition of plasticity: the relation that an individual
entertains with what, on the one hand, attaches him originally to himself, to his proper
form, and with what, on the other hand, allows him to launch himself into the void of all
identity, to abandon all rigid and fixed determination?
– Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?
Rhetoric’s interest in neuroscience is cyclical. A recent special issue of Rhetoric
Society Quarterly dedicated to articulating theories of neuro-rhetorics, and the very fact
that such a portmanteau is now in circulation, is evidence that rhetorical scholars are once
again turning to neurological research to redefine persuasion. This, of course, is nothing
new. In “Of Brains and Rhetorics” (1990), Jeffrey Walker urged the field to pay closer
attention to brain research as, “[n]o discourse theory, and no practice that wants to be
informed by theory, can afford to ignore whatever might be known about the neural
substrate of the processes involved in thought and writing” (301). As crucial, and in some
ways evident, as Walker’s observation was, it went largely unheeded until very recently.
Currently, the scholarly attention paid towards defining just what a “neurorhetoric”
would entail and how rhetoricians might proceed with a neurorhetorical criticism has
demonstrated that rhetoricians have taken up Walker’s call. This chapter aims to
intervene into the scholarly discussion of neurorhetorics in three ways: first, by tracing
neurorhetorics along three distinct conceptual lines, I argue that Jeffrey Pruchnic’s
original articulation of a material neurorhetorics holds the most promise for meeting the
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problematics of attention in the context of digital rhetoric; second, I argue that the insight
of material neurorhetorics has a traceable history in rhetorical paideia through the central
role of epimeleias—attending, or taking care; and, third, following the recent work of
Catherine Malabou, I aim to demonstrate how a material neurorhetoric of plasticity might
work to redefine attention as distributed phenomenon. Finally, I would like to inquire into
the ethical stakes of the neurophysiology of attention particularly as it relates to
education.

Three Neurorhetorics
Recent interest in the potentials of neurorhetorics, along with a broader “material
turn” in the humanities shows that neuroscience—with a particular focus on the
neurophysiology of the brain as object—has once again emerged as a significant area for
rhetorical studies. In many ways, this attention to contemporary brain research mirrors
trends in other disciplines—neuromarketing, neuropolitics, and neuroengineering—as
new studies continue to provide insights into the physiology of motivation and
persuasion. The implications of such research alarms many as it challenges notions of
individual choice and free will. These recent studies have posed a “neuroscientific
challenge” to agency as they investigate the brain activity of human choice prior to
conscious awareness. Here, it would be helpful to get an overview of neurorhetorics—as
it is employed in the field—and the differences that exist between these articulations.
In the article most responsible for the circulation of neurorhetorics as a concept
and as a sub-field, “‘This is Your Brain on Rhetoric’: Research Directions for
Neurorhetorics” (2010), rhetorical scholar, Jordynn Jack, and neuroscientist, L. Gregory
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Appelbaum, argue that the term operates on two separate but related registers: a rhetoric
of neuroscience and a neuroscience of rhetoric. The first register clearly evolves from the
“rhetoric of science,” as defined by Alan Gross and others,1 and is here similarly defined
as an “inquiry into the modes, effects, and implications of scientific discourses about the
brain” that asks that rhetoricians “pay attention to how scientific appeals function in these
debates” (412). The vast majority of neurorhetorical scholarship to date has taken this
first approach. In fact, the remaining articles in the special issue work to articulate a
neurorhetorics that can be closely aligned with rhetoric of science. While the second
register noted by Jack and Appelbaum, neuroscience of rhetoric, is both more novel in its
approach and a richer area of theoretical study. In combining issues of embodiment, nonhuman rhetorics, and affect theory, a neuroscience of rhetoric has enormous potentials to
articulate a theoretical neurorhetorics in interesting ways. In many ways, as I will argue,
this potential is demonstrated in the work of Jeffrey Pruchnic.
For Jack and Appelbaum, a neuroscience of rhetoric draws “new insights into
language, persuasion, and communication from neuroscience research” (412). This
approach would work to broaden rhetoric in order to include a varied spectrum of
communicative and noncommunicative modes of persuasion. Such modes would entail a
richer research agenda into the workings of autism, aphasia, “locked-in syndrome,” and
other expressions of neurological difference. For Jack and Appelbaum, such a rhetoric
asks “how communication occurs through different means, or how brain differences
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
To be fair, I should recognize here that the conversations surrounding the “rhetoric of
science” are a complex and complicated bundle of individual arguments, interests, and
agendas rather than a unified discourse. As Alan Gross himself mentions in the
introduction to The Rhetoric of Science (1990), such discussions are “an aggregate of
individual interests rather than a united effort of a group of scholars with a set of common
goals” (ix).
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might influence communication,” and how contemporary research into the workings of
the brain might “add new insights to longstanding rhetorical issues, such as the
relationship between pathos and logos, or emotion and logic, or other cognitive
dimensions of rhetoric” (412). For Jack and Appelbaum, the key to the furthering for
research in either of these registers is strengthening the interdisciplinary conversation
between rhetoricians and neuroscientists in order for both to become acquainted with the
nuances of the other, an argument they actually perform in their jointly written piece.
Such an approach could rightly be called dialogic since neurorhetoric’s aim is for
rhetorical scholarship to employ and mine neurological research for productive insight—
and for neuroscience itself to mine the rhetorical tradition for insight into human
motivation, emotion, communication, and persuasion.
Similar to Jack and Appelbaum’s methodological approach to neurorhetorics—as
a rhetoric of neuroscience—Chris Mays and Julie Jung’s “Priming Terministic Inquiry:
Toward a Methodology of Neurorhetoric” (2012) intentionally situate neurorhetorics
“squarely within the rhetoric of science,” but unlike Jack and Appelbaum, Mays and Jung
do this tactically in order to create a space for a rhetorical preemption. For Mays and
Jung, there is a need to arrest unethical possibilities that neuroscience will be taken up
and used in the classroom in order to satisfy the discipline’s “pedagogical imperative.”
For Mays and Jung, this imperative would inevitably express itself through positivistic
orientations and neuroessentialism. For Mays and Jung, without a neurorhetorical
intervention, rhetoric and composition could potentially repeat the same epistemological
mistake arguably in with previous iterations of cognitive rhetoric. The motivations of
cognitive rhetoric is, for Mays and Jung, present the
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correlative opposite of the exigency that informs neurorhetoric: namely, to
resist the pedagogical imperative and the cognitive reductionism it can
engender by identifying complexities with which writing teachers must
contend before importing brain research into our pedagogies and
classrooms. (43)
To their credit, Mays and Jung see the potential interest of neuroscience for rhetoricians,
they just want to refuse its use in particular scripted ways and want to prevent it from
“ending up anywhere” (42). Their methodology alluded to in the title opens a space for
rhetoric to engage neuroscience in an inherently aporetic way. That is, in recognizing a
neurorhetoric that is founded on rhetoric as epistemic, we can, first, foreclose the
possibility of an epistemological certainty and, second, preclude the chance that such
certainty will filter into writing instruction.
Both articles, however, rely on an essentially discursive definition of rhetoric that
is always-already bound in language. A third articulation, the alternative I would argue is
most productive to rhetorical studies currently, is to be found in Jeffrey Pruchnic’s
original definition neurorhetorics that is closely aligned with both Gilbert Simondon’s
notion of technogenesis and Bernard Stiegler’s work on tertiary retention. Whereas the
later iterations of neurorhetorics were much more recognizably aligned with a rhetoric of
science, Pruchnic’s original use of the term in “Neurorheotrics: Cybernetics,
Psychotropics, and the Materiality of Persuasion” (2008), focuses on material networks—
biological, technological, and cultural—in order to discuss the relationship between the
brain and persuasion. Looking specifically in areas of cybernetics and psychotropics,
Pruchnic works through a material neurorhetoric in order to question the internal
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sovereignty of the contemporary human subject and the permeability of the boundaries
among technology, neurology, and culture. More specifically, Pruchnic asks after the
“complex and contemporary tangle of concerns over the relationship between experiential
and neurochemical vectors that drives much recent work in both technoscience and
critical theory” (169). Rather than language being the primary site through which a
neurorhetoric can emerge, language is a site among others in relation; a rhetorical force
neither primary or privileged, but one among many. To demonstrate this, Pruchnic begins
with the tangled case of a suicide involving psychological disorder and the compulsive
play of video games.
Shawn Woolley, a 21-year-old resident of Wisconsin who died in 2002, became a
topic of discussion after his suicide sparked a debate in the popular media. Woolley’s
death, Pruchnic argues, points towards how we might define the entanglement of neural,
cultural, and technological networks that define a material neurorhetorics. Far from being
the special cases of uniquely compelled individuals, such entanglements have always
defined the general condition of the brain—to be is to be entangled in just these kinds of
networks.
After his suicide, Woolley’s mother charged his hobby, playing the online roleplaying game EverQuest, with both exacerbating his depression and directly leading to
his suicide. Was it the case, as Woolley’s mother charged, that online video games could
alter the chemical and physiological composition of an otherwise healthy brain so
intensely as to cause a psychological disorder? EverQuest players are known for their
compulsive playing of the game. A public Yahoo! Group, “EverQuest Widows,” or
EQWids, boasts over seven thousand members and exists to provide support for the
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“partners, family, and friends” lost to the immersive virtual world of EverQuest.
Providing links to On-Line Gamers Anonymous, a 12-step program designed to help
players recover from their addictions, EQWids locates itself explicitly as an “Addiction
and Recovery” forum. Pruchnic questions whether the simulated realities of video games,
like EverQuest, influence neurophysiology and to what degree. Further, Pruchnic inquires
into how such interaction online challenges conventional notions of an autonomous
human subject just as it inspires a “technological ecstasy” that defines what Brian
Rotman calls “becoming beside oneself” (168). According to Rotman, such ecstasy is the
defining characteristic of our heavily mediated and digitally oriented milieu. Here,
Rotman’s work is worth explicating a little further not only as its influence on Pruchnic’s
version of neurorhetorics is sizable, but also because it points us towards redefining
attention as a posthuman phenomenon.
In Becoming Beside Ourselves: The Alphabet, Ghosts, and the Distributed Human
Being (2008), Brian Rotman argues that all media—from alphabetic writing to video
games like EverQuest—alter, and ultimately configure, human neurology. In a discussion
of the affect dimension of alphabetic writing on the configuration of the brain, Rotman
notes:
‘Learning one’s alphabet,’ acquiring the ability to read and write
alphabetic inscriptions, is an intense cognitive business requiring a
permanent alteration of their brains that takes human children a protracted
period of repetition and practice to accomplish. Neurologically, the
requirements of literacy create in the brain what we might call a ‘literacy
module,’ a neural complex within the neocortex dedicated to writing and
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reading purely textual entities… (29)
As such, writing acts as a “neocortical override” of the midbrain that suppresses and
inhibits the production of another medium of communication—speech. For Rotman, the
suppression found in the writing/speech binary naturally leads to and is indicative of
other hierarchies present in the Western culture, specifically: cognition over affect,
thought over feeling, and spirit over body. Writing, then, moves us away from the
corporeal self—feeling, the physical body, and affect—and towards a disembodied
cognition—an incorporeal self. In purely neurophysiological terms, such conceptual
hierarchies are iterations of a material hierarchy taking place in the brain with the
strengthening and growth of the neocortex to the detriment of the midbrain. Writing
itself, as both a medium and a way of becoming, encourages and privileges certain parts
of the brain. In the trajectory away from speech, with its dependence upon specific
anatomical realities, there is a simultaneous movement away from all embodiment.
Simply put, for Rotman, to write is to become disembodied:
Once the alphabetic body is in place, once the neuronal pathways of
literacy have been installed in the brains of its users and became automatic
through the repeated alphabetic writing of speech and reading of lettered
texts, that is, as soon as writing ‘invisiblizes’ itself as a medium, the stage
is set for the coming into being of an entity—necessarily incorporeal—
who is imaged to write ‘I.’ (31)
Writing is the beginning of the incorporeal and disembodied “I” that stands beside “us.”
Interiority of the thinking subject would have been impossible, according to Rotman,
without the advent of writing. Likewise, the advent of writing would be impossible

!

67

without the reticulated relationships between neurophysiology, technology, and cultural
symbolicity.
Similarly, Pruchnic’s version of neurorhetorics calls for recognizing the kinds of
reticulations present in rhetoric and neuroscience rather than simply calling for a
specialized version of a rhetoric of science as others have recently done. For its part,
rhetoric’s role in such networks is, for Pruchnic, the “creative manipulations of our
abilities to respond” (197). Here I would like to turn towards recent discussions of
rhetoric and the body in order to argue that Pruchnic’s definition has a long history in the
rhetorical tradition. By thinking through this long tradition we will also come to the
relationship between rhetoric and attention, attention and the body, and, finally, to a way
to think of attention as nonhuman phenomenon. I would like to begin, surprisingly
perhaps, with Isocrates and trace the role of attention in one of the earliest instances of
formal education: rhetorical paideia.

An Embodied Neurorhetoric
In Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece (2005), Debra Hawhee
observes deep connections between the pedagogical strategies of both athletics and
rhetoric in classical antiquity. Emphasizing the materiality of persuasion in the rhetor’s
own physiology, to train for Isocrates—whether as an athlete or rhetor—required just
that, training. The development of capacities through sustained engagement and physical
repetition, it was the conscious production of bodily habits based on movement. As
Hawhee observes, the same term—epimeleias—is used for training in both the athletic
and rhetorical milieus. That is, epimeleias, as a practice, would be familiar in both the
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context of the gymnasium and the agora. Connoting careful, even painful, attention
towards something—epimeleias was the term used by Isocrates to describe the intense
physical practice of memorization his rhetorical education was premised on. Hundreds of
phrases, passages, and anecdotes were to be committed to memory in order to develop the
capacities for speech and put them to use in public life. Similarly, Aristotle’s own
structure of rhetorical education stressed epimeleias, along with spoudas and suntonias—
the attention, study, and exertion that—according to his Rhetoric—begin as pain, but
become a pleasure through habit.
What I am concerned with here is: First, how epimeleias—as the central concept
and condition for a rhetorical education—demonstrates how attention itself might be
defined as the relationship between knowledge embodied in mnemonic technologies—
alphabetic texts, audio recordings, film, digital modes of inscription, or any other
spatialization of memory transforming it into a social object—and the trainable and
mutable properties of the human biology—particularly the plastic properties of the brain;
and, second, how we might then say that this relationship provides the conditions of
possibility for the emergence of rhetorical agency. Further, I would argue that the diligent
attention of epimeleias enacts a dynamic between what we attend to and the dynamic
properties of the brain.
This dynamic has been the focus of intense discussion in conventional
neuroscience since advancements in imaging technologies have made the material brain
visible in novel ways. For instance, recent studies have observed greater brain volume in
the hippocampus—a structure heavily involved in both memory and spatial navigation—
of London taxi drivers who must memorize the many hundreds of streets and routes they
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transverse daily. In studies conducted by cognitive neuroscientists, Eleanor Maguire and
Katherine Woollett, London taxi drivers were used as useful models to explore the
relationship between the environment and the structure of the hippocampus because of
their daily navigational habits (“Acquiring” 2109). Discussing the larger ramifications of
their study, Maguire and Woollett continue:
Direct evidence for hippocampal plasticity in response to environmental
stimulation could allow us to understand the boundaries within which
human memory operates and the scope for improving or rehabilitating
memory in educational and clinical contexts. Moreover, given the dearth
of longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) structural association
studies focusing on higher cognitive functions in average adults engaged
in truly naturalistic behaviors, taxi drivers could contribute new
information to the wider debate about whether key aspects of cognition are
fixed or malleable. (2109)
Maguire and Woollett conclude the adult brain is indeed more malleable and plastic than
previously considered. In fact, their study concludes, “there is a capacity for memory
improvement and concomitant structural changes to occur in the human brain well into
adulthood” (2112).
Similarly, braille readers are found to have structurally different brains than the
sighted population—particularly in areas of the brain associated with finger sensitivity. In
brain imaging studies exploring the spatial recognition capabilities of the blind,
neuroscientist Amir Amedi, explores the extent to which neuroplastic properties aid the
visually disabled to navigate their world. Defining neuroplasticity as, “the brain’s ability
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to change its structure and function throughout the course of a lifetime” which is “visible
across different levels of brain functioning which include genetic, neuronal, and synaptic,
as well as the level of brain networks and the nervous system as a whole” (353).
Concerning the temporal dimension of neuroplasticity and its relation to frequent
practice, Amedi continues, “plasticity is also manifested in the dynamics of emergent
cognitive processes and overt behavior” (353). Amedi’s research explores the emergence
of plastic properties in cases of sensory loss—when a sighted person becomes blind, or a
hearing person losses the ability to hear, for example. Amedi concludes that such losses
initiate “radical reorganization of the neural architecture” as the parts of the brain
previously working towards that lost sense become reallocated over time (372).
While studies in human subjects are offer intriguing possibilities, neuroscientists
have turned to the study of neuronal changes in mice to get attempt to capture
neuroplasticity in action. In one such study, neuroscientists have been able to link the
growth of dendritic spines—the kind of neuronal growth associated with learning—to
task-specific environments. Investigating the neurophysiological changes in mice when
introduced to new practices, the team introduced three sets of mice to three different
practice scenarios: a first set trained only to reach under a piece of plexi-glass for a seed;
a second set trained to reach for a seed and climb for a piece of pasta; and, finally, a third
set that were introduced to multiple stimuli in the form of ladders, tubes, fences, etc., but
not trained in any new way to get food. They discovered that the brains of the first group,
the set practicing one task—that of reaching—changed the most. Tighter clusters of
dendritic spines—and with larger ends that are associated with stronger synaptic firing—
were more prevalent in the reach-only mice. Perhaps one of the most enlightening aspects
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of the study was not that there was physical evidence of learning on a neuronal level, but
the speed at which those changes could be measured. In a period of four days, there were
marked differences. Unlike the tree in this slide adapting to its environment glacially—
becoming brick—it appears that brains—at least physiologically—are geared towards
rapid change when set to a single task. It appears that single-task learning re-structures
the brain for that task and idea which obviously has some evolutionary benefits—skills
that formerly required active attention could become more automatic, freeing up those
attention reserves to look for threats.
In many ways, this relationship between such objects of attention and the brain
preclude the possibility of the autonomous human subject in the same way that “we” both
are and are not our brains in profound ways. As Deleuze and Guattari observe in the
conclusion to What is Philosophy? (1991): “It is the brain that thinks and not man—the
latter being only a cerebral crystallization” (287). The notion that individual agency must
be founded upon an autonomous rational subject has, of course, been problematic for
some time. Yet, for many still, the possibility of rhetoric at all rests on an intact rhetorical
agent capable of choice. In Rhetoric of Motives (1950), for instance, Kenneth Burke notes
that persuasion necessarily involves “choice, will; [and] is directed to a man only insofar
as he is free…” as rhetoric becomes unnecessary when an actor “must do something”
(50). Elsewhere Burke gives the analogy, “Food, eaten and digested, is not rhetorical. But
in the meaning of food there is much rhetoric” (173). Keeping with Burke’s analogy, the
last decade of neuroscience research is making gains towards proving that the idea of a
liberal human subject—a volitional self—is the result of mechanistic neuronal processes
which individuals have perhaps less awareness of, or control over, than their own
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processes of digestion. Collectively, such research has been dubbed the “neuroscientific
challenge” to free will as it argues that—to quote Sam Harris, one of the more popular
and vocal neuroscientists making such arguments—“all of our behavior can be traced to
biological events in which we have no conscious knowledge” (103). Harris, at one point
in his 2010 book The Moral Landscape, describes the mind/body relationship as a
“phenomenological glockenspiel played by an unseen hand” (104). Harris’s argument of
the phenomenological glockenspiel has been gaining credence since Benjamin Libet’s
original investigations into the neuroscience of free will in the 1980’s.
Libet, one of the first neurologists to study consciousness by conducting
experiments on live human subjects, used patients whose medical conditions already
necessitated cortical implants. Libet’s first experiments delivered a small electric pulse
deep within the brain. Libet found that patients were only aware of the pulses if they
lasted longer than half a second, but experienced the pulse—once aware of it—as if they
had felt it from the start. Inspired by these findings, Libet’s next set of experiments asked
healthy subjects placed in front of a clock to push a button at any moment they had an
urge to do so while making a note of the exact moment on the clock. Libet discovered
that EEG monitoring subject brain wave activity could observe changes in the brain,
again, a half second prior to the conscious decision to act. Libet’s experiments
demonstrate that the brain, at least on a basic electro-chemical level, is in the processes of
decision-making before conscious awareness of the decision. While half a second is
enough to be scientifically significant in itself, Libet notes “The actual initiation of
volition may have begun even earlier in a part of the brain we weren’t monitoring” (qtd.
in Horgan 305). Twenty years later John-Dylan Haynes’s repeated similar experiments
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using much more advanced equipment, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
which could monitor areas of the brain previously unstudied by Libet.
In 2007, Haynes’s team at the Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience
in Berlin asked subjects to lie flat in an fMRI scanner while holding two buttons. At any
time subjects could push either the left or right button at their discretion and were asked
to remember when they became consciously aware of their decision. Haynes found that
they could predict which button would be pushed in many cases seven full seconds prior
to the actual event. According to Haynes, his experiments reveal that “there is a
mechanism unfolding, a deterministic mechanism, that leads up to [an individual’s]
decision at a later point in time that is inevitable and could only go one way”
(“Neuroscience and Free Will”). For Haynes, conscious processes of decision-making—
and, by extension, consciousness itself— is only the byproduct of neuronal activity; the
exhaust of a biochemical engine which supplies the actual impetus of human motivation.
While Haynes experiments may not have uncovered the “unseen hand” playing the
phenomenological glockenspiel, we now had a clearer picture of how long it took to
strike the keys.
Taking up Libet’s supposed challenge to free-will, Brian Massumi used Libet’s
work to provide insight into the role of affect as a bodily rhetoric. In Parables for the
Virtual (2002), Massumi provides a way in which we can begin to think about the precognitive affective dimension as the underlying condition and pretext for conscious
attention. Discussing the significance of experiments conducted by Libet, Massumi
demonstrates how attention, decisions, and conscious choice are the secondary
afterthoughts, so to speak, of affect. For Massumi, Libet’s missing half second is nothing
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less than a gateway into the virtual, in which one can see the primacy of the body in an
affective relation with its environment. Massumi observes,
In other words, the half second is missed not because it is empty, but
because it is overfull, in excess of the actually-performed action and of its
ascribed meaning. Will and consciousness are subtractive. They are
limitative, derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be
functionally expressed. (29)
For Massumi, the present moment always passes too quickly to be perceived and
experienced consciously. We, at least to the extent we can be identified with our
conscious minds, experience the world behind the body. Libet’s experiments demonstrate
that that the present is taking place virtually though we experience it in “real time.”
Libet’s missing half second is, for Massumi, a virtual half second that occurs within an
altogether different set of temporal constraints. Concerning this, in A Counter-History of
Composition (2007), Byron Hawk notes that the virtual is “like bullet time in The Matrix
… [in which] viewers see the trajectory, the movement of the bullet, slowed down,
intensified, so they can get a sense of that movement, which is a primary form of reality
beyond static points of visual perception” (118). It is this “primary” form of reality—the
affective space of the virtual—that is inhabited by and accessible to the body.
Importantly, the “static points” that are accessible to consciousness are made
static by their affective pull and come to be objects of attention. In this sense, to perceive
visually necessarily occurs within what Massumi identifies as an “economy of attention
and distraction” (139) as the complexity of experience must be narrowed to that which is
comprehendible to consciousness, much like the range of visible light is only the portion
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of the entire electromagnetic spectrum that is available to our ocular perception. Like
Hawk’s “bullet time” example demonstrates, this is economy of attention is largely a
question of speed—of slowing things down, and speeding them up, to observe what
becomes available to us with each successive change. Simply put, what we can attend to
depends on our speed. Here I would like to question whether it is possible to effectively
change our speed, to “shift gears” perhaps, and, if so, does this fall within the domain of
the plastic properties of the brain as recently discussed by Catherine Malabou and others?

Plasticity and Attention
When interviewed by Bill Moyers, Patricia Smith Churchland noted that the basic
assumption of the interdisciplinary discussion between neuroscience and philosophy—a
generally called neurophilosophy—is that the brain holds the key to the epistemological
and ontological questions philosophy has been engaging since the beginning. As
Churchland remarked in the interview, “I am assuming that if we do understand the
brain, we will understand the nature of knowledge, learning, memory and so on”
(“Neurophilosophy”). For Churchland and many other philosophers in the analytic
tradition, neuroscience is a way to solve the mind-body problem. A continental
perspective of neuroscience, however, coming most forcibly from Catherine Malabou,
demonstrates that the brain’s plastic properties work to foreclose such epistemological
totalities. Rather, for Malabou, contemporary neuroscience of plasticity presents ways to
reimagine subjectivity.
In the conclusion to What Should We Do With Our Brain? (2008), Malabou
argues that “neuroscientific discourse in general exposes itself to ideological risk and
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offers nothing new to mankind, while plasticity, far from producing a mirror image of the
world, is the form of another possible world” (80). The implications of Malabou’s
argument here for a neurorhetoric of attention is twofold. First, we can see that what
counts as knowledge in neuroscience, like any other discipline, is grounded in an
episteme of the particular era and, in this Foucauldian sense, always gives the world back
to itself. Second, plasticity does not hold the potential for novelty and invention, but is
rather is the ground for invention itself. In this way, Malabou uses plasticity as a way in
which to navigate the trajectories of tradition and innovation and articulate what John
Muckelbauer has recently called “the problem of change.”2 One of the essential features
of plasticity that interests Malabou is that it is both malleable and resistant
simultaneously, that is, plastic is simultaneously open to change, resistant to change, and
unable to return to its previous form once changed. Plasticity then is not simply the
overcoming of one form for another, but is also not static. More to the point, during a
larger discussion of plasticity and the question of change, Malabou notes that,
Changing therefore amounts to finding a mode of torsion, reversion,
metamorphosis, or migration that matches the impossibility of fleeing and
the injunction to look at what looks at us. It is a kind of flight in situ, if
you like …To modify oneself is to change without fleeing, running, or
waiting. (Plasticity 42)
In this way, perhaps plasticity can offer us a way to engage the problem of change and
the challenge to “invent a practical style of engagement that doesn’t just repeat the
structure of negation and refusal” (Muckelbauer 12). For Malabou, it is precisely this
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See the first chapter of The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the
Problem of Change, SUNY Press, 2008.
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stationary movement that the concept of plasticity offers.
In The Principles of Psychology (1890) William James notes, “[o]rganic matter,
especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with a very extraordinary degree of plasticity”
(105). In the two decades, there has been significant progress with regards to just how
plastic nervous tissue actually is. One of the contemporary leaders in researching
neuroplasticity, Salk Institute geneticist and adult brain researcher, Fred H. Gage3, notes
that the idea of plasticity challenges the entire notion of identity and neural stability that
so much contemporary scientific thought rests on. In a recent article, “Structural
Plasticity of the Adult Brain” (2004), Gage notes that neuronal plasticity calls into
question our ability to remember details of our experience from one moment to the next
and the experiential unity of our subjective experience. Discussing the frequent
comparison of the brain to that of a computer, a comparison that will be pertinent during
later discussions of posthumanism and cognition, Gage notes that,
One of the main reasons for viewing the brain as a stable machine or
computer is because this analogy helps explain how we can remember
from one instant to the next. If the underlying structure was changing all
the time, how could we do that? For that matter, if the brain is the seat of
consciousness, as proposed by Francis Crick, how would we maintain a
self identity if the brain were not stable? (136)
Gage here refers to Crick’s later work, specifically The Astonishing Hypothesis: The
Scientific Search for the Soul (1994), in which Crick argues for a materialist
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
It is important to note here that Gage’s research led to the discovery that adult
neuronal regeneration, or neurogenesis, does occur. Gage’s discovery that ran counter to
the conventional neurology of the time.
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understanding of consciousness. Neuroplasticity does not discount such a materialist
understanding, of course, but what it does do is complicate and untether such
understandings from the strictly deterministic outlook that continues to be a pervasive
force in genetics and biological circles. In other words, we continue to imagine the brain
as a “series of fixed, indeed genetically programmed, entities, without any suppleness,
without any improvisational ability” (What Should We Do 4). The problem with such a
mechanistic view of the brain, for Malabou, is alienation. Neurodeterminism works to
create a phenomenological feedback loop of alienation as the unknowable material brain
determines future possibility. Malabou’s own comments on the computer metaphor of the
brain may be helpful here, as such
unsettling metaphors in the register of command and government: a
controller that sends orders down from on high, a central telephone
exchange, a computer … all of this cybernetic frigidity which only serves
to alienate us from consciousness (What Should We Do 5).
Malabou goes so far as to say that through plasticity, we are “living at the hour of
neuronal liberation” (8). If nothing else, Malabou’s enthusiasm is indicative of the
sausive force behind ideas of neuroplasticity as questions of agency are revitalized and
given a new wholly material life.4 Neuroplasticity, at least conceptually, resists the
deterministic foreclosures of an increasingly vocal element in conventional science.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
While she will complicate such notions later, the introduction to What Should We Do
with Our Brain? is fairly, and uncharacteristically, explicit in connecting neuroplasticity
with a certain kind of agency. At one point she argues, “The difference between brain and
psychism is shrinking considerably, and we do not know it. ‘We’ end up coinciding
completely with ‘our brain’—because our brain is us, the intimate form of a ‘proto-self,’
a sort of organic personality—and we do not know it. Humans make their own brain, but
they do not know they are doing so” (8).
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The problem with contemporary research into consciousness and cognition lies in
the neglect of the ideological and political influences into such processes and
phenomenon. For Malabou, the neuronal self,5 is just as much a construction of such
social forces as it is a biological construction of cells and electrochemical processes.
Malabou argues that such neglect is not the fault of accident, but is built into the very
value structure of the sciences and it works to support an idea for the naturalization of
capitalism in a supposed pre-determined world. In fact, misreadings of the implications of
neuroplasticity have worked towards this as well. Malabou notes that plasticity is almost
always misread as “flexibility,” in that new research demonstrates that our brains are
malleable enough to adapt to the contingencies of our environment. For Malabou, this
flexibility works to satisfy the demands of hypercapitalism and the increasing need for
“flexible” labor. Concerning this, Malabou suggests an exploration of the explosive
properties of plastic:
Not to replicate the caricature of the world: this is what we should do with
our brains. To refuse to be flexible individuals who combine a permanent
control of the self with a capacity to self-modify at the whim of fluxes,
transfers, and exchanges, for fear of explosion. To cancel the fluxes, to
lower our self-controlling guard, to accept exploding from time to time:
this is what we should do with our brain …To ask “What should we do
with our brain?” is above all to visualize the possibility of saying no to an
afflicting economic, political, and mediatic culture that celebrates only the
triumph of flexibility, blessing obedient individuals who have no greater
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
Malabou’s usage of neuronal self stems from Jean-Pierre Changeux’s work, Neuronal
Man: The Biology of the Mind (1985).
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merit than that of knowing how to bow their heads with a smile. (What
Should 78-79)

According to Malabou, the reductive equation of plasticity with flexibility is indicative of
how neuroscientific research can be employed in the service of what she calls neuronal
ideology, that is, constructing views of how our brains are organized and, by extension,
how we come to think about the world around us. Flexibility neglects the idea of
resistance central to plasticity, as plastic is that which both receives form and gives form.
Similarly, flexibility also neglects the explosive orientations of plasticity. Towards the
end of What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Malabou offers an explication of the
political implications of plasticity. The formation of what she calls a “biological alterglobalism” that results from the cultivation of rage “against a certain culture of docility,
of amenity, of the effacement of all conflict even as we live in a state of permanent war”
(79). Malabou is quick to remind us of the connection between the concept of plasticity
and plastic explosives and that not all explosions are acts of terror. For Malabou, the
plastic brain provides an image of an alternative to global capitalism and, as a nod to
Jacques Derrida, a “world to come” (82). Just as Derrida theorized the necessity of
democratic political systems oriented towards futurity—a democracy “to come”—
Malabou argues for a plastic “world to come.”
This third characteristic of plasticity, taken from plastic explosives, is the most
politically charged element in Malabou’s model. Conceptually, plastic has the ability to
receive, give, and erase form simultaneously. Plasticity’s political agenda is to provide
subjects a way in which a “biological alter-globalism” can be rendered from
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contemporary global capitalism. This variance on the social structures of global capital is
not so much an alternative as it is a deformation of the same. Malabou’s challenge to
what she calls “neuronal ideology” is designed to deform how her audience relates to
their brains, and the supposed plasticity of this organ. As alluded to above, what we have
now is a consciousness of flexibility, and what we need to develop, Malabou argues, is a
consciousness of plasticity. To this point, Malabou notes that a more appropriate and
exact title of the book that was published as What Should We Do With our Brain? would
be: “What should we do so that consciousness of the brain does not purely and simply
coincide with the spirit of capitalism?” (What Should 12). But to discuss the development
of a political consciousness is a very different thing than a discussion of neuronal activity
and the strictly material biology of the brain. In some sense, such neuronal activity has to
be “translated” or transformed into what we generally understand as conscious
awareness. For Malabou, nothing has been put forth by contemporary neuroscience to
account for what she characterizes here as a becoming. Despite scant answers, such
questions remain central for Malabou’s project. Concerning these, she asks, “We do not
truly know what originally makes these transitions possible: Are they biologically
programmed? Are they the fruit of experience or of individual history? Are they the result
of both?” (What Should 64).
While we may not fully know how electrochemical processes in the brain
translate into mental phenomenon, part of Malabou’s overall project and her attraction to
plasticity as a concept is that, however malleable, ultimately it seems to give form. In a
recent work, Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing (2009), Malabou proposes a “philosophical
change of perspective that focuses on closure as its principal object” (82). Closure,
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without rigidity, is plasticity’s promise. In many ways Malabou holds to the notion of a
unified subject, or the desire of a unified human subject, even if that subject is now a
brain with plastic properties. For Malabou, the condition of being a human being is to be
a “brain that changes itself” (82). In this way, she separates herself from many
contemporary thinkers that see the brain organized as a series of neural networks that are
ultimately open-ended and indicative of the larger networked and distributed assemblages
in a plural mental/physical assemblage. It is here that Malabou seems most connected to
what could be a neuroscientifically informed phenomenology.6 Malabou’s “object of
closure,” however, when thought against the conceptual framework of autopoiesis in
biological theory takes on a much different connotation.
Ideas of autopoiesis and cognition in the work of Chilean biologists Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela is, I would argue, the most fruitful area to discuss
cognition and consciousness as it relates to Malabou’s concept of plasticity and the
relationship between brain and mind. Maturana and Varela’s “Santiago Theory of
Cognition” states that, "Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a
process of cognition” (Autopoiesis 13) which is the same for organisms with and without
a central nervous system. In this way we can see that all living systems—down to cellular
level and beyond— are involved in the process of cognition which works against the
privilege surrounding the human and it the supposed unique properties of the human
brain. Simultaneously, cognition in Maturana and Verla’s sense suggests rhetorical
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It is helpful to remember that Malabou traces her use of plasticity back to Hegel. In a
recent interview, she notes that “I found [plasticity] for the first time in Hegel. He uses it
when he defines subjectivity in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The subject is
not supple and soft, and it is not rigid either; it is something in between. The subject is
‘plastic.’” See: interview with Noelle Vahanian in the Journal for Cultural and Religious
Theory, 2008.
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possibilities for the articulation of a plasticity not as a singular characteristic of the highly
developed neomammalian brain, but as a general characteristic of life. In such a way the
relationship between cognition and plasticity runs into many contemporary arguments
taking up the idea of posthumanism.
What I want to stress in casting Malabou’s philosophical “object” of closure
against many threads running in posthuman thought is Malabou’s ultimate emphasis on
plasticity’s ability to maintain form as a type of closure and how this can be related to
Maturana and Varela’s work with autopoiesis, but while this may help us think of how
cognition creates what Maturana calls “linguistic domains” in which autopoietic systems
can use to “reduce environmental complexity and interface with the world” (qtd. in Wolfe
xx), this also works to complicate the “problem of change” as cognitive loops can account
for invention as they seem to replicate the selfsame. Helpful in this regard is Cary
Wolfe’s principle of “openness from closure” discussed in What is Posthumanism?
(2010) and elsewhere. As Wolfe states, “the very thing that separates us from the world
connects us to the world, and self-referential, autopoietic closure, far from indicating a
kind of solipsistic neo-Kantian idealism, actually is generative of openness to the
environment” (xxi).
Openness and closure, tradition and innovation, difference and repetition, as they
are articulated in the “problem of change” appear to be more closely related that we could
have imagined. They are, in Malabou’s idiom, plastic. At least on a neuronal level,
“openness from closure” is the general operation which is always impacted by the
communicative domains of the environment, and in fact, are indicative of how such
domains are always—and above all else—rhetorical. As Malabou observes:
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The ‘plasticity’ of the brain refers to the capacity of synapses to modify
their transmission effectiveness. Synapses are not in fact frozen; to this
degree, they are not mere transmitters of nerve information but, in a
certain sense, they have the power to form or reform information. This
type of plasticity makes it possible to forward the hypothesis of neuronal
circuits that are able to self-organize, that is, to modify their connections
during the activity required by perception or learning. (Plasticity 59)
In this way, one can say that to perceive is to be persuaded. The rhetoricity of perception,
on a cellular level, forms and reforms our perceiving material brain. What it means to
“learn” then, and the function of education, takes on a material significance not usually
argued for and role of the body itself becomes much more mysterious as it becomes
virtual.
Katherine Hayles’s first tenet of posthumanism in How We Became Posthuman
(1999), states that the posthuman view “privileges informational pattern over material
instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of
history rather than an inevitability of life” (2). Plasticity, in Malabou’s sense, blurs the
lines between information and materiality in such a way that to be embodied biologically
is to be virtual. Hayles’s tenet here echoes much of the work which fell under the general
heading of posthumanism a decade ago most of which theorized and lauded the
posthuman as a way to think not only outside of the liberal humanist subjectivities, but
outside of the body as well. Alan France’s “Historicizing Posthumanism” (2001) begins
with this idea as he notes that the promise of the posthuman “enables us to imagine what
it might be like if experience were no longer contained in the biological vessels we now
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inhabit” and an eventual “escape from the limits of corporeality” (175).
Neuroplastic properties, when looked at from the an autopoetic orientation,
demonstrates that the boundaries of the corporeal human is permeated through and
through by the environment. Such permeations are, according to theories of
symbiogenesis, how organisms progress. In many respects symbiogenesis takes the
already blurred boundaries between organisms a step further as the line between what is
considered living and non-living becomes even more skewed. An early theorist of
symbiogenesis, Russian botanist Boris Kozo-Polyansky writing just after the turn of last
century, considered organisms to be a “consortia” resulting from an “accumulation of
homogeneous elements and their development along different directions, depending on
their function” which form a “composite organism, characterized by a new form and a
more complex structure” (110). From the view of symbiogenesis, the human body is
neither unified or human, but rather an ecology of various organisms in symbiotic and
parasitic relationships. Symbiogenesis is one way to think of the body as a distributed
assemblage along biological lines. It is also one way to think of the brain, as Deleuze and
Guattari mention in the third chapter of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia (1980), a “population, a set of tribes” (64). Quite another way to articulate
both the body and the mind as an accumulated consortia is to think of medial
relationships in larger ecologies, particularly our increasingly dependent relationships
with technologies. As Brian Rotman notes in Becoming Beside Ourselves,
There is however ultimately no separation between interior and exterior:
inner experiential ‘I’ and outer collective ‘they’ fold into each other. All
thought, even the most private and enclosed, is from outside itself, socially
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existing, being publically mobilized, using and being used by the media
and technological apparatuses that surround us, constitutes our psyches—a
phenomenon whose articulation demands an ecology of the self and
psychic agency that foregrounds the contemporary technologies of the
virtual (103)
Here Rotman points towards ways in which our experience of consciousness, our
individual cogito, is a mutual experience with our larger environment that cuts across
temporal and spatial gaps. Just as current research into neuroplasticity discussed in
Malabou’s work demonstrates that the brain is in a state of constant flux of reaction,
resistance, and adaptation to our environment, so too is the mind. For me, the tracking of
such change and fluctuations is inherently within the domain of rhetoric. Rhetoric, it
could be argued, is the development of a way in which to account for such changes and
the creation of taxonomies of flux.
Rotman, along with Malabou, also points towards possible avenues that could be
taken in neurorhetorics. Rather than a continuation of a “rhetoric of science” only now
applied specifically to neuroscience, a neurorhetorics as such could also be employed to
the rhetorical affects of—and just as importantly—the appreciation of the “compositional
dimension of body-brain-culture relays” (Connolly xii). Such relays and registers at once
material, virtual, and conceptual are always rhetorical. Political theorist, William E.
Connolly’s Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (2002) concerning the intersections
between neuroscience and political culture is a precursor to how neurohetoric could
proceed. According to Connolly, neuropolitics provides a way to talk about a “politics
through which cultural life mixes into the composition of body/brain processes” (xii).
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Similar work done within the field of rhetoric, most notably by Jeffrey Pruchnic whose
work examines the “materiality of persuasion” through psychoactive drugs, technology,
and neuroscience. What can contemporary theories of neuroplasticity, symbiogenesis,
and our relationships with technology, promise for discussions of ancient rhetorical
education and the civic life of ancient Greece? Here I would like to return to Isocratean
rhetoric in order to offer a “plastic reading”7 of Isocratean rhetorical paideia.

Plasticity and Paideia
Rhetorical education for Isocrates was a training in plasticity. Much like the
etymology of plastic—from the Greek plassein, which means to mold, model, or form—
Isocratean rhetorical pedagogy was designed to allow students to be attentive and
receptive to the audience in any rhetorical situation, and to have the ability to apprehend
the kairotic moment in which to act. In such a way, Isocrates designed his paideia as a
means of training participants in civic culture to make the right decisions, and to take the
right actions to serve the public good. The emphasis here on the social would be
impossible without a training of the individual to become proficient in self-deliberative,
phronetic processes which result in a kind of plasticity in relation to the social, but also to
the rhetor’s self. As Leslie Paul Thiele observes in an extended investigation into ancient
rhetorical practices and contemporary neuroscience, “moral judgment is not a process of
deriving imperatives for action from abstract propositions ... it arises through the
internalization of social values and the immediate perception of their violations” (71). As
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Malabou’s work often takes the form of an extended discussion of a major figure
(Hegel, Freud, Derrida) that she describes and alludes to as “plastic readings.” Her notion
of plastic readings is important for rhetoric in its own right, particularly as it relates to
Muckelbauer’s notion of “productive reading.”
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a result of his unique pedagogy, Isocrates has been historically positioned in a liminal
space between philosophy and rhetoric, but belonging fully to neither. Even in Plato’s
Phaedrus, Socrates mentions Isocrates’s noble character who even “nature has placed the
love of wisdom in his mind” (279A). At the time of Plato’s writing, Isocrates’s school in
Athens was better known that Plato’s own Academy and its pedagogical practices were
also quite different. Isocrates founded his rhetorical paideia on the mutual relationship
between kairos and phronesis (Sipiora 8). Citizens with phronesis, as a pragmatic ethics,
and the ability to apprehend kairos as the “opportune moment,” make for good speakers,
and ultimately, a good polis.
Isocratean rhetorical paideia was arguably more concerned with teaching
philosophy than a system of rhetoric because of this emphasis on the self-deliberative and
an attunement to phronesis. Not only did Isocrates aim to teach students the ability to
make good speeches—and therefore have the persuasive abilities to align an audience
with your position—but also meant generating a particular kind of plastic subjectivity
that could be attuned to wisdom. Thus, the rhetorical success in Isocratean paideia is
much more polyvalent and nuanced than at first appears to the modern reader as it takes
into account both external and internal practices. As Isocrates states in the Antidosis:
With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are
open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown;
for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak
in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts; and,
while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we
regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their problems in their
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own minds. (Readings in Classical Rhetoric 48)
The distinction Isocrates makes here between one that is eloquent and one that is a sage is
important, as it is not only indicative of the two primary aims of a rhetorical education,
persuasive speech and wisdom, but also how those two aims are inherently related and
learned.
The same faculty for speaking well which allows the student to persuade an
audience also allows the student to deliberate matters internally and vice-versa. The
distinction between relating to an audience and relating to your “self” then is one of
degree rather than kind. On a neuronal level, it would seem that the same mechanisms are
placed in motion whether one is attempting to persuade an audience publically or reciting
a speech from a handbook in private.8 There is a correlation between Isocratean mimetic
practices and how the brain functions as it forms and reforms itself resulting from the
rhetorical situations it apprehends itself in. According to Haskins, Isocrates viewed
"performance (mimesis) as a source of civic education" (7) and designed a rhetorical
paideia which affirmed the “the cultural sources and performative nature of political
identity” (14). One can read such a system of education dependent on kinds of rhetorical
templates in terms of neural development, as, according to Malabou, “cerebral
morphogenesis results not in the establishment of a rigid and definitively stable structure,
but in the formation of what we might call a template [which] is then refined (sculpted)
during development and, in a subtler but always powerful way, throughout life” (What
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It has been successfully argued from both sides as to whether or not Isocrates taught
using a kind of handbook. It is clear that Isocrates’ rhetorical pedagogy did not hold to a
prescriptive method, but there is evidence that an anthology of speeches or a collection of
the types of oratory was used. Terry Papillion’s “Isocrates’ Techne and Rhetorical
Pedagogy” (1995) does an excellent job of exploring the various sides of this debate.
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Should We Do 21).
Contemporary research in neuroscience is only in the last ten years discovering
just how the brain regenerates cells. Gage looks towards a future in which we will not
only be able to target such growth and development using specific drugs, but also via
targeted activities which will work at “activating specific brain areas to accept and
integrate the new cells” (140). Such research points the way in which, to quote Daniel
Smith’s review of Thiele’s work mentioned above, “The neurological self is a constant
yet dynamic dimension of who we are and what we can do” (243). Facilitating and
forming the plastic abilities of the brain to enact a social good was the aim of Isocrates’
rhetorical paideia and through his particular education one can see the intersections of the
civic, neurological, and rhetorical.

Plastic Futures
In 2006, a team of German researchers affiliated with the University of
Regensburg examined the brains of thirty-eight medical students before, during, and after
a grueling three month long period of intense study leading up to their preliminary
medical exam—the Physikum. Using a variety of scanning and imaging techniques, the
researchers found that there was a significant increase in gray matter in the parietal
cortex, an area towards the rear of the brain which is involved in calculations,
visuospatial relations, and memory (Blakemore and Frith 60). The researchers concluded
that neurogenesis, the generation of neurons from stem cells, and neuroplasticity
increased during this period of “acute study” and “cognitive stimulation” leading up to
the exam (Draganski et al. 6317). Specifically, the researchers concluded their study by
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noting:
It is reasonable to assume that plasticity is a characteristic of the nervous
system that evolved for coping with changes in the environment.
Understanding changes in brain structure as a result of learning and
adaptation is pivotal in understanding the characteristic flexibility of our
brain to adapt. (6317)
Such studies are beginning to fuel an entire speculation industry surrounding
neuroplasticity and its implications for how we think about the world and ourselves.
Books such as Sharon Begley’s 2007 bestseller, Train Your Mind, Change Your Brain:
How a New Science Reveals Our Extraordinary Potential to Transform Ourselves, with
its cover that touts the work as a “groundbreaking collaboration between neuroscience
and Buddhism” and even has a forward written by the Dalai Lama, and Norman Doidge’s
The Brain that Changes Itself—“The power of positive thinking finally gains scientific
credibility!”—are indications that we are at the beginning of neuroplastic boom
regardless of how sound the science may be. The public wants to believe in
neuroplasticity for obvious reasons, it grants us a belief in the power and possibility of
change. If even adult brains are capable of neurogenesis, and periods of learning as short
as three months can demonstrate neuronal growth, then one can only guess at where the
limits may be. In this way, due to its sausive force, neuroplasticity has value for rhetorical
scholarship despite whether or not it will prove to be just another booth in the quasiscientific self-help marketplace. Though, to echo Jordynn Jack’s warning, rhetorical
scholarship of neuroscience must be aware of falling into an “uncritical fetishization of
the brain as a scientific object divorced from its historical and rhetorical context” (409).
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One way to do is through Catherine Malabou’s conceptual work involving
neuroplasticity which aims to both sketch an “ideological critique of the fundamental
concepts of the neurosciences,” and at the same time one that resists the “tired alternative
between reductionism and antireductionism” (What Should 82). For Malabou, grasping
the ethico-political dimensions of neuroplasticity allows us to rhetorically mobilize it for
affirming alternative futures. As Malabou notes, “I have tried to position us at the heart of
this [plastic] challenge, while inviting readers to do what they undoubtedly have never
done: construct and entertain a relation with their brain as the image of a world to come”
(82). As such, Malabou’s work offers a productive resonance with the recent work of
Bernard Stiegler who takes up and theorizes neuroplasticity for the purposes of
highlighting the effects of digital technics on human capacities to sustain attention. For
Stiegler, neuroplasticity ensures a material cognitive dimension of biopower on a cellular
level that begins at birth. As Stiegler observes:
When they construct children’s day-to-day environment,
psychotechnologies modify the synaptic organization of their developing
brains, to the detriment of the structuring of the cerebral plasticity nurtured
by the psychotechniques Katherine Hayles analyzes as ‘deep attention,’
critical consciousness, which education is responsible for inscribing as the
basis of rational disciplines (regulated circuits of transindividuation).
(Taking Care 94)
For Stiegler, psychotechnologies the brain’s of children in a contemporary hypercapitalist
milieu are subject to the children’s programming industry whose product works to
“short-circuit” the long-chain retentional circuits necessary for full psychic maturity. The

!

93

intensity of affect, the speed with which it is delivered, and the variance of information of
digital media, in particular, present problems for the synaptogenic properties of the brain.
Though, for Stiegler, those same plastic properties also offer alternative possibilities
through the mobilization of therapeutic new media that cultivate a responsibility towards
intergenerational retentions. !
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CHAPTER 4
PSYCHOPOWER AND THE PHARMAKON OF COMPOSITION
History is a heat. It is the heat of accumulated information and accumulated complexity.
As our culture progresses we find that we gather more and more information and that we
slowly start to move almost from a fluid to a vaporous state as we approach the ultimate
complexity of a social boiling point. I believe that our culture is turning to steam.
-Alan Moore
In Chasing Literacy: Reading and Writing in the Age of Acceleration (2014),
Daniel Keller argues that literacy in contemporary culture is best defined through
speed—more specifically, through acceleration. As students increasingly read and write
online in modes other than traditional print, Keller rightfully calls for scholars working in
rhetoric and composition to further invent pedagogies of reading and writing in the
twenty-first century. For Keller, many in the discipline focus too heavily on theorizing
the composition of multimodal and networked texts, but fail to account adequately for
changing literacy practices and what it means to read in digital environments. As digital
rhetoric continues to emerge as a major area of research in the discipline, the increase in
the number of composition courses that allow students to compose primarily audio and
video texts increases as well. Further, the very definition of composition as a discipline is
changing in the wake of this discussion. The problem for Keller, however, is the
intensification of multimodal composition and production has yet to bring an equally
important focus on consumption and reading of these texts in digital environments. This
focus on consumption, perhaps unsurprisingly, is largely a matter of theorizing attention
95

and its role in literacy. Accordingly, Keller argues, that “speed and attention are vital
components of contemporary literacy” (1).
Much like N. Katherine Hayles’s work on hyperreading in “How We Read: Close,
Hyper, Machine” (2010) and elsewhere, Keller notes the ability to skim and scan across
multiple juxtaposed windows of information through multiple digital interfaces
encourages an increasingly accelerated reading practice that rhetoric and composition
scholars have yet to attend to or account for. While composition instructors have tended
to value slow rhetoric—that is, as described by Lester Faigley, the kinds of rhetorics that
are defined by “lengthy exposition, explicit logical relations, sobriety, and order” (qtd. in
Keller 95)—the benefits of fast rhetoric should be considered and evaluated.
My aim here is to show that neither fast nor slow rhetorics should be privileged
by the field independently, but in their relation to attention—to the direction and
composition of particular attentions. Furthermore, I will show how fast and slow rhetorics
as articulated by Faigley and Keller can be productively reframed through Bernard
Stiegler's extended work on writing in all its incarnations as a pharmakon. As noted by
Stiegler, it is the pharmakon that is “at once what enables care to be taken and that of
which care must be taken—in the sense that it is necessary to pay attention: its power is
curative to the immeasurable extent that it is also destructive” (What Makes Life 4). In
the end, I want to suggest that a pharmacological approach to composition pedagogy
offers an ethics of literacy for composition studies in this “age of acceleration.” In
concert with Rosi Braidotti’s recent work towards a posthuman ethics of becoming and
Marilyn Cooper’s recent call for a “pedagogy of responsibility” (“Rhetorical Agency”
443), a Stieglerian ethics of literacy complicates notions of responsibility premised on
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individual choice in order to promote and emphasize the rhetorically affective roles of
technical objects through which a becoming literate is a possible in the first place.
Towards this end, it is important to articulate Stiegler’s concept of psychopower
by showing its relation to Michel Foucault’s work on biopower and its relation to
contemporary technologies of reading and writing.

Psychopower, Capital, and the Biology of Individuation
The relationship between technology and culture is such that it is notoriously
difficult to parse out the causal agents driving one from the other. For Keller, new
technologies largely enabling an acceleration of literacy cannot be separated from the
larger cultural context from which they emerged. The twin values of late capital—
efficiency and production—work in conjunction with new technologies in order to create
the conditions of possibility for an accelerated literacy. The rapid pace of hyper-attention,
moving from information stream to information stream in quick, often nonlinear
succession, feels productive. It is, in a sense, covering a lot of textual ground with a
seeming dexterity and nimbleness provided by a contemporary computing experience.
The persistent metaphor of “surfing” the Web is a reflection of the economic drives of
contemporary capital. Keller argues this pace of accelerated literacy is enmeshed in and
supported by a culture that values an uninterrupted availability and equally uninterrupted
production. As Keller notes:
Speed is influenced by economic competition, which is also mirrored in
social competition. Market competition for the latest communication
technology or upgrade also drives the social competition to be an early
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user of the technology or upgrade, which then becomes the norm. (72-73)
Norms most of us know all too well as our favorite products and services increasingly
have a shorter and shorter shelf lives. The planned obsolescence of product engineering
and design coupled with the cultural capital of using the latest device and services,
provide the conditions for the accelerated turnover of our digital lives and the literacy
practices that constitute it. Inherent in this acceleration and move towards ever faster and
ever more mobile practices is, of course, the increasingly permeable distinctions between
work and leisure.
While largely out of the purview of Keller’s study, this permeation of work-time
and work-space into what used to be the domestic and private space-time of everyday life
is worth investigating further through Stiegler's concept of psychopower. For Stiegler, the
idea that such spheres of relation are increasingly indistinguishable make an argument for
the replacement of affective and libidinal desire1 with mechanistic drives. A replacement
that results in a general diminution of the libidinal economy necessary for long-term
affective cultural investments and the developing of systems of care, which [attention]
Jeffrey T. Nealon's recent work on Foucault describes this relationship between
work and play in terms of biopower and the traditional distinctions between public and
private rhetoric. In his analysis of Foucaultian biopower, Nealon’s Foucault Beyond
Foucault (2008) uses the indistinct boundaries between personal and private time
encouraged by the contemporary culture of global finance capital to reverse the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Stiegler's frequent references to libidinal desire are taken from his reading of JeanFrancois Lyotard's Libidinal Economy (1974) and Lyotard's project to use Freud's work
on psychosexual desire to analyze contemporary capital is here used by Stiegler to make
explicit the connection between contemporary marketing and public relations techniques
as psychological techniques working in and through desire.
!
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traditional domain of rhetoric as an essentially public enterprise. Rhetoric has been
traditionally interpreted as discourse useful in the creation of a public space or a
“commons”; however, for Nealon, biopower demonstrates the opposite as this common
“takes up residence in the private realm, not the public sphere” (85). As the practices of
biopower have leached into every facet of human life and the shift of more and more
work taking place in digital environments, the distinction between one’s working-life and
non-working life has been all but erased. As Nealon notes:
Following the intense saturation of biopower’s concepts and practices
within everyday life, contemporary capitalism has not gone about setting
boundaries on work, but rather has sought to increase work’s saturation
into the very fiber of everyday life. Think of yourself at home, answering
e-mail at midnight. A Highly intensified mode of biopower, then, is what
one might call the ‘operating system’ of contemporary economic and
cultural life, at least in the so-called first world. (85)
Further, Nealon argues that the increasing privatization of economic value demonstrated
by increased privatization of formerly public social endeavors along with the gross
discrepancies of wealth shifting to fewer and fewer private entities can be seen in all
facets of life. Nealon cites the rise of the memoir as the preferred literary form, the rise of
the creative writing major, the dominance of the “body” as an academic preoccupation
across many disciplines, the entertainment industries’ shift to the inside of the home
through high-speed internet, pay-per-view events watched on home-theater systems, the
privilege placed on “subjective authenticity” in popular music, student-centered
pedagogies, and the coverage on American television of sporting events becoming
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“orgies of personal revelation” (87-88). In so doing, Nealon broadens the scope of
biopower from simply focused on the economic analysis towards those cultural practices
that are so near and valued that they often fall out of the purview of critique; the creative
and domestic realms that too often go under-theorized. Towards the end of his own
analysis, Nealon asks leading questions that will be helpful to think through just how
Bernard Stiegler in his own theory of the spread of biopower to distinctly cognitive and
psychological domains in psychopower. As Nealon asks: “Are celebrations of individuals
and their intimate experiences merely cultural compensation of an economic system that
renders the individual’s private feelings and desires almost completely moot?” For
Nealon, this seeming turn to interiority as a cultural value is a byproduct of
privatization’s absolute victory in the economic domains (89). Just as the technologies of
power worked through regulation, education, and imprisonment towards the docility of
bodies in the development of biopower, psychopower augments biopower by working
within distinctly mental capacities through technics of attention.
Nealon’s description of the contemporary “cognitive laborer” checking e-mail at
in the middle of the night is, for Stiegler, symptomatic of a “generalized
proletarianization” occurring through our contemporary pharmacological condition
leading to a general addiction to such practices (What Makes Life 26). Towards this,
Stiegler notes that this worker is not simply working because he or she now has the
capabilities, but is rather a reaction from a history of immersion in an entire mediated
milieu that has been biologically internalized. The brain, as the organ of individuation—
and consequently trans-individuation—is in a relation to the technologies of literacy and
sociality on a chemical level. This central concept of individuation that Stiegler takes
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from the work of Gilbert Simondon is always a process of collective individuation, that is
transindividuation, and it is that which separates it from individualization in a more
general sense. For both Simondon and Stiegler, “for the I to individuate itself, my
individuation must participate in the process of collective individuation, that is, in the
individuation of a we where, insofar as I am an I, I have always already found myself
inscribed” (Acting Out 66). This pre-inscription of the I that is not yet an I is elsewhere
called the “preindividual funds” of the “transindividual horizon” and represents all the
possibilities of becoming individuated including language, law, philosophy, etcetera
(Acting Out 5).
What is important here is the relationship to the material brain and these material
instantiations of the preindividual fund which neurologically inscribe the brain in the
processes of adulthood, or, as Stiegler discusses in a later work:
The brain is a plastic space of reticulated inscriptions organized by the
internalization and, if you will, the retro-projection of relations linked with
and through the supports of epiphylogenetic projection—through which
nervous memory both exteriorizes and internalizes itself, that is, weaves
itself by passing through its outside, by making a detour through a
pharmacological milieu—and such that synaptic short-circuits are also
possible. (What Makes Life 69)
For this reason, Stiegler can make claims similar to those of externalist thinkers discussed
in the second chapter, noting that “the life of the brain to a large extent occurs outside the
brain” (What Makes Life 68). What separates Stiegler from many of these other thinkers,
however, is that his work understands these processes of individuation as essentially and
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irrevocably pharmacological—that is there are cognitive and social consequences that
Stiegler articulates along the line of the poison/cure metaphor that the pharmakon
provides. Much like biopower, and power more generally, for Foucault, working to
catalog bodies, mitigate risk, and intensify punishment, through the generation of data—
medical records, illness prediction, the knowledge produced by bodies sick and well—
psychopower is actively involved in the collaborative production of exploitable metadata.
For Stiegler, the exploitation of metadata through social engineering and relational
technologies working to develop folksonomies are not benign, but rather are intended to
disrupt and “short-circuit’ the capacity of attention necessary for individuation
(“Relational Ecology” 13). While digital media has intensified psychopower, it is
important to trace psychopower further back in the 20th century to understand Stiegler’s
concept. In the contemporary pharmacological moment, this consequence can be seen as
a crisis of attention, and ultimately, individuation itself.
One can think of the whole overarching structure of forces that fall under the
purview of “market research,” and how such research is mobilized through film,
television, and new media to get an idea of the enormity and scope of Stiegler’s concept
of psychopower. In fact, for Stiegler, it was in the 20th century, beginning with Edward
Bernays, the famous nephew of Sigmund Freud and the “father of public relations,” that
psychopower became the central core of consumer capitalism. This trend has continued
in the 21st century with the development of neuromarketing techniques. While Lanham
observes signs of the healthy progression of late capital and Hayles sees a looming
problem for models of education in the 21st century, Stiegler sees nothing less than the
collapse of western culture and permanent neurological disorder of an entire generation;
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with the digital pharmacology “the speed of operation has led to short-circuits in the
political and noetic spheres” (What Makes Life 103). To quote N. Katherine Hayles,
whose work influenced Stiegler’s thinking about attention, “Stiegler argues that the
phenomenon is much graver than I acknowledge; rather, attention is actively being
destroyed by what he calls the audiovisual (i.e. film and television) and programming
industries” (How We Think 251). One can better understand how Stiegler can make such
claims by understanding the processes of individuation and the role attention, as
retention, plays in such processes.
A central concept running through Stiegler’s oeuvre, the notion of retentional
apparatuses, provide the condition of possibility for both society and any notion of a
“self.” These retentional apparatuses are divided into three registers that simultaneously
operate in the function of individuation: primary retention, the perception of the present
as it experienced moment-by-moment; secondary retention, the internalization of primary
retention woven in the context of the subject’s collective internalized representation of
life, or what we generally think of when we think of one’s “memory”; and, finally,
tertiary retention, the material instantiation of memory and the formation of archives
through technologies. Tertiary retentions are the collected technics of secondary retention
that allow for something like culture to emerge. For Stiegler, “[t]ertiary retentions are the
sedimentations that accumulate across generations and that are central to the process of
creating collective individuation, internalized through both consciousness and the
unconscious during the development of the psychic apparatus” (Taking Care 6). The
ongoing processes of individuation result from a relationship with the cultural past,
relationships the technologies of psychopower, for Stiegler, threaten to undermine.
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Technology and/as Pharmakon
Such issues are pharmacological in the sense articulated by Jacques Derrida in
“Plato’s Pharmacy” (1968) as both poison and cure. In Socrates’ recounting to Phaedrus
the Myth of Theuth (274C-275B). Theuth, an ancient Egyptian divinity that is accredited
in the dialogue for the discovery of calculation, astronomy, games of dice, and—most
importantly in the myth—writing. As Socrates continues, Theuth explained to the
Egyptian king at the time, Thamus, the benefits of his many inventions and the effects
they would have on the Egyptians. Describing writing, Theuth notes that it will “make the
Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory: I have discovered a potion for memory
and for wisdom” (274E emphasis mine). In reply, Thamus notes that Theuth’s discovery
of writing and his affection for it has clouded his judgment, that his description of writing
as potion for remember is the opposite of what it truly is:
In fact, it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it:
they will not practice using their memory because they will put their trust
in writing, which is external and depends on signs that belong to others,
instead of trying to remember from the inside completely on their own.
You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding;
you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its
reality. (275A)
Famously, in his reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, Derrida analyzes Plato’s use of this word
potion (pharmakon) to characterize writing. The notes accompanying the 1995 translation
of Phaedrus by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff note that potion here can refer to
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a “medicinal drug, a poison, or a magical potion” (79). For Derrida, the multivalences of
pharmakon as used in Plato’s dialogue, as both poison and cure, point toward the inherent
“complicity of contrary values” contained in writing itself (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 125). For
Derrida, the “‘essence’ of the pharamakon lies in the way in which, having no stable
essence, no ‘proper’ characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, physical,
chemical, alchemical) of the word, a substance” (125-126). Hence, pharmaka as a
“pharmaceutical nonsubstance” is insecure, unstable, and thoroughly working through
différance.
In “Plato’s Pharmakon: Between Two Repetitions,” published as the first chapter
in the influential Derrida and Deconstruction collection (1989), Walter Brogan notes that
Derrida’s encounter with Plato’s dialogue is indicative of the problematic Derrida wants
to express with regards to writing itself; that every composition, every moment of writing
is simultaneously a reading that forecloses possibility (8). To translate pharmaka as
either remedy or poison is to foreclose the play of différance that allows the word to
function at all. Thus, to write is to close off possibility. Not only the logocentric tradition
of Western philosophy makes this demand, but something about the nature of writing
itself. In sum, writing is a pharmakon—as Thamus said. On one level then, perhaps
ironically, Derrida and Plato’s dialogue seem to be agreement—writing is pharmakon—
but the difference, the essential difference, is one of style. Stylistically, Derrida famously
attempts to perform the play of difference in his writings. As noted by Rollins,
In the case of ‘Plato’s Pharmacy,’ Derrida demonstrates a style of
inheritance that exceeds the content of his claims about the Phaedrus.
Though this text is full of methodological asides, for example, it is
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impossible to tell where Derrida’s discussion of method stops and the
enactment of this method begins. (23)
Whereas it has been generally interpreted in the history of Western philosophy that Plato
is creating what Alexander Galloway has called a “moral distinction between the lifeless
media and the living people” in Phaedrus (French Theory 16), Derrida’s performative
style notoriously complicates the possibility of reading in this way. One can see Plato’s
distinction between the living logos enacted in dialogue and thought compared to the
inert pretension towards logos that occurs in writing. In this letter, only a teacher as a
pathfinder can enable the “flash understanding” that “blazes up” and allows the mind to
be “flooded with light” (“Epistle VII” 99). For Plato then, pharmakon of writing is a
negative, while for Derrida it is an invitation to make a statement regarding language writ
large, and, finally, for Stiegler is the general condition of human life at every turn. For
Stiegler, the pharmacological question is the question of technology—what capacities do
technics open and which do they close; said another way, how what do they cure and
what do they poison.
For Stiegler, every technology from pencils, cotton gins, tape recorders, iPods,
and server rooms presents a pharmacological dilemma that that threatens individuation at
every step. For Stiegler, technology is pharmacology. The technological shifts we are
currently living through present a particularly pointed dilemma for Stiegler in that current
technologies threaten to sever the long-chain associations of tertiary retention and the
attentional and critical faculties necessary for education in the Kantian sense—as the
struggle for maturity. Digital media then, for both Stiegler and Hayles, presents a crisis,
or turning point, for education. This particular crisis calls for a cataloging of affects in
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order to intervene. In other words, a cultural therapeutic that can transform the digital
milieu from one dominated by the capture of psychopower to the care of what Stiegler
refers to as “technologies of the spirit.”
For Stiegler, his therapeutic is to be achieved through interdisciplinary study of
the mutual dependencies and coevolutions of the three domains of transindividuation: the
technical, the social, and the biological. This study, which Stiegler refers to as a general
organology, attempts to index the “hypermateriality of knowledge” in order to gain an
understanding of the relationships between the bodies, minds, and technologies. Stiegler
is quick to note that “this study of hypermateriality must be placed at the heart of digital
studies, which must itself become the new unifying and transdisciplinary model of every
form of academic knowledge” (“Die Aufklärung” n.pgs). Just as Hayles posits the need
for bridgework—between the cognitive modes of deep attention associated with literacy
and book culture and hyper cognitive modes—Stiegler calls for a pharmacological
indexing necessary for the “organological rethinking of the education system” (Taking
Care 83). For Stiegler, technology should be indexed according to its associated effects
on attentional forms and its relation to tertiary retention. This reactivates, according to
Stiegler, questions introduced under the rubrics of distributed cognition, situated
knowledge and extended mind by the likes of Edwin Hutchins, Andy Clark, and others
(“Relational Ecology” 13).

Stieglerian Pedagogy
The central chapter of Taking Care of Youth and the Generations (2010), entitled
“What is Philosophy?”, is unsurprisingly associated with Deleuze and Guattari’s book of
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the same title. Their What is Philosophy? (1991), became a best seller in France and is
impossible to disregard when reading Stiegler’s work. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari
spend their work making distinctions between science and philosophy—and these fields
concern themselves with, namely, functives and concepts—Stiegler begins with the
beginning, that is, with what is generally considered Plato’s first written work, Lesser
Hippias, in order to point towards the initiatory gesture of philosophy itself as a question
regarding philosophy as teaching. This first question, according to Stiegler, demonstrates
that philosophy’s question is not of being, becoming, poetry, law, power, technics, not
even of the pharmacological question of memory technologies—but of teaching (Taking
Care 107). Stiegler’s reading of Lesser Hipias shows that philosophy’s question—of
teaching—also shows that it is philosophy’s practice.
While philosophy as teaching and practice was present in this earliest example
from Plato, philosophy’s general shifting of emphasis from the techniques of selfconstitution—that is “care for the self”—towards the recognition of a pre-existent self
implicit in the Delphic injunction—“know thyself”—Plato moves from the “body
knowledge” of rhetoric to the disembodied gnosis of anamnesis. For Stiegler, the dictum
to “know thyself” ontologically as what is contrasted with “care for thyself” as what
does. As noted by Alexander Galloway:
I am not sure philosophy has a name for ‘what does,’ but if it did it would
probably be filed under either physics or ethics, these being the two
branches of philosophy that consider the doing or the practice of things,
the two branches that consider the machinic energies of the world that
Stiegler so avidly entreats us to cultivate. Or perhaps one wanders too far
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afield. Perhaps this is simply what one calls the political. What does.
(French Theory 11)
What the philosopher does that is central to Stiegler’s practice of philosophy is desire.
Specifically, for Stiegler, the philosopher desires to understand the objects that, by
necessity of the practice itself, can never be understood. As Stiegler notes, “[t]he
philosopher loves wisdom precisely to the degree that escapes and transcends him:
wisdom is philosophy’s object of desire in proportion—and disproportion—to its being
chimerical, persisting for the philosopher as an endlessly renewed interrogation” (Taking
Care 109). The very limits of interrogation, the end limits which end in aporia,
demonstrate the boundary between philosophy and what Stiegler refers to as
mystagogy—religious teaching. Thus, for Stiegler, philosophy’s pedagogical object can
“never be the telos of straightforward teaching (the simple interiorization of retentional
operations), but that must become an experiment, indeed a way of life: an ascetism, a
care, an epimēleia of a specific type…” (109). Education for Stiegler is the continual
care and cultivation of the desire for wisdom.
However, understanding that begins with the technology of writing composes
objects as knowable in that they are “stripped of mystery” and inculcated into systems of
grammatization. But, according to Stiegler, the object of this understanding can never be
ultimately reduced to composing due to there being an “irreducible inadequacy” between
the object itself and knowledge of the object (110). Most importantly, for Stiegler, this
discrepancy is at the very heart of individuation—there must be this aporia.
Understanding’s important quality here, being that which precedes it, the desire for
understanding the object. For this reason, Stiegler claims, that Plato and Aristotle argue
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that philosophy is not a techné. A technique to be understood and re-enacted displaces the
object of philosophy as an affective desire. As Stiegler notes: “The true, the just, and the
beautiful have an effect on me, transcending my understating as such: they transform me”
(110).
Of interest to rhetoric scholars in Stiegler’s discussion of teaching as philosophy’s
practice is Stiegler’s critique of Plato’s shortsightedness with regards to sophistry as a
pharmakon necessary for individuation. In this sense, Stiegler wants to “rescue” rhetoric
from the history of Western philosophy that continues to interpret in various, often
normatively negative ways, as we shall see with Emmanuel Levinas’s sentiments against
it. Even in the classical world the term was as contested as it was prevalent. As John
Muckelbauer notes, “[w]hile it appeared to have some connection to things like
pedagogy, civic virtue, and language, it also seemed uninterested in providing a rigorous
account of its involvement with any of these things” (“Returns of the Question”).
Sophistry, for Stiegler, is central to processes of becoming and Plato’s repression of it
calling the knowledge gained through technique sophistry and those that practice it
polimatheia or Mister Know-It-All (Taking Care 113). [Plato doesn’t see the pharmakon
of rhetoric.]
In Stiegler’s reading of Plato, rhetoric is interpreted solely as a poisonous technic,
an organized knowledge that is a hypomnesis, a “making-technical of memory,” that is
pitted against the understanding of philosophy that can never be grammatized, organized,
nor made into a techné. We can get a sense of Plato’s privileging of the former in the
dialogue Meno. In the dialogue as Socrates and Meno discuss whether or not virtue
(arête) can be taught and where knowledge comes from, Socrates famously asks an
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uneducated “slave boy” a geometrical question and the slave boy seemingly arrives at the
answer through a process of recollection. This process, anamnesis, is a direct interior
dialectic independent from any exterior memory aides. This process, for Socrates,
apparently answers the “sophistic paradox” of the origins of knowledge; Meno articulates
this paradox once Socrates admits to not knowing what virtue is, but expressing a
willingness to search for it:
Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature
you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you
know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even
supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the
thing you did not know? (80D)
Socrates’s answer comes through a “doctrine of recollection” and spells out the whole of
Platonic epistemology. This epistemology is dependent upon an immortal soul, having
exited in the world of forms prior to being incarnated, recognizing the unknown objects
once they are discovered. Virtue, like any other unknown object in Platonic dialogues,
becomes a bit like Justice Potter Stewart’s famous verdict with regards to pornography,
the lover of wisdom will recognize and know the object when he or she comes across it.
Hypomnesis, and hypomnemata of all of kinds—most famously the act of writing in
Phaedrus and the “Seventh Letter”—thus act as a detriment to the search for wisdom as it
bypasses the process of recollection as anamnesis in favor of a static grammatization or
representation of wisdom.
Stiegler argues, however, that Plato’s dismissal of hypomnemata and organized
cultural memory as the techné of the sophists denies the pharmacological relationship that
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is necessary for individuation. According to Stiegler, “[a]s anamnesis, philosophy
requires a hypomnesia that as a stage of grammatization makes it possible. But
philosophy denies this. (Taking Care 111). Further, since Plato, Stiegler argues, the
entirety of academic tradition has denied writing even as it is constructed on writing as a
culture of letters. Retentional technologies, such as writing, configure disciplines in
academia as they also re-configure the disciplines as projections of knowledge-to-come.
What's important to recognize here is both the crucial importance of grammatized
understanding—as techné, as epistēmē, and, in this sense, as rhetoric—for the possibility
of philosophy in Plato's sense and a the concomitant repression of grammatized
understanding in all forms by philosophy. This amounts to a repression of the pharmakon
itself by Plato's Academy, a repression that continues to shadow over much of
contemporary education. The refusal on the part of academic institutions to embrace all
forms of knowledge as mnemotechnological has allowed for the programming industry
to dominate those technologies and their “empirical mastery of the contemporary forms
of psychotechnologies of hypomnesis” (112). What is called for here, though Stiegler
fails explicitly name it, is a rhetoric of the pharmakon. How does the grammatization of
knowledge affect and persuade the student-reader with regards to individuation? How do
particular technologies influence how we perceive and interpret knowledge? Essentially,
how are particular technologies rhetorically affective?
In Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961), specifically a section in
the work entitled “Rhetoric and Injustice,” Levinas works to construe rhetoric as a violent
encounter with the other that does not seek truth—as does philosophical discourse—but
seeks “propaganda, flattery, diplomacy, etc.” (70). By defining rhetoric as a violence to
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the face of the Other, it is in a direct opposition to the ethics that play such a central role
as first philosophy; an ethics more foundational than ontology even. For Levinas, rhetoric
is a violence on the very idea of freedom that should be “incorruptible” and unable to be
questioned. Indeed, Levinas argues, that rhetoric interrogates this freedom of the Other
asking it to explain itself: “What is the nature of this freedom?” (70). To encounter the
Other in truth, one must renounce the manipulative pedagogy of rhetoric and cease
attempts to objectify—the rendering into an object that, for Levinas, seems to be the goal
of rhetoric—and allow for the required “let him be” of conversation to emerge.
Discussing the role of dialogue and dialectic in Platonic dialogues, Levinas argues
that the transformation of the other, the interlocutor, into an Idea was also simultaneously
a transformation of the other into the Other. Noting the maiutic quality of Plato’s
philosophy, Levinas notes: “Thought, for Plato, is not reducible to an impersonal
concatenation of true relations, but implies persons and interpersonal relations” (71). To
be sure, however, Levinas does not want to cast Platonic dialogue as a conversation
amongst equals, rather it is Socrates coming to his interlocutor transformed to Other—
Socrates’ master. This relationship of the Other as master is necessary for Justice for
Levinas—to recognize the other as master is the seat of ethics and of justice. Equality in
the conventional sense, Levinas argues, has more to do with financial relations and
economic concerns. Justice, on the other hand, assumes a relationship of self and Other
that is outside of the “ruse, enterprise, and exploitation,” which is the domain of rhetoric
(71).
Towards the end of Totality and Infinity, Levinas makes a direct connection
between rhetoric and teaching. Teaching, for Levinas, is not simply the maiutic
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orientation of a master-teacher drawing forth the knowledge the student already is
capable of containing—and in fact contains a priori. Rather, teaching is a relationship
with a master in which the master brings to the student, introduces to the student, more
than the student contains and is capable of containing. In Levinasian idiom, the teacher
enables the student to contact Infinity. Infinity is not so simply the absolute resistance to
the totalizing gesture—the violence—of rhetoric, for Levinas. As the title alludes to,
there is totality and there is the alternative, infinity. For Levinas, the Platonic dialogue as
an ideal does not present a model for teaching as participants in dialogue of this type have
already “decided for discourse, who consequent have accepted its rules, whereas teaching
leads to the logical discourse without rhetoric, without flattery or seduction and hence
without violence” (180). With the Logos as ideal, as the telos of discourse, there is a
totalizing logic already in place. For Levinas, teaching comes before the Logos, before
knowledge, if one comes to the teaching relation as one approaches Infinity. Writing in a
recent special issue of JAC dedicated to Levinas’s relationship to rhetoric, Grant Matthew
Jenkins notes the inherent ethical center to teaching in Levinas’s project: “teaching
presupposes a relationship with an exterior, the Other, so it is ethics, not reason, that
makes teaching possible” (573). I would argue that it is also ethics that makes teaching—
as the practice of philosophy—possible in the work of Bernard Stiegler as well. The
difference is, and it is a key difference to be sure, that Stiegler recognizes the role of
rhetoric in this relationship as absolutely essential—here I am tempted to say, an
essential violence—without which, teaching would be impossible.
It may be helpful to investigate the key differences between Stiegler and Levinas
with regards to rhetoric and teaching by looking at a key passage from Totality and
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Infinity that Grant also pulls from:
Ideas instruct me coming from the master who presents them to me: who
puts them in question; the objectification and theme upon which objective
knowledge opens already rest on teaching. The calling into question of
things in a dialectic is not a modifying of the perception of them; it
coincides with their objectification. The object is presented when we have
welcomed an interlocutor. The master, the coinciding of the teaching and
the teacher is not in turn a fact among others. The present of the
manifestation of the maser who teaches overcomes the anarchy of facts
(69-70)
For Grant, Levinas is stating that knowledge comes in conjunction with the pedagogical
moment—the experience of teaching. As Grant continues, it is language that the teacher
gives the student. Though the language may change—as will the situated knowledge, the
content, etc.—the “primordial sociality” of the teaching relation will not (573). For
Levinas, however, it seems that rather than the situated content playing a conjuctive role
in pedagogy, it is reduced to a form of violence that only the face of the Other in a
recognized infinity can rescue. I would argue that if it is the totalized content—the
knowledge—that the student encounters through the teacher is of equal importance in an
ethical pedagogy. Here it may be helpful to look at Derrida’s critique of Levinas’s ethics
in “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas” (1967)
in order to provide a fuller context to Stiegler’s thought on rhetoric and pedagogy and
how is able to respond the way he does throughout his work on pharmacology.
Teaching in Levinas’s work is premised upon the face-to-face encounter that
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contains the chance for, at least in some regard, an outside of totalization—that is,
infinity. Presence, then, physical presence of the teacher and the student is essential.
Much like Plato’s “Seventh Letter,” which argues that philosophy depends upon physical
presence for the “spark” of the love of wisdom is physically transferred from teacher to
student, the static written word will not suffice. The past, the written, the said, has been
consumed by the violence of totality for Levinas and is unable to teach anything. The
assistance of the Same is necessary for the encounter with the Other, for Derrida. That is,
to put it another way, totality is necessary for and is assisted by infinity in an economy of
violence:
An economy irreducible to what Levinas envisions in the word. If light is
the element of violence, one must combat light with a certain other light,
in order to avoid the worst violence, the violence of the night which
precedes or represses discourse. This vigilance is a violence chosen as the
least violence by a philosophy which takes history, that is, finitude,
seriously; a philosophy aware of itself as historical in each of its aspects...
(117)
It is evident here that, for Derrida, an attention to rhetoric is a kind of necessary violence
that keeps the violence of logocentric regimes aiming to bypass—or short-circuit—
discourse. In Stiegler's idiom, this is exactly what the technologies of psychopower aim
to do—a kind of violence against history and long-term retentio-cultural memory. For
Stiegler, however, philosophy as a practice of teaching centered on rhetoric is another
type of psychotechology—or nootechnologies—that works to foster individuation and by
placing subjects historically in a world.
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The act of teaching, for Stiegler, places us—the teacher and student—on the
grounds of the pharmakon—poison and cure, violence and infinity. The totalizing effect
of writing that becomes the literate pharmakon is a necessary part of the teaching
process. Further, what Levinas views as the violence of persuasive rhetoric is, for
Stiegler, at once a psychotechnology of violence and a necessary foundational dogmatism
that can be “played off of” through questioning and problematizing. In this way, it is easy
to think that Stiegler uses rhetoric as philosophy’s straight-man—holding to the
steadiness of epistēmē while philosophy is “in play” with concepts moving towards
aporia and undecidablilty. But philosophy, as desire, can only do anything when coupled
with an object to cathected itself with (i.e. rhetoric). Rhetoric and the grammatization of
understanding, then, allows for the development of systems of care, which is the object of
teaching and the practice of philosophy as a practice.
Early in What Makes Life Worth Living, Stiegler uses the analogy of what English
pediatrician and psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott called the transitional object to think
through this relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. A transitional object for a
child is any object that is used to provide a sense of comfort and relief form anxiety when
the mother-child bond is not available. For Stiegler, the transitional object is not merely a
substitute for the mother-child bond, but rather is the object that enables and configures
the mother-child bond. Stiegler notes that the actual object, the blanket or stuffed animal
say, is only important insofar as it provides a space for the child to encounter the mother
and vice versa. In its protectional capacities then, the transitional object “gives to the
child placed under this protection the feeling that 'life is worth living'” (2). In this way,
the transitional object is the first pharmakon experienced. It is an external object both

!

117

mother and child are in some way dependent upon and, by consisting in the material
world, lends sovereignty and autonomy to both (2). For Stiegler, then, the transitional
object enacts the necessary composition of heteronomy and autonomy. Whereas Plato
opposed heteronomy and autonomy—the “false” memory of an externalized writing
opposed to “real” recollection of internalized remembering—Stiegler notes the two are
always, in fact, composed. I would argue this is a moment of agreement between Bernard
Stiegler and Richard Lanham with regards to the way objects not only shape our
attention, but enable the shaping of attention to take place at all. Though to two thinkers
are political contrasts, they can be thought together as their own pharmakon.

Lanham’s Rhetorical Education of Oscillation
Herbert Simon’s "Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World”
articulates an attention economy of supply and demand. As Simon notes,
“...in an information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something
else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes
is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of
information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently
among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it.” Largely
building off of Simon’s work, rhetorician Richard Lanham in his own Economics of
Attention writes, “It will be easier to find our place in the new regime if we think of it as
an economics of attention. Attention is the commodity in short supply.”
In the twenty years following Lanham’s definition, his work has continued to
keep attention-rhetoric coupled and central to his work. Recently in The Economics of
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Attention (2006), Lanham has investigated the role of rhetoric as attention in our current
“information economy.” Reworking the so-called information economy, Lanham argues
that all economies are based on supply-and-demand and the short supply in contemporary
technical societies is certainly not information, but rather attention. Consequently the new
economists, for Lanham, are those that can manipulate the push-and-pull of attention:
artists, designers, and rhetoricians. This is demonstrated most succinctly in Lanham’s
discussion of twentieth-century art as playing on bi-stable oscillation of at and through.
In many ways the question of capture and care, or the pharmacological condition
of the digital milieu, is a return to one of the most fundamentally enduring questions the
history of rhetoric has ever produced: the question of whether or not the practice of
rhetoric, in and of itself, produces virtue or vice. Asked differently, is a good orator
necessarily a good person? The question was most famously asked by Quintilian toward
the beginning of book 12 of the Institutio oratoria when he questions Cato the Elder’s
definition of the perfect orator as vir bonus, dicendi peritus, or “the good man speaking
well.” In The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (1993), Richard
Lanham revisits Quintilian’s question, calling it the “Q” question, in order to say that
Quintilian’s refusal to ever give a straight answer to the question is nothing new, in fact,
it reflects a tendency of Western humanism since Isocrates and Plato (155). Quintilian
proffers what Lanham dubs “the Weak Defense” which argues that rhetoric itself
bifurcated into good and bad. It follows, of course, that whoever is speaking is using the
good kind of rhetoric and their opponents are propagating the bad kind. There is,
however, a “Strong Defense” to the question as well. It states that we can never know
how to evaluate what is good or bad until the always man-made social context plays itself
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out. Within this defense, rhetoric is “is not ornamental but determinative, essentially
creative” (156). For Lanham, this question would remain happily unanswered or simply
trotted out periodically to spur philosophical debate had it not been so persistently asked
of, and by, those of us in the humanities in order to provide some kind of justification for
the education we provide. Whenever a curriculum is designed, or a syllabus for any
course that relies on reading and writing we are required to ask this question once again.
According to Lanham, the “Q” question has been most significantly answered by
Peter Ramus who dissolves the question by splitting the rhetorical canon giving
invention, arrangement, and argument to philosophy and leaving rhetoric with style and
delivery (157). Thus the ethical considerations of rhetoric no longer apply. Ramus
provides neither the Weak Defense—rhetoric itself is neither good nor bad—nor the
Strong Defense—history cannot judge it either good or bad now that rhetoric qua rhetoric
is ethically neutral. Ramus’s decision to split and contain philosophy from rhetoric,
which Lanham argues was never the case in ancient rhetorical paideia despite Plato’s
charges, allowed for the creation and evolution of academic disciplines to be thought of
as essentially discrete sites. For Lanham:
We can hardly make too much of this decision. Value-free language and
the possibility of a self-contained discipline make possible both modern
science and that mapping of humanistic inquiry onto a scientific model
which has created modern social science as well. (158)
Further, this decision problematizes the relationship between thought and action itself:
“Thought now had its own disciplinary arena. Knowing could be a self-enclosed activity
all by itself, pursued ‘for its own sake,’ a claim that simply makes no sense in the
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rhetorical paideia, tied as it was to public action” (158). Thus, for Lanham, Ramus
splitting of the discipline of discourse into “essence and ornament” had an effect not only
on the Renaissance education of Ramus’s own time, but continue to affect contemporary
pedagogies of reading and writing into and through our contemporary world. However,
Lanham does not contain the Ramus effect to education, rather it can be seen in
management of corporations and the general comportment of the culture of capitalism.
Towards the end of the essay, Lanham reads Quintilian differently. Rather than
the Weak Defense that Quintilian actually uses to answer his own question, Lanham asks
whether or not his answer was dependent upon the idea of the Strong Defense that was in
mind the whole time. For Lanham, the Strong Defense is linked to the civic good, to
ethics, and to being a “good man,” through the creation and maintenance of a public life
over private realities (189). Perhaps Quintilian understood, Lanham questions, that
rhetoric is how the public person is generated—it did not simply train the person for
public life, rather it generated the conditions of possibility for that public person by
creating and maintaining a public life in toto. This particular kind of rhetorical education,
and, as a result, this kind of humanism, is one that must be able to see and oscillate
between a rhetorical play of ornamentation and the purposeful content of the message.
Or, as Lanham argues, rhetoric must be supple and, at times, “look at language selfconsciously is to play games with it,” and at other times be able to “look through
language unselfconsciously” and “act purposively with it” (189). In one of the more
important moments of “The ‘Q’ Question,” and one that will demonstrate a stark political
and ideological difference between Richard Lanham and Bernard Stiegler, Lanham notes
that the link between philosophy and rhetoric, the key element to justify a humanities
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education in a largely dismissive world is power. According to Lanham, “[w]e can begin
to envisage as well how a theory of reading and writing can become a training in moral
judgment. For what links virtuosity , the love of form, and virtue, is virtú, power” (189).
Power, for Lanham, is generated through the rhetorical oscillation of attention by those
able to move, to persuade, to be both a virtuoso and virtuous. This is, of course, the bistable oscillation of at and through that Lanham discusses elsewhere in The Electronic
Word and, at length, in The Economics of Attention.
Lanham argues that the 20th century’s major contribution to the history of art was
this play on bi-stable oscillation. Just as John Cage invites audiences to “listen” at
silence—or silence’s impossibility, more precisely— in 4’33” (1952), he simultaneously
invites us to be attentive to what we would ordinarily listen through. Similarly, Christo’s
Running Fence (1976) focuses our attention on the aesthetic potentials of wind and the
invisible boundaries of bureaucratic zoning practices—things we usually see through. It
is this at/through distinction—indicative of Lanham’s new rhetorical figure oscillatio—
that marks digital environments most profoundly. In digital environments we must toggle
between looking at the screen as the software continually calls attention to itself as
rhetorical, as constructed, as stylized, and looking through the screen for content,
meaning, and substance. The ability to oscillate attention between “at” and “through” is
an essential twenty-first century literacy and the central concern of rhetorical education
for Lanham. Much like Stiegler, Lanham interprets Plato's repression and dismissal of
sophistry as the beginning of a fundamental error in the Western tradition, and one that
has continual consequences through to the contemporary education. As Lanham notes:
Rhetoric has, since Plato first calumniated the Sophists, been synonymous
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with the art of deception. In democracies, we always call the methods by
which we come to common purpose 'politics' and scorn them, as if there
were some other way to decide business in a democracy. Nowadays, we've
come to call it 'spin'. The flipside of this definition is the art of
cooperation. (58)
For Lanham, Christo's work presents an antidote to Platonic repression of rhetoric.
Christo, according to Lanham, attempts to teach rhetoric as he creates moments and
situations which invite social cooperation from the bottom up through installations that
allow for the reflection on “the social machinery of persuasion” (59). Running Fence, for
example, by the way it was self-financed—by being a startup company—was kept in “the
real world” according to Lanham, and sought no outside support or funds (60). For
Lanham, by Christo selling a kind of artistic stock in Running Fence, certificates with
sketches of the piece by the artist, is purely joint-venture capitalism taking place in the
attention economy. Running Fence presents a pedagogy of attention in contemporary
America, according to Lanham. By creating a very temporary project—the actual “fence”
was only to be up for two weeks—from scratch and self-financed, Christo shows how we
can “bring an idea to fruition in an economics of attention” (62). A lesson that can, of
course, be carried over to the political and public spheres of society. Christo is, in
essence, an inherently social artist and stands in stark contrast to characteristics of the art
world Lanham seeks to negatively assess. Christo occasions Lanham's critique of art that
seeks philanthropic financing and governmental funding in order to maintain a separation
between art and hard financial economies of the world. Such an artist represents, Lanham
argues, the “top-down Platonic lawgiver” who thinks society should pay for his “ex
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cathedra pronouncements” (61). We can see from Lanham's short discussion of Christo's
work that the attention economy is intimately tied tethered to the financial realities of the
monetary economy more generally. Consequently, rhetoric's role in turning attention one
way or the other and its success can be measured by in dollars. For Lanham, attention
may be the substance from which all art is made, and therefore inherently rhetorical, but
it can be used to serve either socio-pedagogical or self-serving ends. If Christo is the
former model, then Andy Warhol's explicit and purposeful vapid stance in the “hyperventilated self-consciousness of the New York art scene” represents the latter (63). Yet,
for Lanham, both Christo and Warhol represent “economists of attention” making their
art from attention, the stuff that makes up “what we think about stuff” (63).
While he ends on an equalizing note, placing Christo and Warhol on an equal
footing with regards to their rhetorical economics, Lanham’s distaste for Warhol’s actual
financial and economic life is undisguised. According to Lanham, Warhol was “naturally
shallow, selfish, and unreflective, a person who would let his kind old mom take care of
him for much of his life and then not bother to go to her funeral” (52). Compared to
Christo’s bootstrap entrepreneurship, Warhol is indicative of the conventional artistic
community stressing the need to remain separate and funded, that Lanham has an agenda
against. Similarly, in the earlier “Q” question piece, we could easily put “the humanities”
as the culture Lanham rails against for their unwillingness to join the practical world of
business. It is little wonder that the preeminent example of the good man speaking well
that Lanham arrives at towards the end of the “Q” question is none other than former
Apple co-founder and CEO, Steve Jobs. For Lanham, Apple Inc. For Lanham, the Jobs
fronted Apple Inc. represents a company that has mastered the rhetorical oscillations
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between at and through in a way that enriches humanity. Focusing on a now famous
anecdote surrounding Steve Jobs luring PepsiCo president, John Scully, to Apple by
asking him: “Do you want to sell sugared water for the rest of your life? Or do you want
to come with me and change the world?” (191). According to Lanham, Jobs’s offer
extended an invitation for Scully to move the profit-centered career that Pepsi offered
him to the “moral life” of Apple Computers. Lanham continues,
Without sentimentalizing the life of a volatile corporation, we can say that
people working at Apple found that it engaged far more of the human
personality than the highly ritualized and spiritualized competitive
atmosphere at Pepsi.
Clearly Lanham has Apple’s American executives in mind as he states this rather than the
thousands of Apple’s assembly workers who are unaffected by Apple’s purported ethos
of conscious capitalism. While it would be nearly twenty years before Apple became the
most profitable company in history and criticized for innumerable human rights
violations across the planet, one is still taken aback by Lanham’s conclusions that, at its
best, Apple “has been trying to mix human motives, not to purify them, to stake its future
on a rich mixture of game, play, and purpose, as the most creative for us humans” (192).
Apple, for Lanham, represents not only an ideal in the economics of rhetoric-attention,
but in old fashioned monetary economics as well. As Pat Kane noted in his review of The
Economics of Attention for the The Independent, Lanham maintains a “unusual political
stance for a literary academic: as a Hayekian, free-market, bottom-up libertarian” (n.
pag.). Indeed Kane’s charge is supported throughout the work in a number of arguments
for both Friedrich A. Hayek’s economic theory and for a theory of a “bottom-up”
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dynamic at play in culture.
According to Lanham, Hayek’s argument for a bottom-up’ free-market economy
“parallel in many ways the basic assumptions of the rhetorical system of education”
(Economics 28). Lanham’s argues that rhetoric sets the conditions of possibility for
competition in a free-market economy to exist and, from there, a site for rhetoric to
prosper in the agon of entities competing for attention and, ultimately, capital. Such a
structure is inherently bottom-up and counter to the “top-down force” operating through
the “state planning of socialism” (73). A belief in the possibility of a bottom-up economy,
whether of attention or of stuff, enables Lanham’s valorization not only of Christo and
Steve Jobs, but of a self-fashioning ideal of a rhetorical education that gives a humanities
education its value. It’s telling discussing the “Q” question in his latter work, Lanham
notes, “What good, finally, are the arts and letters, what work do they do in the world?
They leaven and enrich, rather than repudiate, the commercial world and its values”
(260). From the civic to the commercial world is apparently the trajectory of a Lanhamian
rhetoric.
In many ways, the primary difference between Lanham and Stiegler with regards
to the attention economy is an ideological one. Whereas Lanham observes a “market
attention economy driven from the bottom” (Economics 20), Stiegler notes that pure
“bottom up” organizations do not exist if we mean that such an organization must bring
“all information and grounding decisions to the participants, rather than having a few
decision makers that impose their order,” rather “[s]omeone always decides”
(“Contributory Work” n. pag.). In stark opposition to Lanham’s libertarianism and the
role he assigns to digital media in the future of capitalism, we see, in Stiegler’s work, a
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critique of the attention economy. A critique centered on the notion that digital
technologies—and, indeed, the whole host of technologies that brought about the
ascension of “screen media” in the 20th century—have the ability to capture attention in
ways detrimental to individual and cultural development. Stiegler’s concept of
psychopower articulates the ways that biopower circulates through attention—that is, to
inscribe the psyche. Just as the techniques of biopower that were developed in the 18th
century allowed for the emergence of contemporary capitalism, the techniques of
psychopower are currently being developed and represent similar techniques and
objectives applied specifically to the psychic apparatus in the digital milieu (Taking Care
103). Objectives that are, according to Stiegler, fueled by market forces that hold the
development of psychotechnologies as their central concern. According to Stiegler, the
model of an “attention economy,” where attention is the scarce resource does not so
much produce an emphasis on rhetoric or rhetoricians as the new economists, rather it
persuades corporations to create and employ methods of attention-capture:
Businesses must now be attention-capture mechanisms for all their
products and means of distribution, because only a ‘limited amount of
attention is available’—as if attention were a fluid whose volume and
pressure could somehow be measured; as if it were not the result of
education as the formation of the individual as such, through interiorizing
of psychotechniques crossing an organological set of connections resulting
in construction and expansion of consciousness (i.e. discernment) and the
critical capacity to analyze; that is, intelligence. (Taking Care 95)
The “short-circuit” affect that is attention-capture is the foreclosure of the possibility for
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creating new synaptic circuits for transindividuation. The pharmacological condition of
attention-capture is that it presents only the option of decoupling technics from their
potential therapeutic effects, and, as a result, leaves only the operation of technics. Said
differently, it removes desire and replacing it with drive. For Stiegler the answer is to
develop models of human forms of attention that is at once cultivates the psychic and
social faculties in a plastic brain through the writing of circuits of transindividuation. For
Stiegler, this kind of development is the very basis of care. The human, in this sense, is
defined by the capacities of cerebral plasticity. For Stiegler, what constitutes and
distinguishes the human from inhuman is this characteristic and degree of plasticity in the
neuronal structure—for a human, “plasticity is endless” as is the ability to “interiorize the
circuitry of what they can exteriorize initially, as artifacts” (96). Infinitely plastic
capacities warrant equally infinite systems of care and the proliferation of technologies of
the self.
In this sense, care is a “becoming-pharmacological” that requires a care grounded
in “techniques of the self” (159). Becoming-pharmacological, in this sense, resonates
with the basis of Lanham’s rhetorical education that works to the create the public
person. What is becoming-pharmacological other than the oscillation between capture
and care of technics? In the idiom Lanham employs in “The ‘Q’ Question,” this is the
Strong Defense of rhetoric’s value—it enables a mutually beneficial movement from
private reality of the mind to the maintenance of a public reality. For Lanham, rhetoric
enables the bi-stable movement between at and through, between the technics that
promote an economy of stuff—the codex—to the “volatile fluff” of the computer screen
(Economics 21). Ultimately, for Lanham, it is “rhetoric’s long effort to preserve both
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kinds of attention, and both kinds of language, however self-contradictory in theory the
effort may prove to be, attests to its final loyalty to making things happen in the world”
(Electronic 189). Here it is important to note that the notion of the pharmakon makes the
differences between Lanham and Stiegler becomes apparent here. For Stiegler the
respective ends of bi-stable oscillation are ran through with the pharmacological
condition: a capture/care dynamic of looking at as well as a capture/care dynamic of
looking through. Said differently, from the perspective of the “Q” question’s Weak
Defense, both philosophy as content and rhetoric as ornamentation are inherently
pharmacological. If Lanham’s concern in The Electronic Word was to observe the ways
in which the digital revolution could mark a return to rhetoric and rhetorical education
through bi-stable oscillation, Stiegler’s work nearly two decades later works to observe
the ways the digital as pharmakon—specifically the ways in which the digital have been
taken up and developed by psychotechnologies—challenges the possibility of education
at all.
With this in mind, revisiting Plato’s Phaedrus may prove to be useful. Just as
King Thamus informs Theuth that his invention of writing has occluded his own
judgment regarding writing as a memory aid, and that it, in fact, had detrimental effects
on the soul of the user. We can take from the two interpretations of technics: Theuth’s
notion that technics are transparent tools for use and the King’s view that technics are
anything but transparent in their real effects. For Stiegler, the interaction between
technics and human users creates an emergent pharmacological condition that demands
an effective mediation of technic’s effects through care. For Lanham as well, the digital
presents the potential for a rhetorical mediation of technics that could foster an enriched
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public life. Despite the ideological differences between Stiegler and Lanham, it is
possible to see how bi-stable oscillation could be a technology of care. If, through the
movement between at and through, the rhetor was supposed to produce a self-reflective
feedback loop between technology and its use, as such, it could be seen as a system of
care. Systems which, I argue, demonstrate three properties: first, that care is a particular
kind of attention that acts as an interface between the psychic and collective
individuation; second, that care dissolves the producer/consumer binary through
contribution or contributory work; and, third, care is ontological in that it reverses the
hierarchy of knowing and being that emerged through the Delphic dictum to “know
thyself” as explored in Michel Foucault’s later work on caring for the self. As such, care
is an ethos of responsibility towards the pharmakon of technics. That is, as Alexander
Galloway notes, “[t]hrough care, one can maintain a responsible balance between the
pharmacological teeter-totter; between life and death, poison and cure; between the
corruption of the psyche and the cultivation of the psyche” (French Theory Today 17).
Further, as Stiegler observes in Taking Care of the Youth:
To take care, to cultivate, is to dedicate oneself to a cult, to believe there is
something better: the non-inhuman par excellence, both in its projection to
the level of ideas (consistencies) and in that this ‘better’ must come. This
is exactly the ēthos for which techniques of the self are required; to take
care is to know that since there is a “better,” there is a “worse,” and that it
must be combated… (179)
One way to combat the pharmacological negative of capture is to compose therapeutic
networks of care through contemporary digital technologies. Such networks would be
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inherently rhizomatic in their structure, associating and re-associating in often
unpredictable ways. While it would be impossible to design a network of care with
predictable sets of outcomes, it is possible to create the conditions of possibility for such
networks to emerge. In this way, Jeff Rice’s argument for English studies to focus on the
composition of networks is an prescient call.

English Studies as Networks of Care
Within the context of English Studies, Jeff Rice has looked at these questions as a
way to potentially move the disciplinary object of English studies from writing to
networks. In “Networks and New Media” (2006), Rice notes that networks “foreground
the role connectivity plays in content management, information organization, and
information production in explicit and implicit ways” (128). As such, by reorienting
College English toward the network as the dominant metaphor, we could begin to think
through and make explicit the rhetoric of associations and connections that make up how
we work and play in contemporary life. For Rice, networks are the literal and figurative
spaces of connectivity that are both ideological and technological and allow “information,
people, places, and other items to establish a variety of relationships that previous spaces
or ideologies of space (print being the dominant model) did not allow” (128). The spatial
affordances of the digital network offer, for Rice, a way to reinvigorate English studies
for the twenty-first century. In this way, the teaching of English would move from the
rhetoric of print, that is how print modalities persuade English departments and
consequently student-writers towards maintaining a “fixed point of view through a
singular notion of writing as static, fixed, and individually composted (typically via the
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essay or the exam), taking place in a unified realm of thought deemed 'English'” (129),
towards a rhetoric of new media modalities emphasizing connection and linkage. Print,
and the always-present “space of the page” are seemingly and irrevocably tethered to the
individual author with a fixed identity working alone and aiming to express a singly
coherent and unified idea or argument (130).
On the other hand, new media's space of the screen insists on the possibilities of
dynamic connections and linkages shifting cultural registers and significance through
mixing and remixing “those connections that move from popular culture to the university,
form geography to politics, from literature to film, from theory to theory, form celebrity
to non-celebrity, from city to classroom, from the Web into our daily lives, from writing
to writing” (132). I would argue that Rice's call for English studies to move from its
continued focus on literary texts towards media is a call for the development of a rhetoric
for mnemotechnologies—the techniques and materials used not only to externalize
memory through recording and production, but their affective comportments when
consumed and engaged. Such a disciplinary object would view, like Stiegler, the
foundational importance of rhetoric, and the explicit teaching of rhetoric as a
psychotechnique of care cultivating an awareness of pharmacological relations. In the
chapter that follows, I attempt to assert such careful potentials through three digital
objects: first, Stephen Duncombe’s Open Utopia project, which attempts to create a
digital space to reimagine both More’s text and utopia itself; second, two wiki-based
composition courses I taught at the University of South Carolina; and, third, the
potentials for care in machine grading software developed by LightSIDE Labs. Each
example presents textual interactions—a literary text as community, collaboratively
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composed wiki-texts, and the assessment of student texts by machine graders—that work
to demonstrate potentials for an English studies reoriented towards text as network.
!

!
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CHAPTER 5
CAREFUL PEDAGOGIES
In the previous three chapters I attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for
reorienting the disciplinary object of composition studies towards attention. As discussed
in the second chapter, this would necessarily entail a rekindling of the relationship
between cognitive science and composition studies that was once so productive in the
discipline. Chapter two traces this scholarly history beginning with the famous National
Council of Teachers of English report chaired by Richard Braddock in 1963 and ending
with Margaret Syverson’s more recent work on distributed cognition and composition,
The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of Composition (1999). While decidedly not the
beginning of cognitive rhetoric, the Braddock report does mark an early attempt to study
writing instruction empirically and, for this reason, is often cited as the first formal study
of writing instruction in the United States. While never without its critics, empirical
orientations to the study of writing reached an impasse in composition studies with the
coming of the social turn and increasing skepticism towards claims of scientific validity.
In this climate, knowledge was said to be highly situated, localized, and contextual; in
other words, the critical distance necessary for the observer to say anything conclusive
about the observed was increasingly problematic and discountable. In short order, the
social turn brought with it a scholarly dilemma for those researching cognitive rhetoric.
In order to open a space for a return to cognitive rhetoric, the second chapter turns
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towards science studies, specifically to the work of Bruno Latour.
For Latour, many scholars identified with the social-constructivist critique of
science prematurely ended their analysis. That is, they simply did not go far enough into
the facts they were investigating. Rather than recognizing the inherent sociality of
scientific research and, from there, mounting arguments against science as naïve realism,
these critical projects ended with social-construction as a way to dismantle claims
towards the natural and privilege the social. According to Latour, the next step for
critique is to work from a network orientation in order to articulate ways that both the
natural and the social are generated from relations. The second chapter argues that
Latour’s notion of a “second empiricism” presents a way for composition studies to once
again take up and make use of a cognitive science of writing—a move necessary to begin
thinking through the myriad ways that attention itself can said to be composed by and
between relations of actors—cognitive, technological, and environmental.
These relations continue to be investigated in chapter three, through recent
articulations of neurorhetorics and by theorizing the material networks of the brain and
its plasticity. While Latour’s work provides a productive way to envision the relationship
between scientific values and humanistic ways of knowing, the third chapter picks up
current conversations in rhetorical theory that are attempting to do just this—most
notably, the recent attempts to define the relationship between persuasion, neuroscientific
discourse, and the material brain. Such neurorhetorical orientations look at both the
rhetoric of neuroscience and the inherent rhetoric of neurobiology itself through the
suasive force of neurochemical processes (Jack 2010; Pruchnic 2008). As such, it is a
discourse that points us towards the entanglement of the social and the natural via
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dynamically plastic neuronal networks. Simply put, the environments human beings
interact with work to write the brain in a way that is—at some level—analogous to how
reverberating sound waves write themselves into vinyl when making a gramophone
record or the arrangement of magnetic particles in order to record information. Much like
these analogies to physical media, the plasticity of the brain enables both the ability of
environmental imprints to occur—a process we may more generally refer to as learning.
The third chapter takes up Catherine Malabou’s discussion of these neuronal
processes in her recent work on plasticity. Malabou traces the concept to the Greek term,
plassein, meaning both “to model” and “to mold,” through Hegel’s oeuvre to
contemporary neuroscience. The plastic properties of the brain—both the openness to
change, and a simultaneous resistance to change—ensure that the brain can be molded by
the world, but also that it can give form to the world in return. For Malabou, this
“feedback loop” of openness and resistance to form is coupled with a third property of
plastic: plastic as plastic explosive. This third property of plastic, unlike the other two, is
resistant to the very idea of form itself and seeks to destroy form through explosion. The
third chapter takes up Malabou’s concept as both informative for neurorhetorics and for
thinking through the environment’s role in the forming, modeling, and exploding of the
composition of attention.
The fourth chapter continues an analysis of attention, particularly the ways in
which the digital milieu is said to explode attention, via Bernard Stiegler’s work on the
pharmacological condition. Taking up the notion of pharmaka from Jacques Derrida’s
work on the concept in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Stiegler argues that every technology can
said to be a pharmakon—both poison and cure—as it explodes and/or cultivates attention

136

in particular ways. In this way, the pharmakon places every user in a pharmacological
dilemma that is altogether an ethical question at every turn. Stiegler’s pharmacological
analysis of our contemporary digital milieu shows that it is attention itself that is
threatened in the exchange. According to Stiegler, digital technologies currently ask that
we make a choice between the capture and care of attention. This affective capture of
attention non-metaphorically “short-circuits” the long-chain retentional ecologies that
always exist in some form of material record—either in the data-storage of neuronal
circuits of the brain, through medial recordings of various kinds, or both. These longchain retentions consist of generational transmissions and are the center of formal
education for Stiegler. As such, intergenerational retentions are necessary for the
processes of enculturation.
The urgency of the contemporary pharmacological dilemma can be seen
throughout much of Stiegler’s recent work. To demonstrate this urgency, Stiegler notes
that the cigarette—an easily recognized pharmakon to be sure—is indicative of all
technical pharmaka as they all have a poisonous dimension resulting in addiction,
sickness, and death. For Stiegler, putting cigarettes on a list with computers and cellular
phones demonstrates that the pharmacological condition is more than “simple alienation
and gives the term ‘capture’ its urgency” (Taking Care 161). Further, according to
Stiegler,
Attentional deficiencies brought about by psychotechnical attention
capture, whose current result is an immense psychological, affective,
cultural, economic, and social disaster, and has led to the weakening and
increasing fragility of social linkages that at this point are capable only of
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engendering generalized insecurity and immense doubts about the future
condition of all intergenerational relations. (Taking Care 58)
From this we can begin to both understand Stiegler’s notion of capture—as it exists as a
relation between contemporary capital, digital media, and the neurochemical processes
and the sense of urgency that Stiegler attaches to it. Capture, or what Stiegler also refers
to as a diseconomy of attention, is a particular way that digital environments write
themselves into the plasticity of the brain and, as a result, limit future learning
capabilities and capacities for sustained attention.
Stiegler’s 2012 seminars with the Ecole de Philosophie d’Epineuil-le-Fleuriel
examined Nicholas Carr’s The Shallows: What the Internet is doing to Our Brains (2011)
in light of a pharmacological analysis of attention and digital media. Looked at as such,
Carr’s narrative can be read as a memoir of capture. This is apparent from Carr’s opening
lamentation of a perceived disruption in his capacity for sustained attention:
Over the last few years I've had an uncomfortable sense that someone, or
something, has been tinkering with my brain, remapping the neural
circuitry … I feel it most strongly when I'm reading. I used to find it easy
to immerse myself in a book … That's rarely the case anymore. Now my
concentration starts to drift after a page or two. I get fidgety, lose the
thread, begin looking for something else to do. I feel like I'm always
dragging my wayward brain back to the text. The deep reading that used to
come naturally has become a struggle. (6)
Similar to The Atlantic article that initiated the book project, here Carr reflects on the
pharmakon of the Internet. As can be gleaned from both titles, Carr’s work inquires into
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the extent that our relationship with new media, particularly our habits of reading, have
altered how we think. According to Carr’s anecdotal evidence, online interaction can
drastically undermine our ability for sustained attention and contemplative thought.
According to Carr, today we are reading quantifiably more volume, but the quality of our
reading has been eviscerated. Citing the work of developmental psychologist Maryanne
Wolf, Carr notes that when reading online “Our ability to interpret text, to make the rich
mental connections that form when we read deeply and without distraction, remains
largely disengaged” (“Is Google” 58). In Stiegler’s idiom, such connections are necessary
to foster and care for the generational transmissions of retention needed for culture as
currently understood and experienced.
As discussed in the fourth chapter, care is a particular attentional form that
oscillates on three related fulcrums simultaneously: the interfacial, the contributory, and
the structural. Technologies of care must bring attention towards the recognition that
individual psychic development is always already social and vice versa. As such, it works
as an interface between the collective and individual operations taking place in
transindividuation. Technologies of care must also be inherently contributory, working to
collapse the distinction between producer and consumer, as users are always both
simultaneously. And, finally, care in this way must work to reverse and collapse the
structural hierarchy between knowledge and care. In other words, there is a shift needed
to reorder epistemology along decidedly ontological lines: to know is to care and to care
is to know.
With these three analytics in mind, this chapter attempts to bring the theoretical
discussions of the previous three chapters back towards composition studies and
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pedagogy. Similarly, it also works to provide an analytics of care demonstrated through
three digital objects: Stephen Duncomb’s Open Utopia project, a digital edition which
aims to provide a space to interact with, remix, and modify Thomas More’s 1556 text,
Utopia; a wiki-based composition assignment revolving around the democratic potentials
of digital writing environments; and, third, the speculative and nonhuman future of care
in writing instruction through an investigation of automated assessment software.

The Retentional Economy of The Open Utopia
In “Low-Fidelity in High-Definition: Speculations on Rhetorical Editions,” Casey
Boyle makes a distinction between the digital editions traditionally associated with the
digital humanities and digital editions that could mobilize rhetorical potentials in
different ways. The former, which Boyle refers to as critical literary editions, emphasize
textual authenticity and aim to collect, preserve, and disseminate an authoritative text or
texts through the affordances of digital networks. The latter, which Boyle refers to as
rhetorical editions, would not solely be premised upon a version of textual authenticity—
as rhetoricians are often “not interested in what a text is”—rather it is premised upon
“what a text does” (Boyle), the kinds of novel discourse and networks potentially
produced. Such a move is inherently speculative as we simply cannot forecast the effects
of a text reliably enough to predict exact outcomes. Whereas critical literary editions
trace knowledge around a particular corpus, rhetorical editions aim “[t]o build knowledge
and not simply trace it. To invent as a way of knowing” (Boyle). Further, rather than
maintaining a fidelity to a set of authoritative texts, a rhetorical edition would invite
multiple networks to coalesce around a given text in order to respond, extend, and affect
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how that text is rhetorically mobilized. As Boyle notes,
…a rhetorical edition would be compelled to ask the question: in what
ways do secondary texts and tertiary responses influence the re-creation of
a primary text(s)? Thus, the goal for any rhetorical edition would not be to
capture and preserve a faithful text but to provide environments that
construct and reconstruct texts as dynamic situations.
The difference between critical and rhetorical editions, I would argue, demonstrates the
difference between epistemological and ontological orientations towards composition.
The use of rhetorical editions in the writing classroom would highlight these
differences as well as the difference between instrumentalist and ecological approaches to
textual production. Much like Cooper and Syverson have argued, the condition of
writing’s possibility is only through such complex sets of relations. The contributory and
editorial properties of online writing environments based on rhetorical editions would
emphasize an economics of contribution—playing on the increasingly indistinct lines
between consumer and producer. In what follows, I would like to a recent project, The
Open Utopia, as a rhetorical edition.
Stephen Duncombe’s The Open Utopia project aims to be the first free, complete,
and completely accessible digital edition of Thomas More’s Utopia. According to the
project’s homepage, by doing this Open Utopia will honor the “primary precept of
Utopia itself: that all property is common property.” The “Open” in the project’s title
refers to the radical openness—to reading, copying, and remixing—that is the project’s
purpose. For Duncombe, twenty-first century digital technologies enable the book to
become much more than a static codex. Rather, the book can be reimagined as a
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distributed assemblage spanning several sites and modalities. Towards this end,
Duncombe’s reworking of More’s Utopia presents not only the standard text and audio
files of the texts read aloud, but also a community discussing the book via The Institute
of the Future of the Book’s SocialBook platform, a user-generated gallery of visual
representations of Utopia and, finally, a modifiable wiki-based platform that asks
contributors to rewrite and remix Utopia together. Such a project represents an
experiment in scholarship and pushes material dynamics of the book itself.
Beyond the project as an aggregated series of digital artifacts, the project is meant
to instruct users on how such textual practices may inform larger cultural and ethical
practices. That is, it is meant to mobilize and foster a transindividuating care towards the
collective domain. As Duncombe notes in the introduction to the digital edition: “It’s a
text that instructs us how to approach texts, be they literary or political, in an open
manner: open to criticism, open to participation, open to modification, and open to recreation.” In so doing, I argue, Open Utopia represents a step in digital rhetoric and
multimodal composition towards response. In the past, computers and writing scholarship
focused on how emerging technologies empower users towards democratic potentials as
autonomous rational human actors working through digital media. I would argue that a
responsible orientation towards technology would locate human agency within a conflux
of forces and sites, human and non-human. In this way, it is inline with Marilyn Cooper’s
call that, “[w]hat we need is not a pedagogy of empowerment, but a pedagogy of
responsibility,” and further, “[r]hetorical agency is a big responsibility. It means being
responsible for oneself, for others, and the common world we construct together” (443444). Experiments like The Open Utopia project have immense potential for how writing
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instructors assign readings and how students can respond to those texts. Further, it is
representative of new relationships users can generate in online reading and writing
environments to create new attentional forms that reorient digital projects towards care.
Through both the SocialBook and MediaWiki platforms of Open Utopia, users are
invited to contribute to the More’s Utopia. The SocialBook software allows users to read
a conventional digital edition of More’s work singling out moments from the text to
inquire and generate discussion. Each highlighted text becoming a thread, much like in an
asynchronous discussion forum, that other users can see, read, and respond. In this way,
Open Utopia demonstrates how social reading platforms both revitalize the longstanding
scholarly tradition of marginalia and work towards making that tradition a social practice
in digital space. Opening Open Utopia within the SocialBook platform, readers are
prompted to do one of three things: begin a new group, begin reading the general group’s
edition, or share. The first option gives writing instructors a closed space from which to
conduct course readings and discussions without a more general public readership
allowed to view or participate. Outside of the context of More’s Utopia, the value of
having the ability to upload a text, invite readers to collectively begin annotating and
discussing the work should be immediately apparent for teachers of writing. The second
option, allows readers to join hundreds of others in their collective reading and discussion
of Utopia. Further, the comments and discussion functions have full social media
integration that allow users to simultaneously post discussion replies and questions to
other networks outside of the SocialBook platform (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, and Google+).
In this way, the share functionality of Open Utopia presents users with opportunities for
the kind of textual cross-pollinations inhabited by what Rice discusses as the future of
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College English. SocialBook presents exactly the kind of “information space” to which
users can connect their own networks and sets of relations and from which can create new
linkages. Open Utopia, like the name suggests is an “open space constructed out of
connections where multiple writers engaging within multiple ideas in multiple media at
multiple moments function” (Rice 130). Further, it resists the properties and tendencies of
the individual page to keep user-readers separate—from one another, from other media,
from other ideas, other networks—rather it invites a kind of socialization that not only
includes people, but also technologies, materials, and information (Rice 131).
What user-readers can gather from this particular edition of More’s Utopia is not
simply a working knowledge of the text—its historical context and effects—but how the
fluctuation of ideas and texts circulate rhetorically in contemporary networked ecologies.
It presents an interface from which users can enact a variety of individuating practices
and, as such, highlights Collin Gifford Brooke’s notion of rhetoric as ecologies of
practice. Inherent in the design of the project is an openness to the rhetorical possibilities
introduced with each new user and each new use. In fact, the project’s success depends
upon the engagement of users with the text, not simply to engage an authoritative digital
version of Utopia, but to engage More’s text, the texts of other users, and the interface
itself. As Brooke observes concerning the ecologies of practice enacted by interfacing
digital space,
Ecologically, practice includes all of the “available means” and our
decisions regarding which of them to pursue. In the case of interfaces, this
ecology also includes not only those practices involved in the production
of a particular interface, but those made possible by it. The ability to select

144

books based on the relevance of aggregated user data, for instance, is part
of the ecology of practice at Amazon (and many other sites). But it is also
important to acknowledge those practices that may be unintended—users
may take up and repurpose interfaces, expanding their ecology of practice
beyond a designer’s intentions. (49)
Open Utopia is premised on such rhetorical repurposing as users work to produce its
content. In this way, Open Utopia gives users an opportunity to practice what Richard
Lanham refers to as a proper rhetorical education in a contemporary context; it not only
trains users in the skills necessary to create and sustain a public, but also it invites a
recursive awareness of how users are simultaneously generating their public selves in
digital space—the very condition of possibility for the appearance of a public at all.
In Stiegler’s idiom, SocialBook presents users with digital space as retentional
economy as it interfaces between the private and public—the individual and collective
psyche. For Stiegler, just as it was for Simondon, such interfaces are necessary for
transindividuation. By using More’s Utopia, specifically, users of this SocialBook are
engaging with the intergenerational retentions necessary for transindividuation. From
Stiegler’s perspective, More’s text is valuable simply because it requires work. Work
stemming from not only the inhibitory linguistic difficulties, but also from the historical
accretions of Utopia—the previously layered networks having been enmeshed in the text
for generations. This “work” makes More’s text an object of attention as it elicits desire
and enables a libidinal economy. In this way, the value of a complex text is not solely due
to the language or difficult ideas expressed, but in its ability to produce mystery. This, for
Stiegler, is behind all mystagogic traditions beginning with the ancient Greek mystery
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schools that coevolved with rhetorical paideia and the tradition of rhetoric. In this sense,
mystery is produced by a necessarily withdrawing object demanding attention and
enabling the transindividuating circuits necessary for education. But, to be sure,
This does not mean, however, that the mysterious object is miraculous or
supernatural; it means that the object makes mystery, produces mystery,
and in order to become accessible, requires initiatory, mystagogic, or
esoteric discourse—a discipline involving practices of the self. (Taking
Care 169)
Further, discourse with others in the community surrounding Open Utopia also provides
and encourages a return to the text in order to read it again in light of ongoing dialogue
and reconsideration. Such movements are nothing new, in fact, dialectically progressive
reading habits as a practice of self may be the hallmark practice of phenomenology. With
the advent of digital reading environments, however, an explicit material record can be
kept.
In “Ethics and ‘Bad Writing’: Dialectics, Reading, and Affective Pedagogy”
(2003), Daniel L. Smith notes that the “theoretically dense writing of [G.W. F. Hegel,
Theodor Adorno, and Fredric Jameson] suggests ways of making the teaching and
learning of reading and writing an exploration into the practical realm of ethics via the
dynamics of affect” (526). As an invitation to engage alterity, reading—whether More’s
original text or a remixed wiki-based version of Utopia—demands a response and the
composition of a self that holds the capacity to perform such a response. Further, the
dynamics of reception and response that compose composition present the condition for
an emergence and articulation of an ethics for both. If made salient and universalized,
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such an ethics could be remobilized and foreclose the possibility of the very alterity that
an ethical comportment is meant to engage. Necessarily then, an ethics of reception and
response, such as I have been attempting to articulate through the conceptual
development of care, must be recognized as contingent upon situated rhetorical
circumstances. Similarly, the reading and writing practices used in our classrooms should
be designed to create the conditions for ethical response while resisting the need to
articulate exactly how that response should emerge. As Smith notes,
the very spirit of ethics that such an affective pedagogy embraces
disallows any formulas of teaching or curricula formation. This is because
the ethics being discussed here is predicated on the idea that ethical
response requires responding to the specificity of concrete situations with
consideration of one's capacities and the systems of affects that constitute
the macro- and micropolitics of spaces of discourse and practice in which
one is responding. One learns to teach affectively by experimenting with
how to do it and watching others do the same (over time, so that one has a
"feel" for the class's affective ecology and how it emerged). (547)
Models for this can been seen in digital texts—such as the Open Utopia project—that
emerge over time through the rhetorical relations of users, technologies, and texts.
More’s Utopia is not “the point” of the Open Utopia project, though it does presents an
object around which these others can coalesce. In this sense, the particular configuration
of relations expressed through Open Utopia would be impossible without More’s text,
but its teleological necessity is reduced through the emergence of relations produced.
This is particularly the case with Open Utopia’s wiki-based platform, Wikitopia.
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While both the digital edition and the SocialBook edition of Utopia both adhere to a
fidelity of the historical text, the wiki-based iteration is faithful to the historical text in
name only. While not scientific in its aim, Wikitopia is an example of a digital text that
functions through “linking the academic and scientific research of actors who are not
themselves professional researchers” (Stiegler “Relational Ecology” 17). Such texts are,
as Stiegler observes, the potential future of academic research as they present a model of
scholarly research as community that both highlights the ecological and distributed nature
of all research and is, more importantly, inclusive of a non-academic public. In this way,
the contestation of ideas and collaborative dynamics of knowledge production, so often
touted as the democratic potentials of digital space, are only made possible in relation to
the non-human presence of specific technological actors—in this case the MediaWiki
software that powers Wikitopia and the individual networked computers. While Wikitopia
is unique in many regards, compositionists have been exploring the possibilities of wikibased writing for some time. In the following, I would like to present a specific course
design as a failed attempt to facilitate the ethics of response indicative of systems of care.

Wiki Writing, Collaboration, and Care
A decade ago, in a 2003 issue of Computers and Composition, Mike Palmquist
observed that wikis would soon be playing an important role in many writing programs
across the country. Citing the exception of Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi,
Palmquist argued that writing programs had yet to realize the potentials of wikis to offer
a collaborative environment and “support the formation of writing communities” (407).
For Palmquist, wikis were indicative of new technologies that have
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created new possibilities, including new teaching and learning goals.
Writing for the Web, designing documents in ways the typewriter cannot
support, understanding the discourses of online communities, and
recognizing the rhetorical contexts students encounter as they engage in
those discourses (408)
As such, for Palmquist, wikis fulfilled and made visible many of the ideals that
collaborative pedagogues have been articulating for years. Given the historical context—
remember that Wikipedia had only been online for two years, and it would be another
couple of years before the free and simple wikis that many of us have adopted in our own
composition courses would come online—Palmquist’s claim seems bold, if not prescient.
Rather than questioning how, and to what extent, writing programs have incorporated
wikis in the intervening ten years, what interests me here is this notion of support and the
ease to which the visibility and quantifiability of student activity on wikis—and Web 2.0
applications more generally—allows for an easy elision between the technological
support for a writing community and the formation of the community itself. That is to
say, what appears on the screen to be evidence of collaborative engagement, inclusion,
deliberation, and social knowledge building can often obscure telling lacks of personal
investment. With this in mind, the use of wikis in composition pedagogy force the writing
instructor onto the grounds of a quarter century year old exchange so foundational to
composition studies, the debate between Kenneth Bruffee and John Trimbur.
Heavily influenced by Richard Rorty and Thomas Kuhn, Bruffee’s notions of
collaborative decision-making and collective consensus-based production of knowledge
were countered by John Trimbur who sought a conflict-oriented notion of consensus—
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premised on difference. The emphasis on collaboration in Bruffee’s work was largely
influenced by Rorty’s notion of “socially justifying belief” in which
We socially justify belief when we explain to others why one way of
understanding how the world hangs together seems to us preferable to
other ways of understanding it. We establish knowledge or justify belief
collaboratively by challenging each other's biases and presuppositions; by
negotiating collectively toward new paradigms of perception, thought,
feeling, and expression; and by joining larger, more experienced
communities of knowledgeable peers through assenting to those
communities' interests, values, language, and paradigms of perception and
thought. (“Collaborative Learning” 646)
Thus, Bruffee privileges conversation’s role in the generation of consensus. For John
Trimbur, Bruffee’s notion of consensus is problematic as writing courses reliant on this
model of collaborative learning and consensus may marginalize alterity and difference.
As I found out in my own wiki-based writing course, the distinction between when a
knowledge community assents to another community’s interests and when it simply
concedes is a crucial one. To this end, John Trimbur’s work has focused on the political
and ethical implications of collaborative models of learning that can inform collaborative
models of engagement for writing instruction. In many ways, Trimbur introduces
collaborative engagements premised upon contributory notions of care rather than a
consensus-based community of knowledge producers. If this is the case, an argument can
be made that Bruffee’s socially collaborative model of knowledge production—while
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premised upon the social—elided the individual psychic investments needed to enact
circuits of individuation.
Trimbur’s “Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning” (1989) takes
Bruffee to task for his willingness to “overvalue social practices and thus to deny the
primacy of individual consciousness in creating knowledge” (603). Trimbur argues that
we cannot simply abandon the value of consensus, but that we must work to broaden its
practice within the composition classroom. In effect, by beginning with alterity, Trimbur
reorients collaborative pedagogies around dissensus rather than consensus. This,
according to Trimbur, makes consensus a pedagogically viable form for identifying larger
social power dynamics, recognizing who is and who is not allowed to generate
knowledge within these dynamics. Consensus as a heuristic for identifying difference is a
radically different conception than Bruffee’s model allows. According to Trimbur, the
focus of consensus-based pedagogies on agreement needs to be reevaluated in order to
focus on the productive nature of conflict itself rather than its resolution (608). With
some difficulty wiki-based text assignments can provide writing instructors with a way to
“build-in” the kind of generative conflict and consensus-as-heuristic that Trimbur
discusses, I would argue that the course design itself must develop ways for individual
students to gain a sense of their emerging rhetorical agency within the course. That is,
individual students should have the ability to locate themselves in relation to the ideas
and discourses that makes up the grounds for the course. But how do we, as writing
teachers, account for such an agency and, more importantly, perhaps, what pedagogies
are available to us to foster this agency and its appropriate use in composition courses?
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A wiki-based course I co-designed and taught, for example, failed precisely
because individual students were unable to properly respond to texts assigned in class or
to each other in the final wiki-project. Further, my reliance on static concepts—of
collaboration, of democracy, of dialogue—foreclosed the emergence of an ethics situated
within the context of responses in that particular course. This failure was most acutely
demonstrated in the wiki-based discussion forums that were set up to generate the critical
interaction I felt was needed for a consensus-driven wiki-text. However, the stakes of this
failure allow me to demonstrate how Gregory Ulmer’s recent work towards affective
experiences could remake the class to better foster both individual and collective
rhetorical capacities for care.
In the spring of 2009, a colleague and I piloted a second-semester freshman
research and rhetoric course at the University of South Carolina that aimed to explore the
deliberative affordances of wikis. Centered on the theme of “democracy and education,”
students read texts that attempted to access and complicate the relationship between
public engagement and formal education. In a gesture to both the problem and promise of
online civic engagement in digital spaces, we called our course “De/liberative
Democracy.” Operating under the premise that, if allowed, students could arrive at
substantial research questions and engage those questions critically and collectively, we
proceeded to assign a final wiki project to over 80 students split amongst four sections of
English 102. The assignment asked students to collectively review the texts we had been
reading all semester and suss out—through asynchronous wiki-based discussion
forums—some of the “big questions” the texts were asking. Once questions emerged,
students were asked to engage one another in discussions and research with the goal of
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working towards a collaborative thesis-driven expository essay. So, for instance, after
reading and discussing John Dewey, one group arrived at the question: “What kind of
education does a functioning democracy require?” Similarly, another group decided to
focus on the short selections from Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish we had
discussed and asked: “Are state-sponsored surveillance techniques appropriate in a
democratic government?” A related question, based again on the Foucault reading, asked
“What constitutes the difference between being a citizen and being—in Foucault’s
words—a ‘docile body’?” Just like an entry in Wikipedia—the students’ primary genre
reference for this assignment, particularly since we were running MediaWiki, the wiki
software that runs Wikipedia—students produced texts containing a main article, which
presents the thesis-driven essay, along with links to further pages with pertinent
biographical information and important terms that would require discussion and
definition. The success of each individual essay, and the success of the class itself, hinged
on students generating the kind of critical interaction on discussion forums that would
allow for a well-reasoned and arguably collaborative essay.
In her 2008 article, “Teaching with Wikis: Towards a Networked Pedagogy,”
Rebecca Wilson Lundin argues that wikis offer a productive framework from which
compositionists can reexamine long held assumptions concerning the potentials for a
“networked pedagogy” and the very reasons why writing instructors incorporate
emerging technologies into their courses at all. To briefly outline Lundin’s argument,
wikis allow composition instructors the ability reexamine four areas of increasing interest
in a new light: new media writing, collaboration, online authority, and critical interaction.
The first simply states that wikis are an example of new media writing. As such, wikis
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have the capability to not only present a relatively conventional expository text, as
discussed in the examples above, but also incorporate and juxtapose sound, image, video,
etc. which change and intensify rhetorical choice in the making of meaning. Lundin’s
second point argues that wikis encourage collaboration. Wikis, of course, have the ability
to be edited by multiple student users from any networked machine—at any time—thus
potentially leading to the kinds of authorial redistributions available in digital spaces. The
third point then, online authority, demonstrates how wikis allow for a more even
distribution of authority between teachers and students, and between students and
students, than do conventional classroom modes of collaborative writing. And, finally,
critical interaction is meant to convey how wikis and their accompanying discussion
forums give students the ability to work out ideas through deliberation and critical
engagement with one another’s ideas. For Lundin, this last point is perhaps the “central
justification for much wiki use in composition classes” (440). Such interaction is, after
all, the foundational idea behind group work, peer reviews, workshops, and many other
conventional practices of composition coursework. Web 2.0 implementations in
composition are largely attempts to extend just these kinds of interactive practices with
the affordances of digital space.
Much like Lundin discusses concerning her own wiki-based courses, our class
had—to our increasing dismay—become a class of “lurkers.” That is, they were reading
posts, but failing to engage each other in a meaningful way. Though, in the end, they had
produced what appeared to be competent essays—they had not done so through the kind
of critical interaction the course was designed to reach. There was little to no deliberation
beyond the most obligatory interactions and niceties that decorum, even online decorum,
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demands. As Lundin observes of her own students’ interactions on the wiki: “either they
agree and have no constructive criticism, or they disagree and refuse to read the argument
generously” (441). My colleague and I were naïve in our reliance on a particular model of
inquiry-based learning—that is, we thought by giving students the ability to decide their
research agenda that this would quite automatically result in the kinds of productive
conflict and participatory engagement Web 2.0 proponents had promised. But, in reality,
the research agenda was chosen by a vocal few while the majority of students did little
more than the minimum number of required posts and edits.
With few exceptions the kind of ownership we had hoped for simply didn’t
happen. Beyond simply having too many students assigned to each group, our course
design had also relied too heavily on the potential of wikis and discussion forums to
facilitate critical interaction without first fostering capacities for individual students to
locate themselves in relation to the conversation. Throughout the semester, we had
confused the course wiki, its particular material digital instantiation, with the very writing
community it was meant to support. We learned that community—the writing
community of Palmquist’s prediction—was not something we can necessarily point to on
the screen to verify. By paying attention to a specific set of composing strategies and
practices meant to foster community, we had mistaken the material practices for the sets
of relations that define community. While that relation may leave traces on the discussion
forums and wikis at the center of our course design, community is a distributed relation
and takes place across multiple sites that instructors may not have access to. In this light,
I would argue, that community emerges from a collective enactment of unique and
affective histories—histories that instructors may hope to access and facilitate but can
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never guarantee beforehand.
In a recent work, Avatar Emergency (2012), Gregory Ulmer refers to such
affective histories as experience ontologies inscribed on the memory of individual
students. As such, any viable collaborative composition must resonate with individual
students and allow for the intuitive expression of experience ontologies. According to
Ulmer,
Inquiry is conducted in at least two modalities: the high focus of specific
questions, guided by methodological presuppositions, and low focus
browsing, relying on intuition and associative or lateral thinking. Literate
schooling teachers the former and assumes the latter. Intuition is actually
the default mode, in research and quotidian thought alike, in conditions of
massive complexity with rich redundancy in the information. (51)
While our wiki-based class attempted to have students direct their own research agenda,
it was often guided in particular directions by a number of design and curricular choices.
For instance, the images on the course website were overly representative of particular
democratic ideals. Similarly, the texts chosen were meant to generate particular kinds of
questions in particular ways. In many ways, the course captured student attention due, in
part, to the pedagogical choices and the institutional culture obligating their capacities be
directed in specific ways, but it did little to develop and sustain the careful responsibility
the course was supposedly was designed for.
Ulmer’s experience ontology is helpful in this regard as the primary memorial
ontologies Ulmer discusses are needed to ground and vitalize the secondary operations of
the rational and deliberative modes of discourse we expected from our course wiki. In
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Ulmerian vernacular, we were attempting to activate the discursive modalities of literacy
within an environment of electracy. If Ulmer is right, in order to get at the kind of critical
interaction Lundin discusses, the course must first work to traverse the affective
dimension of individual experience ontology. According to Ulmer:
Virtual worlds, or mixed (augmented) realities, may be designed to
support experience ontology, both for pedagogy and research, by
addressing the somatic markers of affective memory, enhanced by
information retrieval. (54)
We can see evidence of Ulmer’s argument in Lundin’s own discussion of her wiki-based
courses. As Lundin observes, the otherwise dead-in-the-water discussion boards in her
writing course suddenly came alive when a student moved the conversation from the
more “serious” work of the course to their favorite childhood television show. Lundin
notes that this thread generated “dozens of responses” as class members began discussing
their own memories of television. According to Lundin,
Although I had no problem with the nostalgic TV discussion (and actually
found it helpful to the class dynamic—the students relaxed a bit and acted
more familiar with one another afterwards), I had hoped that a broader
range of entries would spark similar interest and develop into debate. Most
wiki posts, however, went conspicuously un-commented on and uninteracted with, particularly those dealing with serious or controversial
subjects. (441)
The experience ontologies enacted by playful discussions of childhood television
generated the kind of spontaneous and engaged community Lundin had hoped for all
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along. The problem, of course, is such discussions were excluded from the “real work” of
the course and, for Lundin, largely outside of the course’s relative success or failure.
While it may be easy to dismiss this as a bit of nostalgic fun, or a relatively harmless
detour from the course, such moments of emergence may point towards the potentials for
the kind of play-based pedagogy of care that digital environments such as wikis are
capable of sustaining. The challenge, for writing instructors, is either to find a way to go
through, or perhaps harness the affective energy of experience ontology and move it
towards more critical and deliberative interactions—or to remove the critical ideal from
the courses rubric altogether. Favoring instead the intuitive modes of reception and
production demonstrated through this kind of play.
In Ulmer’s primary example of experience ontology, the life and work of noted
architect and designer Frank Gehry, he observes the affective memorial expressions of
experience ontology throughout Gehry’s work. According to Ulmer,
one of [Gehry’s] most vivid memories was of the carp that his
grandmother would bring home live from the market. Frank loved to
watch the carp swimming in the bathtub, before it was served for Sabbath
supper. The movements of the fish are now observed in the sweeping
curved geometries of Gehry’s designs. The wide image accounts for
Gehry’s recognition of this feeling in the geometries, which he began to
use even before he had access to the computers that made them practical.
(52-53)
For Ulmer, the carp-like elements in Gehry’s design point towards the importance of the
interface. Similar to the interface of digital objects, Gehry’s buildings have both a
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function in the public structural reality and in the imprint of Gehry’s own experience with
carp swimming in the bathtub of his childhood home. Digital elements in interface may
similarly function as “hooks or attractors” to enact experience ontologies of individual
users. Thus, interface may address “potential matches in the idiosyncratic backstories of
researchers, supporting browsing or low-focus inquiry” (53). Similar to Brooke’s notion
of “persistence of cognition,” the images, key words, and other elements of new media
encountered when reading digital texts, that leave perceptible traces or imprints on the
cognitive experience of users in hyper attentive modes—or, following Ulmer, low-focus
inquiry—may point to the ways which cognitive traits associated with deep attention are
still active in hyper modes. The work of both Ulmer and Brooke here gestures towards a
productive blurring of the distinctions between hyper and deep modes of attention and the
make an argument for the effects of techno-biological relations on attention not being as
deterministic as is often assumed. The development of digital systems of care premised
upon contributory economies must take such insights into consideration. Reflecting on
the above, when designing a second iteration of a wiki-based writing course, I was much
more successful in enacting and sustaining the kind of discussion and collaboration I had
hoped for.
This second course, a first-year composition course taught at the University of
South Carolina in 2012, included a collaborative wiki-based essay using the free online
services, Wikispaces. Using education as a theme, this course asked students to compose
a collaborative auto-ethnography focused on the literate and medial practices of
contemporary students. As such, students were both recognized as part of an existing
community—in this case the collective student body at the University of South
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Carolina—and as individual actors within that community engaging in their own literate
practices. Students were asked to compose this essay in two distinct parts: first, students
were to write their own literacy narratives following a collective list generated by
students; and, second, students were to aggregate their individual narratives together as
an archival body of research that they could then use to work in teams of researchers to
construct arguments regarding the literate practices of contemporary students. Working
with collaborative auto-ethnography as a qualitative methodology allowed students to
combine ethnography and autobiography into their collaborative compositions. For my
purposes, the model of a collaborative auto-ethnography provided a balance between the
individual and collective assemblages necessary for students to incorporate their own
affective relations and, in turn, use those relations as objects for reflection and
collaborative research. While I can never be sure it was the difference in assignment
design or the specific dynamics of the individual classes, the wiki-texts students
composed in this later attempt were largely more successful and demonstrated a higher
level of engagement.
Thus far, much of this chapter has been concerned with collaboration, but the
agential role of non-human actors and audiences has only been hinted at. The following
section discusses the potentials for care with a larger consideration towards non-human
actors and the automated systems we compose with.

Machinic Potentials of Care
Patricia Freitag Ericksson and Richard Haswell begin their landmark anthology,
Machine Scoring of Student Essays: Truth and Consequences (2006), by noting a distinct
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lack of response from composition scholars in regards to automated assessment of student
writing. Stating that,
It is an understatement to say that the [analysis and scoring of student
essays by computer] is rapidly growing in importance at all levels of the
education enterprise, and that the perspective on it has been, up to this
point, dominated almost exclusively by the commercial purveyors of the
product. (1)
While this may have been true at the time of their collection’s publication, in 2006, we
can no longer say this is the case. Recent appeals to software developers, machine
learning specialists, and data scientists to create a more supple and efficient tool capable
of scoring student essays—most notably the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s
Automated Student Assessment Prize (ASAP), which awarded $100,000 to three teams in
2012 along with a portion of the $330 million dollars allotted to writing assessment as
part of the United States Department of Education’s “Race to the Top” initiative—have
spurred strong reactions from English professionals. Reactions that are more often than
not deeply skeptical of the value of machine assessment to account for context, rhetorical
nuance, meaningful content, well-reasoned argumentation, and novel expression—that is,
what most of us would likely agree are the necessary elements of “good writing.”
Just in the last year, the NCTE’s “Position Statement on Machine Scoring” (2013)
along with the Professionals Against Machine Scoring of Student Essays in High-Stakes
Assessment Petition Initiative—an online petition with over four thousand signatures—
has brought the question of machine scoring to the fore of our disciplinary conversation.
Subtitled, “Machine Scoring Fails the Test,” the NCTE’s position statement defines
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writing as a “highly complex ability developed over years of practice, across a wide
range of tasks and contexts, and with copious, meaningful feedback.” As such, the
official position of the NCTE is that automated assessment undermines the “nature of
writing, the ways students develop writing ability, and the role of the teacher in fostering
that development.” This sentiment is echoed in the Conference on College Composition
and Communication’s own “Position Statement on Teaching, Learning, and Assessing
Writing in Digital Environments” (2005) that identifies machine scoring as a threat to the
social nature of writing. Stating, “Because all writing is social, all writing should have
human readers, regardless of the purpose of the writing” and “Writing-to-a-machine
violates the essentially social nature of writing: we write to others for social purposes.” In
light of what many scholars have identified as a reappearance of the question of
technology through a “non-human turn” in humanities and social sciences, the sentiments
of the NCTE and CCCC could not only seem to foreclose inventive possibilities of
composition, but also unnecessarily restrictive in its definition of writing as a social
activity conducted by autonomous human actors.
In the 2006 anthology mentioned above, Carl Whithaus invited us to step away
from this “discourse of rejection” in order to consider how technologies are always
thoroughly and actively integrated into the composing process—as the evaluative agency
of software is pre-built into contemporary word processors. According to Whithaus,
software, in practice, is largely a medium of communication and a “tool for assessment
and response” (167). However, composition studies has a long history of ignoring the
inventive capacities of automated composing practices reaching at least as far back as
Ken Macrorie’s critical review of Ellis Page’s The Analysis of Essays by Computer
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(1969). For Whithaus, the fact that our day-to-day composing practices rely on automated
software as a collaborative partner, but our disciplinary culture either actively ignores or
openly combats technology’s role in composition, demonstrates that composition studies
is in need of a “conceptual shift” (167). The shift can be articulated as moving from the
dominant model currently, software as a transparent medium to be ignored, towards the
view of software as a compositional tool demanding attention. According to Whithaus,
“What composition studies needs is not a blanket rejection of these systems but rather
data-driven studies of how these different software agents are already being used in
postsecondary writing courses” (176). Further, such studies could potentially define how
software actually works in the context of a composition course and how to better
construct our pedagogies to account for them. Whithaus’s argument is more relevant
today, I would argue, due the advent and proliferation of word processors and cloudbased collaborative composing environments.
Largely because of upswing in the interest and culture surrounding the open
source movement, the inevitability of open source writing assessment software and what
this could enable, urge us look again at machine reading and automated assessment. Here
I would like to make a just such a gesture, more speculative and tactical than technical, in
order to focus on: first, how the official rhetoric surrounding machine scoring by English
professionals elides the complexity of the relationship between human and technological
actors in the act of composing; second, how questions of audience and reading might be
reimagined by thinking through these relations; and third, how machine scoring, if
removed from the proprietary context of high stakes and standardized tests, could have a
place in what scholars have recently articulated as “assessment ecologies.” Such a move
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would enhance our ability to consider the possibilities for care even at this level of
automation.
Bob Broad’s “More Work for Teacher? Possible Futures of Teaching Writing in
the Age of Computerized Assessment” (2006) draws heavily on the distinctions between
the capabilities of humans and those of computers made by Andrew Feenberg. Broad’s
discussion of Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology (1991) is particularly relevant as
it is in Feenberg’s work that we can trace composition’s critical orientation towards
technology that privileges critically reflective modes and, ultimately, produces a kind of
soft skepticism towards technological potential. According to Broad, Feenberg gestures
towards “how societies might shape uses of technology for the common good as
discerned through democratic processes” (226).
Similarly, Feenberg cautions against both strong technophobic and technocratic
urges in the democratic project of technology’s management. As Broad notes,
“[Feenberg] suggests that we stay alert to technological developments and make, as a
democratic society, well-reasoned decisions regarding how to handle those
developments” (226). While we—as teachers, as users of technology—are eager to
express our obligations to use technology in the democratic and local ways available to
us, we are less likely to recognize the role of technology in the shaping of our continually
shifting definitions and orientations towards democracy, best practices, or even
successful writing. The humanist orientation towards technology in Feenberg’s work sets
up a relationship between technology and the human that cannot help but assume hard
distinctions between the two categories and, ultimately, give the human an interventionist
role.
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In “The Posthuman Challenge to Andrew Feenberg” (2006), Simon Cooper notes
that Feenberg’s reliance on human intervention in the face of technology will not allow
him to side with many posthumanist orientations towards technology that place
technology and the human in active co-production. As Cooper notes, Feenberg’s
objections to posthumanist are two-fold: first, Feenberg’s critique of technology relies on
human acts of democratic interventions and argues that,
decentering humans as simply elements of a cyborg ontology, or as part of
a network involving human and non-human actors leads to a kind of
performative, where it becomes difficult to determine the quality, identity,
and status of any “act.” (25)
Second, according to Cooper, Feenberg has a political objections to posthumanist
theorists that give primacy to the network rather than models that allow for human
intervention and technological reform. By situating human actors in a position of critical
distance and ultimately choice in relation to technology, Feenberg is foundational in the
establishment of the conventional response to technology from those in composition
studies. Such responses, I would argue, are apparent in both the NCTE’s “Position
Statement on Machine Scoring” and other popular iterations of official mandates against
the automated assessment.
In a recent interview published in Composition Forum (2010), Cindy Selfe notes
the field’s indebtedness to Feenberg’s critical orientation. When asked why
compositionists should pay attention to the use of technology in and outside of the
academy, Selfe responds that while technologies do have tendencies that “reveal or hide
certain ways of being in the world,” the agency of human beings in technological systems
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can influence systems for democratic potentials. Further, Selfe notes, it is “our job in
such systems as humanists and teachers is use technologies in ways that can foster
humanist projects and educational projects in humane ways.” According to Selfe,
directed use of technology can by the same the “powerful micro-political tactics” that
Feenberg discusses as an intervention working to “shape technology democratically.”
Selfe’s insight here is aligned with Feenberg’s critical approach to technology that both
grants technology a kind of agency and positions human actors as stewards of that
agency. Selfe and Feenberg are also here aligned with Stiegler’s own post-Marxist
ethico-critical approach to technology to an extent, however, the difference between the
two is largely in amount not kind: Stiegler’s work, I would argue, grants technics full coproductive credit with regards to the creation of the category human while Feenberg’s
does not. For Stiegler, our relationship with technology is not so easily managed through
reflective use, or bottom-up political movements, but is inherently pharmacological in
that human actors can never be sure that their actions are producing beneficially
democratic ends or arresting democratic potentials.
Bernard Stiegler’s notion of technics, which has been increasingly taken up by
many scholars working in computers and writing, holds potential for reframing the
question of machine scoring in productive ways for composition. Technics—which
includes everything from the most primitive tools first used by humans, to writing, to
contemporary digital technologies—is, for Stiegler, the condition of human culture and
thought itself. According to Ben Roberts, Stiegler’s use of technics is meant to define a
particular “prosthetic relationship between the human and its ‘exteriorisation’ in matter”
(5). As such, Roberts continues, technics “does not have the instrumental sense of
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technology as a tool that the human makes use of but rather defines the human as no
longer simply a biological being” (5). The continuous co-modification of humans and
technics is such that agency—the kind necessary for gaining a critical distance from
technology in order to analyze and say something meaningful—becomes much more
nuanced. I would argue, along with Marilyn Cooper, that agency does not simply go
away, rather we are obligated to leave the idea of an autonomous and rational actor
choosing to use technologies in particular ways in favor of a distributed agency as co“use” and co-emergence. Similarly, in How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary
Technogenesis (2012), N. Katherine Hayles notes that:
The situation is akin to a relativistic scenario of a spaceship traveling at
near light speed: the clocks on board by which one might measure time
dilation are themselves subject to the very phenomenon in question, so
accurate measurement of dilation effects by this means is impossible.
Needed are approaches broad enough to capture the scope of the changes
underway, flexible enough to adapt to changes in criteria implied by
technogenetic transformations, and subtle enough to distinguish between
positive and negative outcomes when the very means by which such
judgments are made may themselves be in question. (81-82)
Read from the context of composition studies, the above quote gives insight into why
notoriously slippery and notions of transfer and assessment are so difficult to pin down.
Just as the technics develop to interpret data and assess student writing, those technics
change our relationship to writing in such a way as to encourage such slippage. As
Kathleen Blake Yancey and Brian M. Morrison have recently and succinctly noted
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“[w]riting is changing more quickly than we can record those changes” (277). Rather
than attempting to “catch up” and control technics, we need more ecological models of
assessment “broad enough” and “flexible enough” to situate itself within the complexity
of composing. Such models could recognize the dynamic co-production of the human and
technics and—as such— would not foreclose the inventive potentials of these relations.
One such potential, I would argue, is writing for machine audiences in ways
similar to those recently articulated in Byron Hawk’s notion of “Stomp Box Logic”
(2012). Largely inspired by Geoffrey Sirc’s articulation of box-logic which highlights the
abilities to juxtapose and remix expressions in digital environments, Hawk’s Stomp Box
Logic reorients those abilities to emphasize the rhetorical capacities of non-human actors.
According to Hawk, Stomp Box Logic “extends Box Logic’s primary concern with
human affect and the rhetorical method of juxtaposition to a primary concern with system
feedback and a rhetorical method of looping and layering.” As such, human actors are not
removed from the equation, but are situated as one assembled relation amongst many in
distributed rhetorical networks. Drawing an affective correlation between the responsive
feedback instructors and peers give to student writing and the feedback produced by the
layering of audio signals through stomp-box pedals, Hawk observes that feedback in the
context of composition studies, “typically means giving a paper to another human being
so they can give more written (or sometimes oral) commentary on the writing so the
author can use that information to revise the text,” but the kind of feedback produced by
the use of a Boss’s RC-30 Dual Loop Station Guitar Pedal, or “Stomp Box,” shows that
there are “human beings aren’t the primary source of feedback, making the primary
audience something other than human.” Similarly, I would argue, student writing is
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continually enmeshed in a Stomp Box Logic from its inception—using the research
capabilities of the database and digital archive—to its production through word
processing software which, as Whithaus pointed out, is often more involved in the
composing process than composition scholars would like to admit. Given Hawk’s work
above, I would ask: how might composition instructors rearticulate students writing to an
automated software in order to “game it” and enable potentially inventive capacities?
Further, how might those the gaming of automated assessment software work to redirect
student attention towards the composing process and the rhetorical choices they make?
Just as the Hawk’s Stomp Box reads and interprets signals in particular ways in order to
generate affective expressions, machines are capable of reading texts in particular ways
that may be generative as well.
In her work, N. Katherine Hayles argues that the value of machine reading lies in
the recognizing and making patterns visible to human interpretation. While Hayles
discusses machine reading largely from the context of Frank Moretti’s “distant reading”
and its impact on the digital humanities, her work on machine reading can be
productively coupled with discussions of automated assessment software. Hayles
recognizes a “self-catalyzing dynamic of digital information” at operating as our use of
computers intensifies so too does the need for the kinds of algorithmic analyses they
provide. Just as enormous quantities of information require machines capable of reading
and interpreting this data in useful ways, the data produced must work to become
readable to the machines who have access (How We Think 30). Though, Hayles argues,
machine reading does anything but obviate the necessity for human reading. Contrary to
responses from many composition scholars, both machine-reading and human-writing-to-
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machine can be viewed from the orientation necessitating particular kinds of responses
and trajectories. As Hayles rightly observes that machine reading is often “construed as
pointing toward a posthuman mode of scholarship in which human interpretation takes a
backseat to algorithmic processes” (30). Further, such tensions make obvious the
disciplinary orientations towards either algorithmic analysis or hermeneutic textual
responses, but can be reimagined as a co-productive relationship between the two.
Towards these possibilities Edward M. White’s “Afterword,” in the recent Digital
Writing Assessment and Evaluation collection (2013) noted that,
Students will write to machines just as surely as they now write their SAT
or AP essays to the armies of dulled readers … This is the stuff of
dystopias, where cyborgs take over the world and make humans their
slaves—a common enough theme in the movies. The way to keep this
from happening, as these fictions instruct us, is to get there first, if
possible, and enforce power over them; we need to keep HAL from taking
over the universe (as he—it?—almost does in 2001: A Space Odyssey) and
replacing human needs with inhuman ones.
Rather than the rhetoric of supplanting and struggle, a more ecological response would
attempt to draw its focus on human and non-human relations already present in the
practice of composing. What are needed are useful rubrics of evaluating to account for
and assess those practices. Two recent pieces focusing on the future of assessment have
initiated this undertaking.
In the first, “Addressing the Complexity of Writing Development: Toward an
Ecological Model of Assessment” (2012), Elizabeth Wardle and Kevin Roozen take up

170

Kathleen Blake Yancey’s (199) call for models of assessment flexible enough to account
for the broad complexity and distribution of composition. Summarizing Yancey’s history
of assessment models in composition, Wardle and Roozen note that there have been three
“waves” of assessment modalities in the field: the first wave (1950 - 1970) emphasized
objectivity and testing models; the second wave (1970 - 1986) centered on holistically
scored essays; and, finally, the third wave (1986 - present) focuses on assessing student
portfolios that span a number of drafts and length of the course (106-107). According to
Wardle and Roozen, Yancey argues that contemporary writing practices necessitate a
fourth wave of assessment that can account for “students’ writing development across an
expansive ecology of literate activities rather than within any single setting” (107). Such
a model, according to Wardle and Roozen, would offer a “fuller, richer account of the
kinds of experiences with writing that are informing students' growth as writers
throughout the undergraduate years” (107). Further, this model is large enough to fold in
the insights of Syverson’s work on distributed composition as it “incorporates portfolio
creation, revision, and assessment over time and at multiple locations” (107). The
primary contention in Wardle and Roozen’s ecological model of assessment is that a
student’s literate development in specific writing courses takes place across many
different literate acts often not related to the course, or even to their formal education, at
all. To demonstrate what an ecological model of assessment looks like, Wardle and
Roozen discuss the building of such a model at the University of Central Florida. There,
among other things designed to coordinate ecological assessment models, teams of
researchers are beginning to conduct longitudinal ethnographic assessment of student’s
transfer of literacy-related knowledge that have researchers teaching composition courses
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that include common syllabi, assignments, and assessment models to create the
opportunity for individual case studies of transfer who can be interviewed and observed
in multiple rhetorical situations (115). From there, researchers can begin to envision the
scope of what it means to discuss transfer in the context of freshman writing instruction.
Tracking the literate acts of students in this way could potentially indicate how students
use what they have learned in writing courses and how that literacy-related knowledge
gets folded into their practices in other rhetorical contexts.
Similar to Wardle and Roozen’s ecological assessment models, Christopher
Manion and Richard Selfe’s “Sharing an Assessment Ecology: Digital Media, Wikis, and
the Social Work of Knowledge” (2012) argues for the need to go beyond hierarchical and
product-oriented assessment models in light of the affordances of digital technology.
Wikis, in particular, because they rely on “complex, emergent context and an intentional,
adaptive community of practice” (26) do not lend themselves to being assessed by
conventional models. Largely informed by Syverson’s work on distributed cognition, in
their design and assessment of wiki-based assignments, Manion and Selfe adopt
Syverson’s “careful examination of the interrelationships among actors, artifacts, and
environments as they develop over time” (27). Towards this, Manion and Selfe
researched three cases for the development of an ecological assessment of wiki-based
assignments: the first, an upper-level anthropology course focused on foraging societies
that asked students to collaborate on wiki-based literature reviews; the second, a
psychology course that asked students to write articles and create rubrics of peer
evaluation for an imagined wiki-based academic journal, Future Directions in
Psychological Science; and, third, an advanced professional writing course that had
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students contribute to a wiki focused on “Exploring 21st Century Professions” (27-28). In
all three cases, assessment of each wiki would be premised on first developing and
elaborating on what each discipline values—their habits of thought and practice—in
order to give students a criteria for assessing their own work and the work of others. In
this way, assessment could be distributed among a cohort of peers who were prepared to
follow common criteria. According to Manion and Selfe:
Each of the courses we have presented here gave students some control as
they took up habits of thought that their instructor wanted them to learn.
Students were asked to take part in assessing their and their colleagues’
work and were shown how to apply assessment throughout the term as
they produced mediated wikis. But students did not begin these projects
cold, thrown into the deep end and expected to swim. Each of the three
instructors very carefully scaffold their subassignments to prepare students
to understand the central modes of knowledge making in their fields: the
kinds of questions to be explored, the preferred objects of study, the
analytical lenses to be applied—all the activities involved in inquiry. (43)
Manion and Selfe argue that the affordances of wikis hold the potential for meaningful
collaborative compositions, but assessment models must reflect the kind of mutability
and emergent potential wikis hold. Both the assignments and assessment models should
be conducive to fostering local knowledge production and community.
While ecological models of assessment stress both the distributed and the local, I
would argue, such models should not foreclose the importance of non-human actors in
these relations. Particularly, the role of technics in both the production and evaluation of

173

compositions should be explored through ecological models of assessment. Much like
Brooke’s experience keeping a weblog, discussed in Lingua Fracta, demonstrated that
his daily practice of writing a blog reoriented his daily experience in order to find
bloggable experiences. Thus, such digital practices call into question the limits of specific
digital interface of the blogging software. Similarly, criteria for assessment should be
broad enough to include how particular technologies reorient students’ composing
practices. Further frameworks are needed in order to create dynamic assessment models
that would not resist the potentials of machine scoring. Particularly with regards to
machine scoring, models that recognize the role of technology in distributed ecologies
could incorporate automated evaluation of student writing into course objectives. With
this in mind, I would argue, the first step towards practical implementation of automated
assessment in writing instruction is the forming of cooperative relationships between
teachers and software developers.
One company attempting to forge such relationships is LightSIDE Labs. Started
by Elijah Mayfield and David Adamson at Carnegie Mellon University, LightSIDE Labs
aims to localize automated assessment by putting the software in the hands of teachers
and students. While the company is now proprietary, LightSIDE’s core software remains
open-source and freely available. Premised on the idea that automated assessment’s
negative reputation stems largely from software companies unwilling to acknowledge
what writing instructors actually need and propriety software packages that cannot be
tailored to the situated needs of individual courses or communities. According to the
promotional material available on LightSIDE’s homepage:
Too often, machine learning is a black box. Researchers choose a set of
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features and a model to train, and they get an accuracy reported back to
them by their scripts. If they’re lucky, they have a pipeline set up that
allows them to tweak that behavior and evaluate performance changes.
Actually looking at the text that’s being misclassified and thinking deeply
about why an algorithm thinks it should be labeled a certain way almost
never happens. We’re changing that.
The rhetorical shift from automated assessment to machine learning—even while
discussing the same automated processes and outcomes—suggests a co-productive role
between human learners and machinic instruction that does not foreclose the possibilities
of invention in human-machine relations. Possibilities LightSIDE continues to make a
case for amongst composition scholars and teachers.
Recent discussions taking place over the Writing Program Administrators listserv
(WPA-l) between LightSIDE’s founders and those working within composition are
beginning to change the dialogue surrounding machine scoring. Similarly, one of the
company’s founders, Elijah Mayfield presented a panel at the Computers and Writing
conference (2014) discussing how automated assessment could be reinvented. That
panel, “Automated Essay Scoring Done Right: Using LightSIDE for Feedback in
Classroom Writing,” attempted to demonstrate how LightSIDE’s software presents new
approaches to automated assessment and as a machine learning engine that, according to
their panel description, “emphasizes justifiable, content-driven score prediction and
automated scaffolding of the revision process.” By making available free open-source
software that recognizes specific needs of localized communities, LightSIDE are working
within Bernard Stiegler’s definition of a “contributory economy.” For Stiegler, such
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economies are the foundation of a therapeutic digital milieu that can balance the “selfdestructive” impulses of late capital that promote drive over desire, or, said another way,
capture over care.

Conclusion
In 2005 Stiegler initiated Ars Industrialis, a collective whose aim was to define
what a therapeutic of care means in the contemporary digital world. Lacking such
definitions, the Ars Industrialis manifesto argues, the “pharmakon necessarily becomes
toxic.” According to Stiegler, the toxic of effects of digital technics result in a shortcircuiting of the capacities for sustained attention and a severing of intergenerational
retentions necessary for public life. Gesturing towards the neoconservative revolution in
the 1980’s and its effects in the intensification of speculative capitalism, Ars Industrialis
contends that governments have largely failed to adequately intervene in industrial or
economic life and accordingly:
This means that it has totally failed to assume what is its role par
excellence, namely: encouraging the development of what, in technics in
general, and in mnemotechnics in particular, leads to the reinforcement of
society—to make of technical becoming a social future intensifying
processes of individuation by inventing forms of life, that is, of savoirvivre—and thus to struggle against the destructive, atomising and uncivil
effects which every pharmakon also and always brings with it.
While I would argue that Stiegler’s view is extreme, I do find in his work a useful frame
for reimaging a digital composition pedagogy premised on attention as an ethical
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comportment. Or, said differently, simply a pedagogy premised on care. In this context,
attention is understood to be the suasive effect of relations taking place through
distributed sites. Rather than simply the focused will of individual human actors,
attention as an emergent and distributed effect accounts for cultural and technological
forces generally viewed to be outside of, or in many cases, an impediment to attention.
Rather than interrupt, such forces compose attention. In Stiegler’s work, attention is the
composition that enables both education and its aim: enculturation. Education, as
understood conventionally and in Stiegler’s view, is impossible without gaining the
capacities of response formation that rhetoric and composition is meant to transfer.
According to Iveson, Stiegler’s “genealogical understanding of the pharmacological
nature of schooling” makes it possible to articulate vision of “‘the school’ as an
organization for the teaching of literacy as a formulator of rational, intergenerational
relations and thus as a system of care.” In the preceding pages, I have attempted to sketch
the possibility for such careful attentions within the larger context of composition studies
as a discipline and in individual composition courses by using examples from the Open
Utopia project, my own wiki-based composition course, and future iterations of machine
scoring software.
As both a text and a community, Stephen Duncombe’s Open Utopia project
presents compelling approaches for incorporating common texts for writing instruction.
The Future of the Book’s SocialBook platform allows Open Utopia to be both a
contained community of engaged readers—responding to particular moments in the text
of More’s Utopia—and continually rhizomatic in its exporting and sharing capabilities—
working to draw new connections as networks from other social media outlets are
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potentially formed. Conversations on the text, while beginning on the SocialBook, would
be progressively shifted to other sites creating a distributed marginalia across digital
space.
Similarly, the Open Utopia project’s wiki-based book, Wikitopia, allows users to
respond to More’s text in a much different way: to revise, remix, and rewrite it. On the
wiki, various cohorts are formed responding to More’s text in multiple ways. One group
works to revise More’s text for contemporary audiences—updating references, discussing
contemporary political and cultural landscapes using More’s frame—while another
cohort may be employed in rewriting the text to conform to their specific community.
Still another cohort may remix the text juxtaposing seemingly unrelated images and texts
for novel effects. In one cohort, for instance, the presence of spam text and spam links
makes for an interesting unintended commentary on the invasive techniques of
hypercapitalism. In one such case, the introduction to a cohort named “Promethealand,”
asks that “every community welcomes different individuals/groups since what is different
always challenges and stimulates creative thinking” just as a spam link appears for
advertising “Jordan heels for women.” Unintended compositions like Promethealand’s
introduction work to demonstrate how compositions are always co-compositions with
machines and institutions. In this case, the algorithmic processes of spambots scouring
the World Wide Web found a place to write a bit of code in Wikitopia’s MediaWiki
software and co-composed with human actors. While most users would simply remove
the spam, it would be would be a meaningful commentary on contemporary utopic ideals
to create a cohort just for spambot compositions. How might spambots write utopia? Are
their contributions to the Wikitopia project just as valid, though perhaps unintended by
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the space’s creators? Questions that could only be answered by providing compositional
spaces that allow for the interaction of non-human actors. While spambot activity was
actively removed from my own wiki-based First Year English courses focused on
deliberative democracy, I could see where it would have provided a novel teaching
moment to discuss the role of non-human actors in deliberative relations.
My course asked students to read a common set of texts as the foundation of
productive deliberation and conflict generation. On asynchronous discussion forums,
students questioned the implications of texts on their own ideas of democracy and
education. While ultimately unsuccessful for many reasons, students were asked to pose
difficult—and ultimately unanswerable—questions concerning the texts that were, in
turn, intended to highlight rhetoric as a lived practice. Just as the success of the Open
Utopia project is largely based on the free engagement of its users, these wiki-based
courses failed largely because discussions were obligatory and part of the grading
scaffolding of the class. Students felt uneasy discussing difficult texts in particular ways,
and, as a result, discussions were often stilted. As a result, the discussion forum rarely
generated the kind of deliberation asked for, and the consensus-building practices
necessary for the collaborative wiki-based texts were largely absent. Students discussed
and a robust wiki-based text was eventually written, but students were largely unengaged
in the project as something that concerned their own roles in civil life. Revised versions
of this course would work to intensify engagement by allowing students to define their
own relationships to democracy and education. Working from Gregory Ulmer’s notion of
experience ontology a revised version of the wiki-assignment would ask students to
explore their own affective relationships with the concepts and practices associated with
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civil life before working towards collaborative texts.
Lastly, I have tried to demonstrate how hybrid companies like LightSIDE Labs
are working to incorporate systems of care in automated assessment technologies. And,
further, how such technologies gesture towards systems of care in non-human publics.
Because LightSIDE operates simultaneously on open-source and for-profit models, they
are able to incorporate feedback and development from localized institutions and tailor
software to community needs. LightSIDE’s “revision assistant” can be customized to
individual course contexts and, from there, attempt to provide the “instant multidimensional feedback” that makes automated assessment technologies desirable.
Similarly, student feedback can be constructed from localized criteria of individual
courses and, according to LightSIDE’s website, using those rubrics, begin to “identify
and visualize the strength of student’s individual sentences, scaffolding their ability to
make their weakest contributions more like their strongest.” In this way, LightSIDE’s
software enables students to direct attention to their writing in ways they would not
otherwise. Automated assessment, if taken from its largely proprietary and high-stakes
contexts could provide students the opportunity to attend to their compositions in novel
ways.
To return to the essay that began this project, in “Hyper and Deep Attention: The
Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes” N. Katherine Hayles argues that hypermedia
and the attentional forms they promote, demand more meaningfully engaged responses
from educators. Here, I have attempted one such response in calling for composition
studies to reorient its disciplinary object towards attention. If, as I have argued, attention
is a composed assemblage taking place across many material, cultural, and conceptual
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spaces at once—how might composition studies benefit twenty-first century educational
paradigms by attending to these assemblages as their primary disciplinary object? And,
finally, what are the ethical stakes involved in redefining attention as composition? The
preceding chapters gesture towards how these questions might be addressed.
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